[Assam] A new politics of race: India and its Northeast

[Ram Sarangapani]

Hi Utpal,
>Interesting article.

Yes, but quite frankly, I couldn't figure out where exactly SB was trying to
prove in this whole exercise.

The disconnect that SB seems to be pounding upon is plan common human
nature. Recently, a friend of mine (he read it somewhere) was telling me if
the whole world were to become uniform in race/color/creed etc, within 2
hours the human race would find other differences - like height,weight,
place etc to differentiate.

Even in a "homogeneous" place like Assam, we differentiate. The
words dhekeri, ujonia, upper/lower Assam, mia, bamoon, xuhdir, tribal,
non-tribal, bongals, Marwari, Nalbaria, Borpetia, gaonlia are usually used
as demeaning terms and often by educated people.
Over and above that SB himself illustrates "The settlers whom Karbis refer
to as Biharis" and of  "I came in contact with some Mayangs (the Manipuri
term for other Indians) "

So, the racial look-downs that SB does not just exist in other states, but
also very much alive within the NE, and even within sub-sections of
individual states.

And SB's reference to Dil Se (the movie) is a streach. And of course
Ayeshwara Rai's (the social scientist) take on Mani Ratnam choosing Manisha
Koirala is indeed research worthy! Could it be possible that Rai was upset
she didn't get the part?

While some people will always try and put down others by such
differentiations, most educated Indians will not do it. And most such
references (as in Utpal's case) are not done as put-downs.

The references to "requiring passports" or "which country are you from?" are
usually  said by ignorant people. Utpal too knows that it was the uneducated
sentry who probably has no clues where anyone is from - that fact that Utpal
(and his brother) look different is sufficient for him. However, I am sure
the other officers would regard Utpal's brother as a colleague and a friend
and his appearance never became a factor.

I am sorry, this seems to yet another attempt to justify (in a round about
way) why the NE needs to be independent by trying to give snippets here and
there of a supposedly huge chasm that exists between the "mainland" and the
NE.

In IMHO, the more NE people travel, work and settle down in other parts of
the country, the fewer will be these incidents.

