[Assam] on your writing , Letter to the President of India

Sat Mar 4 09:59:17 PST 2006

Hi Ankur:

Was it Mr. Barkatatki who ordered the police 
firing at Kohima, resulting in dozens of civilian 
deaths that touched off the Naga armed rebellion, 
by any chance?

c-da

At 9:40 AM -0800 3/4/06, Ankur Bora wrote:
>Dear Himendra Thakur ,
>
>It was a pleasure going through your writing. 
>When I was in school , I was an ardent fan of 
>Satyen Barkataki ( pls correct me if  I 
>mis-spelled ) and Birendra Bhattacharjee. Some 
>of their writings vividly portraited Naga life 
>and society. Please let us know if you had 
>interaction with Barkataki ( He was assistant 
>commissioner in Nagaland) and Bhattacharjee ( 
>His Eyarungam was based on Nagaland).
>I am eagerly waiting to read more of your writing.
>Ankur
>Dallas , Texas
>
>Himendra Thakur <hthakur at comcast.net> wrote:
>
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>Dear Netters,
>
>After  Mr. Chandan Mahanta accused me on 
>December 27, 2005 for posting a personal 
>experience with Mr. JM Lyngdoh as the anecdote 
>you cite here --- merely points to your 
>importance, as demonstrated by the courtesy you 
>received from him 
 with the hour long 
>interview 
.  I carefully avoided posting of 
>any autobiographical note in the assam-net.
>
>However, since Mr. Chandan Mahanta himself is 
>now posting autobiographical notes and anecdotes 
>as Let me share one of my own experiences here 
>--- I am gathering some courage to post my 
>experience here 
 some of these stories maybe 
>quite a funny relief for the netters!
>
>Mr. Chandan Mahanta writes that My nick-name at IIT KGP was 'Naga'
>
>Well, I was also called a Naga --- not in IIT 
>Kharagpur, but right inside Nagaland where I 
>served as an Executive Engineer during the 
>stringent days be! fore the Peace Agreement 
>was initiated by the Peace Commission of the 
>late Jai Prakash Narayan, Bimala Prasad Chaliha 
>and Reverend Scott in 1965.
>
>At that time, Executive Engineers were 
>frequently shot dead by the underground rebels. 
>Every morning when I went out to work, citing 
>the story of Field Marshall Rommel of the Second 
>World War, I used to tell my wife that I might 
>not come back in the evening 
 rather, they 
>might bring me in a stretcher or inside a box. 
>My wife used to cry at the beginning, but very 
>soon she got used to it 
 No matter how much he 
>brags, this guy always comes back every evening, 
>anyway, she must have thought!!
>
>There were some narrow escapes, after ! which I 
>made a public announcement that I never carried 
>any weapon in my jeep. Scrapping the green-blue 
>camouflage painting of my army jeep, I got my 
>jeep painted absolutely white so that anybody 
>could spot it from distance. If they were 
>interested, they were free to shoot, I announced 
>publicly. Later,  when the Peace Commission 
>came, we painted all the Peace Commission 
>vehicles white.
>
>I went from village to village fixing their 
>water supply, schools, dispensaries, hospitals. 
>Being an Executive Engineer, working against the 
>vested interest of many, I had to fight tooth 
>and nail to get the work done, 
 and they liked 
>it, because Nagas were born fighters, they 
>thought I was one of them. One fantastic point 
>in their land was that all agreements were 
>verbal 
 nobody would go back on what they said 
>
 they were used! to take full responsibility of 
>what they said. One day, two Gaonburhas started 
>a fight right in front of me during my visit to 
>a village border, because one Gaonbura accused 
>the other Gaonburha that he was working in his 
>land (every village is an exclusive territory in 
>Nagaland, like the City States of ancient 
>Greece) --- I quickly placed myself in between 
>the two Gaonburhas and told them that they would 
>have to kill me because it was my fault, I gave 
>the wrong assignment by mistake. They cooled 
>down, and I assigned another contract to the 
>losing Gaonburha --- who christened me as an 
>Asomiya Naga!! I have a number of interesting 
>episodes in Nagaland, which Ill share with 
>netters if they want.
