[Assam] A new politics of race: India and its Northeast
Chan Mahanta
cmahanta at charter.net
Fri Mar 3 09:32:10 PST 2006
> >Two comments:
1) First this type of of 'ethnic stereotyping' is quite typical of
any country I would say. Couple of years ago, I read a report how a
Senator from Hawaii who happens to be ethnic Japanese were harrased
and checked by Security personal till the Senator produced his
Passport etc.
*** I didn't read that Baruah indicated it to be unique to Indians.
But just because others do it, does not make it either right or
dilutes its corrosive effects. It has to be looked at in the contexts
of what is going on in the region and the corrosive Indian policies
that have been instrumental to v creating those conditions.
> >2) So let us face it. North East has been the subject of 'ethnic
>sterotypiing' by the rest of Indians. That is a fact. The question
>what the North eastern should do? That should be the question and
>that should be the discussion. I failed to see how the suggestions
>made by Baruah will solve the real problem for which a Naga student
>had to feel half Indian in Pune? Any suiggestions from any quarters?
**** WHY is it the responsibility of the Naga student to DO SOMETHING about it?
Have plastic surgery?
Let himself be treated that way? Grin and bear it?
Get the heck-out of Pune'?
>-- opening up the region on the east and the north, and encouraging
close >cross-border interaction -- can slowly change perceptions.
The region seen as >a gateway to a friendly transnational
neighbourhood will evoke very different >emotions than those of a
frontier or an "enemy territory" --
*** I don't see this as Baruah's recommendation for removing Indians'
prejudices and ignorance, but as EMPOWERING the people of the region.
Such empowerment would lead to:
* Their ability to stand up to Indians' prejudicial attitudes.
* Those who are exposed to an empowered people would begin to discard
their own prejudices.
* Empowered people can deal with others' bigotries better.
At 11:10 AM -0600 3/3/06, Rajen Barua wrote:
>Two comments:
>1) First this type of of 'ethnic stereotyping' is quite typical of
>any country I would say. Couple of years ago, I read a report how a
>Senator from Hawaii who happens to be ethnic Japanese were harrased
>and checked by Security personal till the Senator produced his
>Passport etc.
>
>2) So let us face it. North East has been the subject of 'ethnic
>sterotypiing' by the rest of Indians. That is a fact. The question
>what the North eastern should do? That should be the question and
>that should be the discussion. I failed to see how the suggestions
>made by Baruah will solve the real problem for which a Naga student
>had to feel half Indian in Pune? Any suiggestions from any quarters?
>
>RB
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: <mailto:malabikabrahma at yahoo.co.uk>Malabika Brahma
>To: <mailto:cmahanta at charter.net>Chan Mahanta ;
><mailto:assam at assamnet.org>assam at assamnet.org
>Cc: <mailto:baruah at bard.edu>baruah at bard.edu
>Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 10:39 AM
>Subject: Re: [Assam] A new politics of race: India and its Northeast
>
>Interesting article.
>
>Once I was a guest at my cousins place at an Indian Navy base where
>he was the Commander ( INS Shivaji at Lonawala to be precise). I
>had stepped out and while on the way back was stopped by the sentry.
>When I told him where I was headed to and that I was a guest of
>their Commander. After he checked the papers and records, he
>mentioned to another " Yeh Chini Commander Ka Mehmaan Hein' ( He is
>a guest of the Chinese Commander)
>
>
>Chan Mahanta <<mailto:cmahanta at charter.net>cmahanta at charter.net> wrote:
>
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>Dear Netters:
>
>The following is a very interesting and enlightening article by
>Sanjib Baruah. He was hesitant to post it to assamnet because of its
>length. But I felt it something we cannot afford to miss.So here it
>comes.
>
>The emphasis on bell hooks' name is mine, so people don't miss it. I did.
>
>cm
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>IIC Quarterly (New Delhi: India International Centre)
>Vol. 32 (2& 3) Winter, 2005) pp. 165-76
>A new politics of race: India and its Northeast
>Sanjib Baruah
>There was a time when peoples of Northeast India were described as
>belonging to the Mongoloid race. Today Mongoloid and other racial
>categories such as Negroid or Caucasoid -- and indeed, the very idea
>of race as a biological category -- have no standing in scientific
>circles. For there is more diversity of gene types within what was
>once thought of as a single 'race' than between 'races.'