--Ram da


On 3/3/06, Malabika Brahma <malabikabrahma at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
>  Interesting article.
>
> Once I was a guest at my cousins place at an Indian Navy base where he was
> the Commander ( INS Shivaji at Lonawala to be precise).  I had stepped out
> and while on the way back was stopped by the sentry. When I told him where I
> was headed to and that I was a guest of their Commander. After he checked
> the papers and records, he mentioned to another " Yeh Chini Commander Ka
> Mehmaan Hein' ( He is a guest of the Chinese Commander)
>
>
> *Chan Mahanta <cmahanta at charter.net>* wrote:
>
>
>
> Dear Netters:
>
>
> The following is a very interesting and enlightening article by Sanjib
> Baruah. He was hesitant to post it to assamnet because of its length. But I
> felt it something we cannot afford to miss.So here it comes.
>
>
> The emphasis on* bell hooks'* name is mine, so people don't miss it. I
> did.
>
>
> cm
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> IIC Quarterly (New Delhi: India International Centre)
> Vol. 32 (2& 3) Winter, 2005) pp. 165-76
> A new politics of race: India and its Northeast
> Sanjib Baruah
> There was a time when peoples of Northeast India were described as
> belonging to the Mongoloid race.  Today Mongoloid and other racial
> categories such as Negroid or Caucasoid -- and indeed, the very idea of race
> as a biological category -- have no standing in scientific circles. For
> there is more diversity of gene types within what was once thought of as a
> single 'race' than between 'races.'
>
> But while race may no longer be accepted as a scientific category, it does
> not mean that human beings would stop making distinctions based on
> stereotypical phenotypes or skin colour. Arunachalis, Assamese, Garos,
> Khasis, Manipuris, Mizos, Nagas and Tripuris may indeed have some
> phenotypical similarities related to genetics. Thus one may be able to say
> that someone is from Northeast India based on looks, though he or she may
> not always get it right. For "human populations . . . possess a wide genetic
> potential which increases in variation through chance mutations or new
> generic combinations in each generation. . . . Completely stabilized
> breeding isolates. . . are exceedingly rare"  (Bowles 1977, cited in Keyes,
> 2002: 1166).  And of course, most of us realise that what we think of as the
> 'Northeastern looks' are not unique to peoples from the region.  For
> instance, peoples from the western Himalayas -- those from Nepal or the
> Uttaranchal -- might share features similar to those found among peoples in
> the eastern Himalayas.
>
> Race as a social category is the product of practices. There are visual
> regimes of labeling, and individuals encountering those labels from
> childhood may internalise characteristics associated with those labels and
> learn to adapt to the socially constructed racial order.
>
> African American intellectuals have long recognised the role of visuality
> in the politics of race. The writer* bell hooks* -- even her way of
> writing her name without capital letters is an intervention in the regime of
> visuality -- describes her project as one of 'resisting representation' and
> of constructing an 'oppositional gaze.' "We experience our collective crisis
> as African-American people," she writes, "within the realm of the image"
> (hooks, 1992).  The project of black liberation, for her, is thus a battle
> over images.
> The Indian image of the troubled Northeast is increasingly mediated by a
> visual regime constructed by popular films, television, pictures in
> magazines and newspapers, and limited contacts with people from the region.
> Thanks to improved communications, Indians today are quite mobile, and
> Northeasterners travel to other parts of the country more than ever before.
> There are a large number of students from the region in Delhi, Bangalore,
> Mumbai, Pune, Kolkata and other cities.  They are now a 'visible minority'
> in a number of university campuses.  A disturbingly large number of them
> tell stories about their experiences of being racially labeled as 'Chapta'
> (flat nosed), 'Oriental' or 'Chinky'.
> A large number of Northeast Indian young women are employed in upscale
> restaurants and shops in Delhi - their 'Oriental' looks and English language
> skills being considered desirable for those positions.  Many of them live in
> ethnic ghettos, for instance, renting rooms and apartments in 'lal dora'
> areas: the urban villages of Delhi. Apart from rents being affordable, they
> feel physically safer than in upscale neighbourhoods. Compared to landlords
> in elite neighbourhoods, these landlords of more modest means are tolerant
> of Northeast Indian eating habits -- fermented dry fish, beef chutney and
> pork -- and less inclined to impose restrictions on the lifestyles of their
> tenants. However, racially marked niches in the labour market or in