>
>As for the being called a Naga, it is very 
>important to know the answer to the question: 
>who is a Naga? There are some fourteen tribes in 
>the mountainous regio! n that is known as 
>Nagaland. Each one of the tribes has their own 
>language, customs, and name 
 they dont call 
>themselves Naga 
 they are Ao, Angami, Sema, 
>Lotha, etc. They do not understand each others 
>language. They communicate with a lingua franca 
>known as Nagamese, which is a form of broken 
>Assamese.
>
>I was serving mostly in Mokakchung, which is 
>essentially an Ao area. Greeting me with a joke 
>Amikhan Ao Naga achey, tumikhan Asomiya Naga 
>Achey --- they would burst out laughing!! We 
>were all Ao Naga, Sema Naga, Asomiya Naga, Lotha 
>Naga, Angami Naga, Koniak Naga 
 and so on.
>
>Joining in their free laughter, I used to argue 
>with them about Bengali Indian, Bihari Indian, 
>Assamese Indian, Naga Indian, Punjabi Indian --- 
>their ! response to such an argument was: 
>sahabto bar budhiyak achey dei ! --- followed 
>by more laughter!!
>
>Stereotyping people by their birth is a sign of 
>gross ignorance, which is displayed not only by 
>the witless Army/Navy Guards (Utpal Brahmas 
>posting), but by very intelligent people as 
>pointed out by Mr. Sanjib Barua in his article. 
>In the assam-net, Mr. Mukul Mahanta stereotyped 
>Mr. Lyngdo as Khasi Christian.  Stereotyping 
>is a sign of gross stupidity like what one top 
>India leader remarked about the late Birendra 
>Kumar Bhattacharya when he went to New Delhi in 
>1980 to accept his Jnanapith Awa! rd : 
>Although Mr. Birendra Kumar Bhattacharya lives 
>in Assam and writes in Assamese, we consider him 
>as an Indian writer. This was from a top Indian 
>leader, absolutely degenerated into such a low 
>level that even a rickshaw-puller would be 
>ashamed of.
>
>Inter-caste, inter-ethnic marriages across all 
>the barriers of language, religion, nationality, 
>etc., will be a very powerful tool to stop the 
>stupid stereotyping of people. Stupid 
>stereotyping of people is the theme of my drama 
>Baagh (1969) &/or Bindu (1993).
>
>When I was in Nagaland, a yo! ung, educated, 
>first-generation Christian Ao woman fell in 
>love with an Assamese Hindu young man. They 
>disclosed their quandary to my wife, who told me 
>that I must help them. The bride told me that 
>she had a very powerful aunt in the underground, 
>might be next to Phizo in the Ao area.
>
>What did your aunt say? I asked the bride.
>My Aunt asked for two tablets of Novalgin.
>
>Novalgin was a kind of a powerful head-ache 
>medicine in those days! If a powerful 
>underground lady wanted two tablets of a very 
>powerful headache medicine, the problem must be 
>very hard for an Asomiya Naga like me!! 
>However, I did not give up. Did you tell your 
>father? was my next question.
>Yes, I did.
>What did he say?
>He asked me What will happen to your religion?
>Now this was an interesting turning point. 
>Holding my breadth, I asked, What did you say?
>I told him that I would go back to my 
>grandfathers religion, the bride replied.
>Sensing some danger, I blurted out my next question What did he say?
>He did not say anything. Instead, he gave me a 
>such a slap that I fell down three feet away 
>was her sad reply.
>
>I could now see the gravity o! f the problem. It 
>took me overnight thinking to find the solution. 
>Next day, I called the groom privately to my 
>room and told him that we would write a letter 
>to the President of India.
>
>What ??? the groom almost jumped off his chair.