>
>But while race may no longer be accepted as a scientific category,
>it does not mean that human beings would stop making distinctions
>based on stereotypical phenotypes or skin colour. Arunachalis,
>Assamese, Garos, Khasis, Manipuris, Mizos, Nagas and Tripuris may
>indeed have some phenotypical similarities related to genetics. Thus
>one may be able to say that someone is from Northeast India based on
>looks, though he or she may not always get it right. For "human
>populations . . possess a wide genetic potential which increases in
>variation through chance mutations or new generic combinations in
>each generation. . . . Completely stabilized breeding isolates. . .
>are exceedingly rare" (Bowles 1977, cited in Keyes, 2002: 1166).
>And of course, most of us realise that what we think of as the
>'Northeastern looks' are not unique to peoples from the region. For
>instance, peoples from the western Himalayas -- those from Nepal or
>the Uttaranchal -- might share features similar to those found among
>peoples in the eastern Himalayas.
>
>Race as a social category is the product of practices. There are
>visual regimes of labeling, and individuals encountering those
>labels from childhood may internalise characteristics associated
>with those labels and learn to adapt to the socially constructed
>racial order.
>
>African American intellectuals have long recognised the role of
>visuality in the politics of race. The writer bell hooks -- even her
>way of writing her name without capital letters is an intervention
>in the regime of visuality -- describes her project as one of
>'resisting representation' and of constructing an 'oppositional
>gaze.' "We experience our collective crisis as African-American
>people," she writes, "within the realm of the image" (hooks, 1992).
>The project of black liberation, for her, is thus a battle over
>images.
>The Indian image of the troubled Northeast is increasingly mediated
>by a visual regime constructed by popular films, television,
>pictures in magazines and newspapers, and limited contacts with
>people from the region. Thanks to improved communications, Indians
>today are quite mobile, and Northeasterners travel to other parts of
>the country more than ever before. There are a large number of
>students from the region in Delhi, Bangalore, Mumbai, Pune, Kolkata
>and other cities. They are now a 'visible minority' in a number of
>university campuses. A disturbingly large number of them tell
>stories about their experiences of being racially labeled as
>'Chapta' (flat nosed), 'Oriental' or 'Chinky'.
>A large number of Northeast Indian young women are employed in
>upscale restaurants and shops in Delhi - their 'Oriental' looks and
>English language skills being considered desirable for those
>positions. Many of them live in ethnic ghettos, for instance,
>renting rooms and apartments in 'lal dora' areas: the urban villages
>of Delhi. Apart from rents being affordable, they feel physically
>safer than in upscale neighbourhoods. Compared to landlords in elite
>neighbourhoods, these landlords of more modest means are tolerant of
>Northeast Indian eating habits -- fermented dry fish, beef chutney
>and pork -- and less inclined to impose restrictions on the
>lifestyles of their tenants. However, racially marked niches in the
>labour market or in settlement patterns have the danger of
>reinforcing racial thinking. Incidents of violence against Northeast
>Indian women in the country's capital may partly reflect the
>racialisation of the divide between the mainland and the Northeast.
>While many Northeasterners travel to the mainland, thousands of
>Indian soldiers and members of the various paramilitary
>organisations make the reverse journey to the region to fight
>external threats as well as on counter-insurgency duties. In the
>streets and paddy fields of the region security forces stop and
>interrogate Northeasterners every day. The soldier himself faces an
>unenviable situation: the most peaceful of surroundings can quickly
>turn hostile and he has to be alert against possible offensives by
>militants. Some sort of racial profiling becomes inevitable under
>these conditions, especially since we have no laws prohibiting it.
>As Indian soldiers return home, their stories of 'treacherous'
>rebels hiding behind bamboo groves and jungles spread through
>friends and relatives. The shared visual regime provides ways of
>putting those stories and faces together.
>Northeast India's fractured relation with the mainland has been
>described as a cultural gap, an economic gap, a psychological gap
>and an emotional gap. The shared visual regime now carries the
>danger of this fault-line becoming racialised.
>II
>Mani Ratnam's film of 1998 Dil Se is a love story between a woman
>militant from the Northeast and an All India Radio journalist. The
>male protagonist Amar, played by Shah Rukh Khan, travels to the
>Northeast to speak to fellow citizens for a radio programme to
>celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of India's independence. He
>develops a relationship with a local woman Meghna, played by the
>Nepalese-born Manisha Koirala.
