[Air-l] universal ethics?

[Thomas Koenig]

Hi,

I would like to offer a little comment from a "hardcore universalist":

At 01:55 28/03/2005, Charles Ess wrote:
>I think we can propose an ethics that begins in part with the universal 
>value implicit in the suggestion here that "universal" claims have all too 
>often in the past served as excuses for colonialism, imperialism, and 
>other forms of oppression and violence - namely, that tolerance for Others 
>(those whose identities, views, and practices may differ radically from 
>our own) and affiliated presumptions of human equality should be endorsed 
>exactly as the bases for criticizing claims to universality that instead 
>led to colonialism, etc.

True, (false) claims to universalism have repeatedly served to legitimize 
exclusionary politics, but there is nothing inherent in universalism, which 
leads to, say, colonialism. (Truly) particularist claims, such as racist 
ideas, also served to legitimize such politics.

More importantly though, cultural relativism/pluralism is itself a 
decidedly *universalist* value, which originates in modernist (aka 
"Western") thought. To reject universalism in favor of cultural pluralism 
is therefore self-defeating: "The assertion that cultures are 
incommensurable is in fact a transcultural claim rooted in universalistic 
philosophical thinking." (Barry, Brian S. (2001): "Culture and Equality," 
Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, p. 264).


>I would add: this tolerance is not unlimited.  Rather, I think it's quite 
>possible to endorse tolerance as a universal value - but not thereby be 
>committed to tolerating, say, fascist regimes and violent repression of 
>women and minorities.

I am sure you did not mean it that way, but let me ask for the sake of 
rhetorics: Does that mean that "repression of women and minorities" is OK, 
as long as it refrains from violence? Of course, this is a rhetorical 
question, but it shows that if we value individual autonomy, certain forms 
of repression (e.g., the exclusion of Amish children from general 
education) some would subsume under the heading of "cultural autonomy" 
might lead into conflict with core liberal/emancipatory values.

[...]


>My (admittedly characteristic mid-Western [North American]) optimism on 
>this point is fueled in part precisely by the success of the AoIR ethical 
>guidelines.

You might be sampling on the dependent variable here. I already voiced 
several times my dissent with parts of these guidelines, and I was not the 
only one on that matter, either (see, e.g., earlier thread "Google is 
watching" 
http://listserver.dreamhost.com/pipermail/air-l-aoir.org/2004-May/thread.html#5876). 
People outside the acadamy, or even outside social sciences, will rarely 
have commented on the AoIR guidelines, so it seems difficult for me to see, 
how you would establish near-universal agreement with these guidelines.

>   Admittedly, while our ethics working committee included members from 
> Malaysia and Thailand, the background for the guidelines were largely 
> derived from "Western" countries such as the U.S., the E.U., Scandinavia, 
> and the U.K.

A small interjection, as I live in the U.K.: It *is* still part of the EU 
(as is most of Scandinavia) -- sorry could not resist.

[...]


>Indeed, emerging conceptions of privacy and data privacy protection law in 
>these countries - while clearly retaining distinctive cultural "shape" in 
>their conception and application - are nonetheless recognizable cousins of 
>"Western" conceptions and laws.  This suggests that even across the 
>considerable cultural differences, say, between the U.S. and Germany, on 
>the one hand, and China, Japan, Thailand, Korea, and Hong Kong, on the 
>other - there may be agreement on basic (universal?) values such as 
>privacy, [...]

I am unsure what kind of value "privacy" is. It can only be a value with 
respect to certain domains (say, "family affairs"), but not a universal 
value as such. When it comes to the question, which *are* the domains, for 
which privacy should be granted: These cannot a priori or empirically be 
derived, at least according to Habermas' (1992, Faktiziataet und Geltung, 
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, p. 380) ethics, which I find quite reasonable on this 
point.

>But I do think that universal values may be discerned - in part, through 
>an on-going dialogue that works to critically assess any such putative 
>values, precisely with a critical eye towards how any such values might in 
>fact work in oppressive rather than liberating ways.  Indeed, I think we 
>make more progress towards some sort of shared, humane value system_s_ and 
>ethics through such dialogues, rather than giving up the effort, however 
>much previous failures and disasters might tempt us to do so.

I almost agree with this, but I think that the plural-s on systems cannot 
be sustained, because, evidently there are value systems (you mentioned 
fascism, which after all does offer a value system, even if reprehensible) 
that run against universal values that from a liberal point of view are not 
up for discussion.

Thomas

-- 

thomas koenig, ph.d.
department of social sciences, loughborough university
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/research/mmethods/staff/thomas/index.html