>
>Yes. The President of India. Dr. Sarvapalli 
>Radhakrishnan. Ill draft the letter on your 
>behalf and get it typed. You just sign it and 
>mail it to him. It is his job, not mine--- was 
>my cool answer.
>
>My draft of the letter from the groom to the 
>President of India ran like something ! this: 
>Respected Dr. Radhakrishnan, 
. My mother 
>passed away many years ago, my father died last 
>year, I am an orphan now, and I dont have 
>anybody to advice me what to do. You are the 
>Father of the Nation, I beg you to show me the 
>path 
   so on.
>
>It was just a one-page letter from the groom, 
>wondering how he and his bride could get 
>married, seeking the advice from Dr. Sarvepalli 
>Radhakrishnan, President of India from 1962 to 
>1967 ---- 40 odd years ago!!
>
>This posting is already getting too long. Let me 
>stop here. If the netters want to hear the rest 
>of the story, Ill write later. In the mean 
>time, let me try to contact the bride and the 
>groom and ask them if I could divulge ! their 
>names and dig up the original letters!!
>
>With love to everybody,
>Himendra
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: <mailto:cmahanta at charter.net>Chan Mahanta
>To: <mailto:assam at assamnet.org>assam at assamnet.org
>Cc: <mailto:baruah at bard.edu>baruah at bard.edu
>Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 11:10 AM
>!
>Subject: [Assam] A new politics of race: India and its Northeast
>
>
>Dear Netters:
>
>The following is a very interesting and 
>enlightening article by Sanjib Baruah. He was 
>hesitant to post it to assamnet because of its 
>length. But I felt it something we cannot afford 
>to miss.So here it comes.
>
>The emphasis on bell hooks' name is mine, so people don't miss it. I did.
>
>cm
>
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>
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>
>
>IIC Quarterly (New Delhi: India International Centre)
>Vol. 32 (2& 3) Winter, 2005) pp. 165-76
>A new politics of race: India and its Northeast
>Sanjib Baruah
>There was a time when peoples of Northeast India 
>were described as belonging to the Mongoloid 
>race.  ! Today Mongoloid and other racial 
>categories such as Negroid or Caucasoid -- and 
>indeed, the very idea of race as a biological 
>category -- have no standing in scientific 
>circles. For there is more diversity of gene 
>types within what was once thought of as a 
>single 'race' than between 'races.'
>
>But while race may no longer be accepted as a 
>scientific category, it does not mean that human 
>beings would stop making distinctions based on 
>stereotypical phenotypes or skin colour. 
>Arunachalis, Assamese, Garos, Khasis, Manipuris, 
>Mizos, Nagas and Tripuris may indeed have some 
>phenotypical similarities related to genetics. 
>Thus one may be able to say that someone is from 
>Northeast India based on looks, though he or she 
>may not always get it right. For "human 
>populations . . . possess a wide genetic 
>potential which increases in variation through 
>chance mutations or new generic combinations in 
>each generation. . . . Completely stabilized 
>breeding isolates. . . are exceedingly rare" ! ; 
>(Bowles 1977, cited in Keyes, 2002: 1166).  And 
>of course, most of us realise that what we think 
>of as the 'Northeastern looks' are not unique to 
>peoples from the region.  For instance, peoples 
>from the western Himalayas -- those from Nepal 
>or the Uttaranchal -- might share features 
>similar to those found among peoples in the 
>eastern Himalayas.  
>
>Race as a social category is the product of 
>practices. There are visual regimes of labeling, 
>and individuals encountering those labels from 
>childhood may internalise characteristics 
>associated with those labels and learn to adapt 
>to the socially constructed racial order.
>
>African American intellectuals have long 
>recognised the role of visuality in the politics 
>of race. The writer bell hooks -- even her way 
>of writing her name without capital letters is 
>an intervention in the regime of visuality -- 
>describes her project as one of 'resisting 
>representation' and of constructing an 
>'oppositional! gaze.' "We experience our 
>collective crisis as African-American people," 
>she writes, "within the realm of the image" 
>(hooks, 1992).  The project of black liberation, 
>for her, is thus a battle over images.