>If Bollywood gossip is to be believed, Manisha Koirala was chosen
>for the role partly because of her 'small eyes.' Director Mani
>Ratnam, according to Aishwarya Rai, "definitely wanted a small-eyed
>girl in Dil Se. She had to have that kind of physical features as
>she was supposed to be from Assam" (Rai, 2000). The caste of Dil Se
>also included a number of Assamese actors, among them filmmaker
>Gautam Bora, who played the role of the chief of a militant group.
>The film's story unfolds between the fiftieth anniversary in of
>Indian independence on August 15th 1997 and the Republic Day on
>January 26th. While All India Radio reporter Amar embodies the
>Indian nation, Meghna represents the horrors of life in the
>Northeast torn apart by insurgencies and counter-insurgency
>operations. Amar defends the nation against rebels bent on tearing
>it apart.
>The Northeast of Dil Se is a dangerous place where women are raped
>and families are destroyed. Life in Delhi could not be more
>different: the film portrays it as a middle class city where
>tranquil family life and traditional family values prevail. Meghna
>in the nation's capital is a danger to both nation and family. She
>is on a suicide mission to blow herself up at the Republic day
>parade. As a guest at Amar's home she is an awkward presence at a
>time when the family prepares for his arranged marriage. "Had it
>not been for the army, the nation would have been torn to shreds,"
>says Amar to Meghna. It is "your nation, not mine," says Meghna in
>defiance.
>III
>Am I making too much out of a film? Perhaps. But what if we are
>beginning to look at people from the Northeast through the prism of
>a visual regime exemplified by films like Dil Se? What if after
>nearly half a century of counter-insurgency, the counter-insurgent
>gaze is framing our way of seeing peoples from the Northeast?
>Films like Dil Se and pictures in newspapers and magazines enable
>people to put together a mental picture of the Northeast and its
>people. The gaze of the Indian army patrol, reinforced by films
>like Dil Se, gives meaning to what is fast becoming a racial divide.
>There are signs that we are slowly beginning to recognise this new
>politics of race, though we seem to be as yet unsure whether to use
>the 'r' word. A Manipuri journalist wrote in a national daily that,
>"physically the people of the North-east are closer to Southeast
>Asia and China." However, "this racial divide," he said, is not
>appreciated "in a sensitive manner" (Singh, 2004). The journalist
>told me that the 'r' word was edited out at one place in the printed
>version. He had actually written, "racially the people of the
>Northeast are closer to South-east Asia and China." Apparently the
>editors substituted the term 'physical' for 'racial.' However, his
>second usage of the 'r' word -- in racial divide - remained in the
>published text.
>Let me turn to a small sample of writings by Northeasterners who
>have been students in mainland India, recalling their experience of
>being seen as different and encountering racial labels. "I did my
>schooling in a boarding school in India," recalls a Manipuri living
>in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. He was the only student from the
>Northeast in that school. He posted the following on an email
>discussion group:
>Being the only minority I was subjected to many racist comments . .
>. The one that I still remember clearly was my being called "Chapta"
>(flat nose - for those fortunate ones that never heard the term) by
>my Hindi teacher. The word "chinki" . . . is peddled around with not
>even a little thought of whether the term could offend someone, by
>even my closest friends. I came in contact with some Mayangs (the
>Manipuri term for other Indians) here and it shocked me that despite
>my being there amongst them they refer to the other Asians as
>chaptas still with no consideration that I could find it offensive.
>Even on my bringing up the issue they just laughed it off saying
>they saw nothing offensive in it. So I have now resorted to
>referring them as "Pakis" and that really seems to anger them. For
>those who don't know about it, "Pakis" is a racist term used in
>Britain to refer to people with the sub continent features
>(Pakistan, Indian, Srilankan etc.) So the next time you hear any
>mayang using the word chinki or chapta, call them a "Paki". I think
>once this word gets common usage as a term to refer to them by all
>the people of the north east they will finally realize what it is
>like to be referred by a racist term (Manipur Diaspora, 2004; cited
>in Ray 2005).
>In Kuala Lumpur, he wrote, because of his features he had a hard
>time convincing people that he was an Indian. He got tired of
>explaining that he was from India since he "didn't look like the
>Indians they knew." On the other hand, he said, he was "able to
>melt into the crowd and it was easier making friends with the
>Chinese and Malays" (Manipur Diaspora, 2004; cited in Ray 2005).