> settlement patterns have the danger of reinforcing racial thinking.
> Incidents of violence against Northeast Indian women in the country's
> capital may partly reflect the racialisation of the divide between the
> mainland and the Northeast.
> While many Northeasterners travel to the mainland, thousands of Indian
> soldiers and members of the various paramilitary organisations make the
> reverse journey to the region to fight external threats as well as on
> counter-insurgency duties.  In the streets and paddy fields of the region
> security forces stop and interrogate Northeasterners every day.  The soldier
> himself faces an unenviable situation: the most peaceful of surroundings can
> quickly turn hostile and he has to be alert against possible offensives by
> militants.  Some sort of racial profiling becomes inevitable under these
> conditions, especially since we have no laws prohibiting it.  As Indian
> soldiers return home, their stories of 'treacherous' rebels hiding behind
> bamboo groves and jungles spread through friends and relatives. The shared
> visual regime provides ways of putting those stories and faces together.
> Northeast India's fractured relation with the mainland has been described
> as a cultural gap, an economic gap, a psychological gap and an emotional
> gap. The shared visual regime now carries the danger of this fault-line
> becoming racialised.
> II
> Mani Ratnam's film of 1998 Dil Se is a love story between a woman militant
> from the Northeast and an All India Radio journalist. The male protagonist
> Amar, played by Shah Rukh Khan, travels to the Northeast to speak to fellow
> citizens for a radio programme to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of
> India's independence.  He develops a relationship with a local woman Meghna,
> played by the Nepalese-born Manisha Koirala.
> If Bollywood gossip is to be believed, Manisha Koirala was chosen for the
> role partly because of her 'small eyes.' Director Mani Ratnam, according to
> Aishwarya Rai, "definitely wanted a small-eyed girl in Dil Se. She had to
> have that kind of physical features as she was supposed to be from Assam"
> (Rai, 2000).  The caste of Dil Se also included a number of Assamese actors,
> among them filmmaker Gautam Bora, who played the role of the chief of a
> militant group.
> The film's story  unfolds between the fiftieth anniversary in of Indian
> independence on August 15th 1997 and the Republic Day on January 26th.
> While All India Radio reporter Amar embodies the Indian nation, Meghna
> represents the horrors of life in the Northeast torn apart by insurgencies
> and counter-insurgency operations.  Amar defends the nation against rebels
> bent on tearing it apart.
> The Northeast of Dil Se is a dangerous place where women are raped and
> families are destroyed. Life in Delhi could not be more different: the film
> portrays it as a middle class city where tranquil family life and
> traditional family values prevail.  Meghna in the nation's capital is a
> danger to both nation and family.  She is on a suicide mission to blow
> herself up at the Republic day parade.  As a guest at Amar's home she is an
> awkward presence at a time when the family prepares for his arranged
> marriage.  "Had it not been for the army, the nation would have been torn to
> shreds," says Amar to Meghna. It is "your nation, not mine," says Meghna in
> defiance.
> III
> Am I making too much out of a film? Perhaps. But what if we are beginning
> to look at people from the Northeast through the prism of a visual regime
> exemplified by films like Dil Se? What if after nearly half a century of
> counter-insurgency, the counter-insurgent gaze is framing our way of seeing
> peoples from the Northeast?
> Films like Dil Se and pictures in newspapers and magazines enable people
> to put together a mental picture of the Northeast and its people.  The gaze
> of the Indian army patrol, reinforced by films like Dil Se, gives meaning to
> what is fast becoming a racial divide.
> There are signs that we are slowly beginning to recognise this new
> politics of race, though we seem to be as yet unsure whether to use the 'r'
> word.  A Manipuri journalist wrote in a national daily that, "physically the
> people of the North-east are closer to Southeast Asia and China." However,
> "this racial divide," he said, is not appreciated "in a sensitive manner"
> (Singh, 2004). The journalist told me that the 'r' word was edited out at
> one place in the printed version. He had actually written, "racially the
> people of the Northeast are closer to South-east Asia and China." Apparently
> the editors substituted the term 'physical' for 'racial.'  However, his
> second usage of the 'r' word -- in racial divide - remained in the published
> text.
> Let me turn to a small sample of writings by Northeasterners who have been
> students in mainland India, recalling their experience of being seen as