>The Indian image of the troubled Northeast is 
>increasingly mediated by a visual regime 
>constructed by popular films, television, 
>pictures in magazines and newspapers, and 
>limited contacts with people from the region. 
>Thanks to improved communications, Indians today 
>are quite mobile, and Northeasterners travel to 
>other parts of the country more than ever 
>before.  There are a large number of students 
>from the region in Delhi, Bangalore, Mumbai, 
>Pune, Kolkata and other cities.  They are now a 
>'visible minority' in a number of university 
>campuses.  A disturbingly large number of them 
>tell stories about their experiences of being 
>racially labeled as 'Chapta' (flat nosed), 
>'Oriental' or 'Chinky'. 
>A large number of Northeast Indian young women 
>are e! mployed in upscale restaurants and shops 
>in Delhi - their 'Oriental' looks and English 
>language skills being considered desirable for 
>those positions.  Many of them live in ethnic 
>ghettos, for instance, renting rooms and 
>apartments in 'lal dora' areas: the urban 
>villages of Delhi. Apart from rents being 
>affordable, they feel physically safer than in 
>upscale neighbourhoods. Compared to landlords in 
>elite neighbourhoods, these landlords of more 
>modest means are tolerant of Northeast Indian 
>eating habits -- fermented dry fish, beef 
>chutney and pork -- and less inclined to impose 
>restrictions on the lifestyles of their tenants. 
>However, racially marked niches in the labour 
>market or in settlement patterns have the danger 
>of reinforcing racial thinking. Incidents of 
>violence against Northeast Indian women in the 
>country's capital may partly reflect the 
>racialisation of the divide between the mainland 
>and the Northeast.
>While many Northeasterners travel to the 
>mainland, ! thousands of Indian soldiers and 
>members of the various paramilitary 
>organisations make the reverse journey to the 
>region to fight external threats as well as on 
>counter-insurgency duties.  In the streets and 
>paddy fields of the region security forces stop 
>and interrogate Northeasterners every day.  The 
>soldier himself faces an unenviable situation: 
>the most peaceful of surroundings can quickly 
>turn hostile and he has to be alert against 
>possible offensives by militants.  Some sort of 
>racial profiling becomes inevitable under these 
>conditions, especially since we have no laws 
>prohibiting it.  As Indian soldiers return home, 
>their stories of 'treacherous' rebels hiding 
>behind bamboo groves and jungles spread through 
>friends and relatives. The shared visual regime 
>provides ways of putting those stories and faces 
>together.
>Northeast India's fractured relation with the 
>mainland has been described as a cultural gap, 
>an economic gap, a psychological gap and an 
>emotio! nal gap. The shared visual regime now 
>carries the danger of this fault-line becoming 
>racialised.
>II
>Mani Ratnam's film of 1998 Dil Se is a love 
>story between a woman militant from the 
>Northeast and an All India Radio journalist. The 
>male protagonist Amar, played by Shah Rukh Khan, 
>travels to the Northeast to speak to fellow 
>citizens for a radio programme to celebrate the 
>fiftieth anniversary of India's independence. 
>He develops a relationship with a local woman 
>Meghna, played by the Nepalese-born Manisha 
>Koirala.
>If Bollywood gossip is to be believed, Manisha 
>Koirala was chosen for the role partly because 
>of her 'small eyes.' Director Mani Ratnam, 
>according to Aishwarya Rai, "definitely wanted a 
>small-eyed girl in Dil Se. She had to have that 
>kind of physical features as she was supposed to 
>be from Assam" (Rai, 2000).  The caste of Dil Se 
>also included a number of Assamese actors, among 
>them filmmaker Gautam Bora, who played the role 
>of the chief of a militant group.