>
>At a seminar in Pune a Naga student joked that after coming to Pune
>he became "half Naga, and half Indian", while he was "a complete
>Indian" before. He elaborated that in Pune, shopkeepers, doctors,
>teachers and government officials, everybody treated him as Japanese
>or Chinese because of his features. He was asked to show his
>passport when applying for admission to college (cited in Das,
>2004). While doing fieldwork in Manipur, anthropologist Sohini Ray
>asked a young student about his first visit to Mumbai. He told her
>that "the first thing he and his companions found difficult was that
>every other person asked them where they were from, and stared at
>them." When they said Manipur, people asked where it was and if it
>was really in India. To avoid such uncomfortable encounters after a
>few days they started saying that they were from Thailand, because
>"it was more convenient" (cited in Ray, 2005).
>
>An Assamese woman describes her first year as a student in Delhi
>University (1996-97), as follows: "I didn't look 'Oriental' - the
>politically correct term they'd devised in lieu of the derogatory
>sounding 'chinky'. So I didn't have to face some of the stupider
>questions. My friend from Mizoram was asked if she needed a passport
>to come to India." The 'Oriental' looking among us," did not have to
>go through hazing, she recalled since "Indians are always nice to
>foreigners" (Goswami, 2004).
>
>IV
>
>The emergence of a racial label to include all 'indigenous'
>Northeasterners fits nicely with the category 'the Northeast' that
>since 1971, in the words of a retired senior civil servant who
>played a key role in designing this political order, has "emerged as
>a significant administrative concept . . . replacing the hitherto
>more familiar unit of public imagination, Assam" (Singh, 1987a: 8).
>In 1971 a number of the new states were created (though not all of
>them were states at the beginning), and another piece of legislation
>gave birth to the North Eastern Council (NEC). These two laws were
>'twins born out of a new vision for the Northeast' (Singh, 1987a:
>117).
>
>Unlike the distinction between tribal and non-tribal that is an
>important part of our vocabulary in discussing the Northeast, the
>racial label has the advantage of including all those who belong to
>the troubled region, and, is perceived as being connected to the
>troubles. For instance, a majority of the plains people of Manipur
>and Assam are not "tribal" which, after all, is an arbitrary
>governmental category. However, the Assamese and Manipuri
>insurgencies are among the most potent in the region. Thus the
>distinction between tribal and non-tribal is not very useful when it
>comes to discussing insurgent Northeast India. Since tribal and
>non-tribal Northeasterners share certain stereotypical phenotypes in
>common, the racial label has become more functional.
>
>The racial label incorporates meanings that predate the era of
>insurgency and counter-insurgency. Willem van Schendel, writing
>mainly with Bangladesh and the Chittagong Hill Tracts in mind,
>comments on the "remarkably stagnant view of the hill people" that
>has prevailed in South Asia. The classic nineteenth century Western
>assumptions about social evolution from a state of savagery to
>civilisation were superimposed on the ancient South Asian
>distinction between civilised society and nature. The later
>distinction, indicated in the categories grama (village) and aranya
>(forest), implies a relationship that is complementary but always
>unequal. These two traditions, writes van Schendel, combined to
>generate a dominant view that considers the tribal peoples as
>remnants of some "hoary past who have preserved their culture
>unchanged from time immemorial. Backward and childlike, they need to
>be protected, educated and disciplined by those who are more
>advanced socially" (van Schendel, 1995: 128). The visual label of
>race that transcends the colonial categories of tribal and
>non-tribal and reaches out to pre-colonial categories such as the
>Kirata people -- used to describe the people of the periphery - may
>now give a new lease of life some old Indian prejudices.
>
>Responsible Indian officials have from time to time used the
>metaphor of children to describe the peoples of Northeast India. In
>February 2004 the Mizoram Governor A.R. Kohli described the entire
>region as a spoilt child. Contrary to the charge that the Northeast
>is "the most neglected region," he said it is "in fact, the most
>spoilt child in the country." The central government, he said,
>"showers funds and other goodies" liberally on the region. But the
>funds are not properly utilized or they do not reach the intended
>beneficiaries. A news report paraphrased the Governor as comparing
>the region "to a petulant child who is showered with goodies but
>does not know what to do with them" (Telegraph 2004).