> different and encountering racial labels.  "I did my schooling in a boarding
> school in India," recalls a Manipuri living in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. He
> was the only student from the Northeast in that school.  He posted the
> following on an email discussion group:
> Being the only minority I was subjected to many racist comments . . . The
> one that I still remember clearly was my being called "Chapta" (flat nose -
> for those fortunate ones that never heard the term) by my Hindi teacher. The
> word "chinki" . . . is peddled around with not even a little thought of
> whether the term could offend someone, by even my closest friends. I came in
> contact with some Mayangs (the Manipuri term for other Indians) here and it
> shocked me that despite my being there amongst them they refer to the other
> Asians as chaptas still with no consideration that I could find it
> offensive. Even on my bringing up the issue they just laughed it off saying
> they saw nothing offensive in it. So I have now resorted to referring them
> as "Pakis" and that really seems to anger them. For those who don't know
> about it, "Pakis" is a racist term used in Britain to refer to people with
> the sub continent features (Pakistan, Indian, Srilankan etc.) So the next
> time you hear any mayang using the word chinki or chapta, call them a
> "Paki". I think once this word gets common usage as a term to refer to them
> by all the people of the north east they will finally realize what it is
> like to be referred by a racist term (Manipur Diaspora, 2004; cited in Ray
> 2005).
> In Kuala Lumpur, he wrote, because of his features he had a hard time
> convincing people that he was an Indian. He got tired of explaining that he
> was from India since he "didn't look like the Indians they knew."  On the
> other hand, he said, he was "able to melt into the crowd and it was easier
> making friends with the Chinese and Malays" (Manipur Diaspora, 2004; cited
> in Ray 2005).
>
> At a seminar in Pune a Naga student joked that after coming to Pune he
> became "half Naga, and half Indian", while he was "a complete Indian"
> before. He elaborated that in Pune, shopkeepers, doctors, teachers and
> government officials, everybody treated him as Japanese or Chinese because
> of his features. He was asked to show his passport when applying for
> admission to college  (cited in Das, 2004). While doing fieldwork in
> Manipur, anthropologist Sohini Ray asked a young student about his first
> visit to Mumbai. He told her that "the first thing he and his companions
> found difficult was that every other person asked them where they were from,
> and stared at them." When they said Manipur, people asked where it was and
> if it was really in India. To avoid such uncomfortable encounters after a
> few days they started saying that they were from Thailand, because "it was
> more convenient" (cited in Ray, 2005).
>
> An Assamese woman describes her first year as a student in Delhi
> University (1996-97), as follows: "I didn't look 'Oriental' - the
> politically correct term they'd devised in lieu of the derogatory sounding
> 'chinky'. So I didn't have to face some of the stupider questions. My friend
> from Mizoram was asked if she needed a passport to come to India." The
> 'Oriental' looking among us," did not have to go through hazing, she
> recalled since "Indians are always nice to foreigners" (Goswami, 2004).
>
> IV
>
> The emergence of a racial label to include all 'indigenous'
> Northeasterners fits nicely with the category 'the Northeast' that since
> 1971, in the words of a retired senior civil servant who played a key role
> in designing this political order, has "emerged as a significant
> administrative concept . . . replacing the hitherto more familiar unit of
> public imagination, Assam" (Singh, 1987a: 8).  In 1971 a number of the new
> states were created (though not all of them were states at the beginning),
> and another piece of legislation gave birth to the North Eastern Council
> (NEC).  These two laws were 'twins born out of a new vision for the
> Northeast' (Singh, 1987a: 117).
>
> Unlike the distinction between tribal and non-tribal that is an important
> part of our vocabulary in discussing the Northeast, the racial label has the
> advantage of including all those who belong to the troubled region, and, is
> perceived as being connected to the troubles.  For instance, a majority of
> the plains people of Manipur and Assam are not "tribal" which, after all, is
> an arbitrary governmental category. However, the Assamese and Manipuri
> insurgencies are among the most potent in the region. Thus the distinction
> between tribal and non-tribal is not very useful when it comes to discussing
> insurgent Northeast India. Since tribal and non-tribal Northeasterners share
> certain stereotypical phenotypes in common, the racial label has become more
> functional.
>