>The film's story  unfolds between the fiftieth 
>anniversary in of Indian independence on August 
>15th 1997 and the Republic Day on January 26th. 
>While All India Radio reporter Amar embodies the 
>Indian nation, Meghna represents the horrors of 
>life in the Northeast torn apart by insurgencies 
>and counter-insurgency operations.  Amar defends 
>the nation against rebels bent on tearing it 
>apart.
>The Northeast of Dil Se is a dangerous place 
>where women are raped and families are 
>destroyed. Life in Delhi could not be more 
>different: the film portrays it as a middle 
>class city where tranquil family life and 
>traditional family values prevail.  Meghna in 
>the nation's capital is a danger to both nation 
>and family.  She is on a suicide mission to blow 
>herself up at the Republic day parade.  As a 
>guest at Amar's home she is an awkward presence 
>at a time when the family prepares for his 
>arranged marriage.  "Had it not been for the 
>army, the na! tion would have been torn to 
>shreds," says Amar to Meghna. It is "your 
>nation, not mine," says Meghna in defiance.
>III
>Am I making too much out of a film? Perhaps. But 
>what if we are beginning to look at people from 
>the Northeast through the prism of a visual 
>regime exemplified by films like Dil Se? What if 
>after nearly half a century of 
>counter-insurgency, the counter-insurgent gaze 
>is framing our way of seeing peoples from the 
>Northeast? 
>Films like Dil Se and pictures in newspapers and 
>magazines enable people to put together a mental 
>picture of the Northeast and its people.  The 
>gaze of the Indian army patrol, reinforced by 
>films like Dil Se, gives meaning to what is fast 
>becoming a racial divide.
>There are signs that we are slowly beginning to 
>recognise this new politics of race, though we 
>seem to be as yet unsure whether to use the 'r' 
>word.  A Manipuri journalist wrote in a national 
>daily that, "physically the people of the 
>North-east are closer ! to Southeast Asia and 
>China." However, "this racial divide," he said, 
>is not appreciated "in a sensitive manner" 
>(Singh, 2004). The journalist told me that the 
>'r' word was edited out at one place in the 
>printed version. He had actually written, 
>"racially the people of the Northeast are closer 
>to South-east Asia and China." Apparently the 
>editors substituted the term 'physical' for 
>'racial.'  However, his second usage of the 'r' 
>word -- in racial divide - remained in the 
>published text.
>Let me turn to a small sample of writings by 
>Northeasterners who have been students in 
>mainland India, recalling their experience of 
>being seen as different and encountering racial 
>labels.  "I did my schooling in a boarding 
>school in India," recalls a Manipuri living in 
>Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. He was the only student 
>from the Northeast in that school.  He posted 
>the following on an email discussion group:
>Being the only minority I was subjected to many 
>racist comme! nts . . . The one that I still 
>remember clearly was my being called "Chapta" 
>(flat nose - for those fortunate ones that never 
>heard the term) by my Hindi teacher. The word 
>"chinki" . . . is peddled around with not even a 
>little thought of whether the term could offend 
>someone, by even my closest friends. I came in 
>contact with some Mayangs (the Manipuri term for 
>other Indians) here and it shocked me that 
>despite my being there amongst them they refer 
>to the other Asians as chaptas still with no 
>consideration that I could find it offensive. 
>Even on my bringing up the issue they just 
>laughed it off saying they saw nothing offensive 
>in it. So I have now resorted to referring them 
>as "Pakis" and that really seems to anger them. 
>For those who don't know about it, "Pakis" is a 
>racist term used in Britain to refer to people 
>with the sub continent features (Pakistan, 
>Indian, Srilankan etc.) So the next time you 
>hear any mayang using the word chinki or chapta, 
>call them a "Paki". I think once! this word gets 
>common usage as a term to refer to them by all 
>the people of the north east they will finally 
>realize what it is like to be referred by a 
>racist term (Manipur Diaspora, 2004; cited in 
>Ray 2005). 