>
>Such sentiments are also found in the language used by B.P. Singh -
>the former civil servant who played a key role in the creating the
>Northeast as an administrative category. In an article published in
>1987, he concluded:
>
>There is no tangible threat to the national integration ethos in the
>region despite the operation of certain disgruntled elements within
>the region and outside the country. But in the context of a history
>of limited socialization and ethnic conflicts, and rapid
>modernization after 1947 the unruly class-room scenario is likely to
>continue in the region for years to come (Singh, 1987b: 281-82).
>
> "Unruly class-room" is a telling metaphor. In the Northeast, Singh
>seems to imply, what is needed is a paternalistic and disciplinarian
>teacher - someone who knows what is good for children and,
>occasionally uses the stick for their own good, the role that he
>probably sees the coercive apparatus of the Indian state playing in
>the region.
>
>These passages smack of attitudes and habits of mind that long
>predate the politics of counter-insurgency. But while these
>prejudices are old, they have acquired new meaning in the context of
>India's failed policies in the Northeast. While Singh's metaphor of
>an "unruly class-room" rationalises the coercive response to
>insurgency, Kohli's description of the region as a "spoilt child"
>expresses the frustration with the failures of a policy of
>nation-building through corruption or what Jairam Ramesh calls
>"using corruption as a mode of cohesion" (Ramesh, 2005: 18).
>V
>What are the some of the consequences of the racialisation of the
>divide between India and its Northeast?
>1, Motivation for militancy: According to Manipuri intellectual and
>politician Gangmumei Kamei, a major motivation for joining insurgent
>groups in Manipur is the social discrimination that young Manipuris
>face in different parts of India because of their appearance (cited
>in Ray 2005). Race has been a factor in the Meitei religious
>revival movement of the 1940s as well. Some revivalists converted to
>the newly formed faith "only after returning from pilgrimages to
>Mathura and Brindavan, where their Southeast Asian features raised
>curiosity and animosity among the local population." The racial
>divide, according to anthropologist Sohini Ray, is central to
>understanding the Meitei urge for constructing an alternative
>history. A constituency for an alternative geneology emerged when
>"the whole idea of sharing a common ancestry with the people who are
>hostile to them for their looks" became unacceptable (Ray 2005).
>2. Perpetuating a divide: While official narratives about
>counter-insurgency view each Northeastern insurgency as distinct;
>the racial label disrupts this narrative. As a result the
>differences between political conditions in different parts of the
>Northeast have no effect on popular perceptions about the
>'disturbed' region, since racial thinking do not allow for such
>distinctions. For instance, the Mizo insurgency that ended with a
>peace accord in 1986 is usually portrayed as a success story. Yet
>that does not mean that Mizo relations with mainland India are any
>different from that with other parts of the Northeast. Even today
>Mizos such as Laltluangliana Khiangte complain about mainstream
>India not understanding their culture and traditions, and about
>Mizos being mistaken as South-east Asian tourists in the national
>capital (cited in Singh, 2004). After nearly two decades of a
>peaceful Mizoram, as Manipuri journalist Khogen Singh puts it, Mizos
>"still don't feel fully at home outside the North-east" (Singh,
>2004).
>3. Hijacking of counter-insurgency: There is evidence that the
>racial divide sometimes subverts counter-insurgency operations and
>they get hijacked for other purposes. For instance, it was reported
>that in the Karbi Anglong district of Assam, Indian security forces,
>ostensibly there to deal with the security threat posed by
>insurgencies, became partisans in local land conflicts between
>tribal Karbi and Hindi-speaking settlers. The settlers whom Karbis
>refer to as Biharis had over time acquired informal control over
>what is formally designated as public lands and had consolidated a
>"considerable amount of economic and political power." They now
>seek formal change in the status of those lands and formal land
>titles (MASS 2002, 11-13). In Karbi Anglong's ethnic configuration
>and the growth of insurgency, the loss of land by Karbis to
>"Biharis" is a factor. Many Karbi young people have come under the
>influence of the United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS). But
>in local armed land conflicts, because of racial solidarity,
>"Bihari" settlers have occasionally secured the informal backing of
>Indian security personnel stationed in the area to fight the UPDS
>(MASS, 2002: 21).