> The racial label incorporates meanings that predate the era of insurgency
> and counter-insurgency.  Willem van Schendel, writing mainly with Bangladesh
> and the Chittagong Hill Tracts in mind, comments on the "remarkably stagnant
> view of the hill people" that has prevailed in South Asia.  The classic
> nineteenth century Western assumptions about social evolution from a state
> of savagery to civilisation were superimposed on the ancient South Asian
> distinction between civilised society and nature. The later distinction,
> indicated in the categories grama  (village) and aranya  (forest), implies a
> relationship that is complementary but always unequal. These two traditions,
> writes van Schendel, combined to generate a dominant view that considers the
> tribal peoples as remnants of some "hoary past who have preserved their
> culture unchanged from time immemorial. Backward and childlike, they need to
> be protected, educated and disciplined by those who are more advanced
> socially" (van Schendel, 1995: 128).  The visual label of race that
> transcends the colonial categories of tribal and non-tribal and reaches out
> to pre-colonial categories such as the Kirata people -- used to describe the
> people of the periphery - may now give a new lease of life some old Indian
> prejudices.
>
> Responsible Indian officials have from time to time used the metaphor of
> children to describe the peoples of Northeast India.  In February 2004 the
> Mizoram Governor A.R. Kohli described the entire region as a spoilt child.
> Contrary to the charge that the Northeast is "the most neglected region," he
> said it is "in fact, the most spoilt child in the country." The central
> government, he said, "showers funds and other goodies" liberally on the
> region. But the funds are not properly utilized or they do not reach the
> intended beneficiaries. A news report paraphrased the Governor as comparing
> the region "to a petulant child who is showered with goodies but does not
> know what to do with them" (Telegraph 2004).
>
> Such sentiments are also found in the language used by B.P. Singh - the
> former civil servant who played a key role in the creating the Northeast as
> an administrative category. In an article published in 1987, he concluded:
>
> There is no tangible threat to the national integration ethos in the
> region despite the operation of certain disgruntled elements within the
> region and outside the country. But in the context of a history of limited
> socialization and ethnic conflicts, and rapid modernization after 1947 the
> unruly class-room scenario is likely to continue in the region for years to
> come (Singh, 1987b: 281-82).
>
>  "Unruly class-room" is a telling metaphor.  In the Northeast, Singh seems
> to imply, what is needed is a paternalistic and disciplinarian teacher -
> someone who knows what is good for children and, occasionally uses the stick
> for their own good, the role that he probably sees the coercive apparatus of
> the Indian state playing in the region.
>
> These passages smack of attitudes and habits of mind that long predate the
> politics of counter-insurgency.  But while these prejudices are old, they
> have acquired new meaning in the context of India's failed policies in the
> Northeast. While Singh's metaphor of an "unruly class-room" rationalises the
> coercive response to insurgency, Kohli's description of the region as a
> "spoilt child" expresses the frustration with the failures of a policy of
> nation-building through corruption or what Jairam Ramesh calls "using
> corruption as a mode of cohesion" (Ramesh, 2005: 18).
> V
> What are the some of the consequences of the racialisation of the divide
> between India and its Northeast?
> 1, Motivation for militancy: According to Manipuri intellectual and
> politician Gangmumei Kamei, a major motivation for joining insurgent groups
> in Manipur is the social discrimination that young Manipuris face in
> different parts of India because of their appearance (cited in Ray 2005).
> Race has been a factor in the Meitei religious revival movement of the 1940s
> as well. Some revivalists converted to the newly formed faith "only after
> returning from pilgrimages to Mathura and Brindavan, where their Southeast
> Asian features raised curiosity and animosity among the local population."
> The racial divide, according to anthropologist Sohini Ray, is central to
> understanding the Meitei urge for constructing an alternative history.  A
> constituency for an alternative geneology emerged when "the whole idea of
> sharing a common ancestry with the people who are hostile to them for their
> looks" became unacceptable (Ray 2005).
> 2.  Perpetuating a divide: While official narratives about
> counter-insurgency view each Northeastern insurgency as distinct; the racial
> label disrupts this narrative.  As a result the differences between
> political conditions in different parts of the Northeast have no effect on
