[Air-L] EWIS Workshop Proposal 2023

[Hedvig Ördén]

For anyone interested in disinformation/influence ops/security studies, me
and my colleagues at Lund University are putting together a workshop
proposal for EWIS 2023, 12-14 July, in Amsterdam.


*Existential Threats, Foreign Interference and Cognitive Resilience in
Times of War: The case of the European Union*

For almost a decade, the European Union has worked to counter foreign
interference
through measures aimed to enhance the ability of citizens and institutions
to withstand
malicious online influence. Existing practices for strengthening cognitive
resilience
include public diplomacy, fact checking and debunking, content flagging,
media
literacy, intelligence collection/sharing and public attribution. Such
practices are
premised on the idea of foreign interference being part of a ‘grey-zone’
conflict
conducted below the threshold of war, using nontransparent methods to
undermine the
cognitive capacities of a population. In this context, a longstanding
problematic has
furthermore been how to reconcile ends and means when safeguarding liberal
democratic values and institutions. Against this background and in the
light of the
Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, we ask: How does the
outbreak of war
in Europe redefine EU cognitive resilience practices?

This workshop seeks to address cognitive resilience practices in an
ambiguous European
security context where existential dooms-day-like threats of nuclear
annihilation and
full-scale invasion emerge alongside the long-time preoccupation with
grey-zone
activities. We hope to engage in interdisciplinary discussions on cognitive
resilience
practices in times of war and welcome security studies, critical security
studies, IR and
strategic communication scholars. The overarching aim is (1) to empirically
take stock
of emerging cognitive resilience practices in times of war, (2) to unpack
security with
regard to foreign interference in a contemporary European context, (3) to
describe and
theorize the changing relationship between justifiable ends and means, as
well as the
legitimacy of security actors, in relation to EU cognitive resilience
practices in wartime.

Potential topics include, but are not limited to: On what grounds can we
assess the
appropriateness of cognitive resilience practices in wartime? Is there a
changing
relationship between justifiable ends and means? (consider the use of
offensive
practices, employment of sanctions, the changing character of digital
diplomacy, use of
new defense technologies and surveillance capabilities, new modalities
employed by
intelligence actors, differences in addressing disinformation vs. state
propaganda, etc.)
How can we best conceptualize security and security governance in the
current European
context, and in relation to foreign interference? (conceptual discussions
on ontological
security, logics of risk/resilience/security, concepts of total defense,
comprehensive
security, but also papers drawing on innovative insights from psychology,
neuroscience,
policing, intelligence analysis). What are the implications of the changing
security
context for the legitimacy of security actors in Europe? Who should engage
in cognitive
resilience practices? (The EU vs. NATO, member states vs. EU institutions,
military/intelligence agencies vs. researchers or journalists, ‘coalitions
of the willing’,
regional vs. local, public vs. private actors, etc.)

If you are interested in joining in, please send a few short lines
summarizing your potential paper topic to *hedvig.orden at svet.lu.se
<hedvig.orden at svet.lu.se>* no later than *November 27th.*

All the best,
Hedvig