>4. Facilitating militarisation: The racial divide facilitates the
>relentless militarisation of the region. Consider for instance, the
>recommendation to strengthen Indian military presence in Manipur
>made by E.N. Rammohan -- a senior Indian police official, who was
>Advisor to the Governor of Manipur. In order to stop the
>penetration of the government departments by militants, Rammohan
>recommended that battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force
>(CRPF) should guard all government offices and the residential
>neighborhoods housing central and state government officials in the
>state. Furthermore, he recommended that ten battalions of the
>Central Para-Military Force (CPMF) be deployed in the Manipur Valley
>in a "counter-insurgency grid", and six to eight battalions be
>deployed in each hills district, where roads are few, with
>"helicopter support to effectively dominate them" (Rammohan, 2002:
>15). Were it not for the racial fault-line it is unlikely that such
>policy options would have been seriously considered.
>
>5. Legitimisation of corruption: The leakage of funds allocated for
>Northeast India's development can be best described as insurgency
>dividend. The figures are staggering. Jairam Ramesh estimates that
>the annual expenditure of the Government of India on the eight
>states of Northeast India, including Sikkim, is about 30, 000 crores
>a year. With the region's population at about 32 million, he
>estimates that the Government annually spends about 10,000 rupees
>per person in the Northeast. This money is not going for
>development. In Ramesh's words, it is going to
>
>ensure cohesiveness of this society with the rest of India through a
>series of interlocutors who happen to be politicians, expatriate
>contractors, extortionists, anybody but people working to deliver
>benefits to the people for whom these expenditures are intended.
>
>A surer way of improving the economic conditions of the intended
>beneficiaries, he suggests, might be for the Indian government to
>open bank accounts and deposit an annual cheque of Rs. 10,000 for
>every poor family in the Northeast (Ramesh, 2005: 18-19).
>
>The racial divide facilitates the sharing of the insurgency dividend
>between local political and bureaucratic elites and outside
>contractors and suppliers. Not unlike western businessmen who
>justify bribing politicians and bureaucrats in the Third World in
>terms of local norms, the image of the Northeast and its people in
>this new visual regime is that of a modern frontier where corruption
>is just a part of the natural landscape. Even the "chinky" students
>from the Northeast in Delhi, after all, appear more "modern,"
>"westernized" and affluent than many of their mainland peers
>apparently confirming the corruption-friendly image of the region.
>It is hardly surprising that when it comes to doing business in the
>region 'make a fast buck and run' appears to have become accepted
>practice. Even today's much-lowered levels of inhibition and moral
>compunctions do not apply to India's modern but wild Northeast
>Frontier.
>VI
>Things did not have to turn out this way. As an Arunachali minister
>once said at a meeting in Mumbai, "Why can't you think that in a big
>country like ours a few people may even look Chinese? Come to
>Arunachal Pradesh, he said, people in areas bordering China will
>greet you by saying Jai Hind" (cited in Das, 2004).
>In everyday conversations Northeasterners resist mainland India's
>representation of the region. But intellectuals, artists and
>activists will have to develop what bell hooks calls an oppositional
>gaze. Khasi commentator Patricia Mukhim believes that because of its
>geographical location policy makers in Delhi think of the Northeast
>primarily in terms of its "strategic importance." The region, she
>suggests, is treated as "enemy territory, which needs to be subdued
>by force." But "you cannot buy allegiance with force," she warns
>and calls for 'an entirely new approach' to the region (Mukhim,
>2004).
>A new approach must start with the domain of representation. Our
>policies have an impact on the way the Northeast and its people are
>represented. For instance, softening our international borders --
>opening up the region on the east and the north, and encouraging
>close cross-border interaction -- can slowly change perceptions.
>The region seen as a gateway to a friendly transnational
>neighbourhood will evoke very different emotions than those of a
>frontier or an "enemy territory" -- a danger zone where foreign and
>domestic enemies conspire against the Indian nation. Policies could
>transform the Southeast Asia within India into a dynamic gateway to
>the Southeast Asia of world political maps. This could be the
>foundation for a new social contract between India and its
>Northeast. This could radically change what it means to look
>Northeastern in India. The battle for the future of Northeast India
>is also a battle over images.
>References:
>Bowles, Gordon 1977. The People of Asia. New York: Scribner.
>
>Das, Arup Jyoti. 2004. "The Half-Indians" (Unpublished essay)
>Goswami, Uddipana 2004 "Misrecognition" (Unpublished essay)
>hooks, bell 1992. Black Looks: Race and Representation. Cambridge,
>MA: South End Press
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