> popular perceptions about the 'disturbed' region, since racial thinking do
> not allow for such distinctions. For instance, the Mizo insurgency that
> ended with a peace accord in 1986 is usually portrayed as a success story.
> Yet that does not mean that Mizo relations with mainland India are any
> different from that with other parts of the Northeast.  Even today Mizos
> such as Laltluangliana Khiangte complain about mainstream India not
> understanding their culture and traditions, and about Mizos being mistaken
> as South-east Asian tourists in the national capital (cited in Singh, 2004).
> After nearly two decades of a peaceful Mizoram, as Manipuri journalist
> Khogen Singh puts it, Mizos "still don't feel fully at home outside the
> North-east" (Singh, 2004).
> 3. Hijacking of counter-insurgency: There is evidence that the racial
> divide sometimes subverts counter-insurgency operations and they get
> hijacked for other purposes. For instance, it was reported that in the Karbi
> Anglong district of Assam, Indian security forces, ostensibly there to deal
> with the security threat posed by insurgencies, became partisans in local
> land conflicts between tribal Karbi and Hindi-speaking settlers.  The
> settlers whom Karbis refer to as Biharis had over time acquired informal
> control over what is formally designated as public lands and had
> consolidated a "considerable amount of economic and political power."  They
> now seek formal change in the status of those lands and formal land titles
> (MASS 2002, 11-13). In Karbi Anglong's ethnic configuration and the growth
> of insurgency, the loss of land by Karbis to "Biharis" is a factor. Many
> Karbi young people have come under the influence of the United People's
> Democratic Solidarity (UPDS).  But in local armed land conflicts, because of
> racial solidarity, "Bihari" settlers have occasionally secured the informal
> backing of Indian security personnel stationed in the area to fight the UPDS
> (MASS, 2002: 21).
> 4. Facilitating militarisation: The racial divide facilitates the
> relentless militarisation of the region.  Consider for instance, the
> recommendation to strengthen Indian military presence in Manipur made by
> E.N. Rammohan -- a senior Indian police official, who was Advisor to the
> Governor of Manipur.  In order to stop the penetration of the government
> departments by militants, Rammohan recommended that battalions of the
> Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) should guard all government offices and
> the residential neighborhoods housing central and state government officials
> in the state.  Furthermore, he recommended that ten battalions of the
> Central Para-Military Force (CPMF) be deployed in the Manipur Valley in a
> "counter-insurgency grid", and six to eight battalions be deployed in each
> hills district, where roads are few, with "helicopter support to effectively
> dominate them" (Rammohan, 2002: 15). Were it not for the racial fault-line
> it is unlikely that such policy options would have been seriously
> considered.
>
> 5. Legitimisation of corruption: The leakage of funds allocated for
> Northeast India's development can be best described as insurgency dividend.
> The figures are staggering. Jairam Ramesh estimates that the annual
> expenditure of the Government of India on the eight states of Northeast
> India, including Sikkim, is about 30, 000 crores a year. With the region's
> population at about 32 million, he estimates that the Government annually
> spends about 10,000 rupees per person in the Northeast.  This money is not
> going for development. In Ramesh's words, it is going to
>
> ensure cohesiveness of this society with the rest of India through a
> series of interlocutors who happen to be politicians, expatriate
> contractors, extortionists, anybody but people working to deliver benefits
> to the people for whom these expenditures are intended.
>
> A surer way of improving the economic conditions of the intended
> beneficiaries, he suggests, might be for the Indian government to open bank
> accounts and deposit an annual cheque of Rs. 10,000 for every poor family in
> the Northeast (Ramesh, 2005: 18-19).
>
> The racial divide facilitates the sharing of the insurgency dividend
> between local political and bureaucratic elites and outside contractors and
> suppliers.  Not unlike western businessmen who justify bribing politicians
> and bureaucrats in the Third World in terms of local norms, the image of the
> Northeast and its people in this new visual regime is that of a modern
> frontier where corruption is just a part of the natural landscape.  Even the
> "chinky" students from the Northeast in Delhi, after all, appear more
> "modern," "westernized" and affluent than many of their mainland peers
> apparently confirming the corruption-friendly image of the region. It is
> hardly surprising that when it comes to doing business in the region 'make a
> fast buck and run' appears to have become accepted practice.  Even today's
> much-lowered levels of inhibition and moral compunctions do not apply to
> India's modern but wild Northeast Frontier.
> VI
> Things did not have to turn out this way. As an Arunachali minister once
> said at a meeting in Mumbai, "Why can't you think that in a big country like
> ours a few people may even look Chinese? Come to Arunachal Pradesh, he said,
> people in areas bordering China will greet you by saying Jai Hind" (cited in
> Das, 2004).
> In everyday conversations Northeasterners resist mainland India's
> representation of the region. But intellectuals, artists and activists will
> have to develop what bell hooks calls an oppositional gaze. Khasi
> commentator Patricia Mukhim believes that because of its geographical
> location policy makers in Delhi think of the Northeast primarily in terms of
> its "strategic importance."  The region, she suggests, is treated as "enemy
> territory, which needs to be subdued by force."  But "you cannot buy
> allegiance with force," she warns and calls for 'an entirely new approach'
> to the region (Mukhim, 2004).
> A new approach must start with the domain of representation. Our policies
> have an impact on the way the Northeast and its people are represented.  For
> instance, softening our international borders -- opening up the region on
> the east and the north, and encouraging close cross-border interaction  --
> can slowly change perceptions.  The region seen as a gateway to a friendly
> transnational neighbourhood will evoke very different emotions than those of
> a frontier or an "enemy territory"  -- a danger zone where foreign and
> domestic enemies conspire against the Indian nation. Policies could
> transform the Southeast Asia within India into a dynamic gateway to the
> Southeast Asia of world political maps. This could be the foundation for a
> new social contract between India and its Northeast. This could radically
> change what it means to look Northeastern in India. The battle for the
> future of Northeast India is also a battle over images.
> References:
> Bowles, Gordon 1977. The People of Asia. New York: Scribner.
>
> Das, Arup Jyoti.  2004. "The Half-Indians" (Unpublished essay)
> Goswami, Uddipana 2004 "Misrecognition" (Unpublished essay)
> hooks, bell 1992. Black Looks: Race and Representation. Cambridge, MA:
> South End Press
> Keyes, Charles 2002 "Presidential Address: "The Peoples of Asia" - Science
> and Politics in the Classification of Ethnic Groups in Thailand, China and
> Vietnam," Journal of Asian Studies 61 (4) November, pp. 1163-1203.
>
> Leshin, Len  2003 "What's in a name The "Mongol" Debate," Down Syndrome:
> Health Issues (website) http://www.ds-health.com/name.htm (Accessed
> September 16th 2005)
> Manipur Diaspora. 2004. Manipur_Diaspora at yahoo-groups.com Archives, E-mail
> No. 367.
> MASS (Manab Adhikar Sangram Samiti). 2002.  And Quiet Flows the Kopili [A
> Fact-finding Report on Human Rights Violation in the Karbi Anglong District
> of Assam] Guwahati:  Manab Adhikar Sangram Samiti.
> Mukhim, Patricia.  2004.  "Life under Martial Law," [Shillong Notes]; The
> Telegraph (Guwahati edition) September 21.
>
> Rai, Aishwarya. 2000. 'I've not come here looking for fame,' Interview by
> Kanchana Suggu, http://www.rediff.com/entertai/2000/mar/29ash.htm(Accessed September 16th 2005).
> Ramesh, Jairam 2005. "Northeast India in a New Asia," Seminar (550) June,
> pp. 17-21.
> Rammohan, E.N. 2002. "Manipur: A Degenerated Insurgency," in K.P.S. Gill
> and Ajai Sahni (eds.), Faultlines. Vol. 11, New Delhi: Bulwark Books and the
> Institute of Conflict Management: 1-15.
> Ray, Sohini. 2005. "Boundary blurred? Folklore/Mythology, History and the
> Quest for an Alternative Geneology in Northeast India" (Unpublished
> manuscript).
> Singh, B.P.  (1987a) The Problem of Change: A Study of Northeast India,
> New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
> Singh, B.P.1987b. "North-East India: Demography, Culture and Identity
> Crisis," Modern Asian Studies 21 (2): April: 257-82.
> Singh, M. Khogen. 2004. "As Indian as You and I," Hindustan Times,
> September 10th 2004.
> Telegraph 2004. "Governor Slaps Spoilt-child Tag on Northeast," The
> Telegraph (Guwahati edition) 14 February.
> _______________________________________________
> assam mailing list
> assam at assamnet.org
> http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org
>
>
>  ------------------------------
> Win a BlackBerry device from O2 with Yahoo!. *Enter now*<http://us.rd.yahoo.com/mail/uk/taglines/default/mobile_o2/*http://www.yahoo.co.uk/blackberry>
> .
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> assam mailing list
> assam at assamnet.org
> http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org
>
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.assamnet.org/pipermail/assam-assamnet.org/attachments/20060303/44e7f96b/attachment.htm>