>In Kuala Lumpur, he wrote, because of his 
>features he had a hard time convincing people 
>that he was an Indian. He got tired of 
>explaining that he was from India since he 
>"didn't look like the Indians they knew."  On 
>the other hand, he said, he was "able to melt 
>into the crowd and it was easier making friends 
>with the Chinese and Malays" (Manipur Diaspora, 
>2004; cited in Ray 2005). 
>
>At a seminar in Pune a Naga student joked that 
>after coming to Pune he became "half Naga, and 
>half Indian", while he was "a complete Indian" 
>before. He elaborated that in Pune, shopkeepers, 
>doctors, teachers and government officials, 
>everybody treated him as Japanese or Chinese 
>because of his features. He was asked to show 
>his passport when applying for admission to 
>college  (cited in Das, 2004). While doing 
>fieldwork in Manipur, anthropologist Sohini Ray 
>asked a young student about his first visit to 
>Mumbai. He told her that "the first thing he and 
>his companions found difficult was that every 
>other person asked them where they were from, 
>and stared at them." When they said Manipur, 
>people asked where it was and if it was really 
>in India. To avoid such uncomfortable encounters 
>after a few days they started saying that they 
>were from Thailand, because "it was more 
>convenient" (cited in Ray, 2005).
>
>An Assamese woman describes her first year as a 
>student in Delhi University (1996-97), as 
>follows: "I didn't look 'Oriental' - the 
>politically correct term they'd devised in lieu 
>of the derogatory sounding 'chinky'. So I didn't 
>have to face some of the stupider questions. My 
>friend from Mizoram was asked if she needed a 
>passport to come to India." The 'Oriental' 
>looking among us," did not have to go through 
>hazing, she recalled si! nce "Indians are always 
>nice to foreigners" (Goswami, 2004).
>
>IV
>
>The emergence of a racial label to include all 
>'indigenous' Northeasterners fits nicely with 
>the category 'the Northeast' that since 1971, in 
>the words of a retired senior civil servant who 
>played a key role in designing this political 
>order, has "emerged as a significant 
>administrative concept . . . replacing the 
>hitherto more familiar unit of public 
>imagination, Assam" (Singh, 1987a: 8).  In 1971 
>a number of the new states were created (though 
>not all of them were states at the beginning), 
>and another piece of legislation gave birth to 
>the North Eastern Council (NEC).  These two laws 
>were 'twins born out of a new vision for the 
>Northeast' (Singh, 1987a: 117).
>
>Unlike the distinction between tribal and 
>non-tribal that is an important part of our 
>vocabulary in discussing the Northeast, the 
>racial label has the advantage of including all 
>those who belong to the troubled region,! and, 
>is perceived as being connected to the troubles. 
>For instance, a majority of the plains people of 
>Manipur and Assam are not "tribal" which, after 
>all, is an arbitrary governmental category. 
>However, the Assamese and Manipuri insurgencies 
>are among the most potent in the region. Thus 
>the distinction between tribal and non-tribal is 
>not very useful when it comes to discussing 
>insurgent Northeast India. Since tribal and 
>non-tribal Northeasterners share certain 
>stereotypical phenotypes in common, the racial 
>label has become more functional.
>
>The racial label incorporates meanings that 
>predate the era of insurgency and 
>counter-insurgency.  Willem van Schendel, 
>writing mainly with Bangladesh and the 
>Chittagong Hill Tracts in mind, comments on the 
>"remarkably stagnant view of the hill people" 
>that has prevailed in South Asia.  The classic 
>nineteenth century Western assumptions about 
>social evolution from a state of savagery to 
>civilisation were superimposed on t! he ancient 
>South Asian distinction between civilised 
>society and nature. The later distinction, 
>indicated in the categories grama  (village) and 
>aranya  (forest), implies a relationship that is 
>complementary but always unequal. These two 
>traditions, writes van Schendel, combined to 
>generate a dominant view that considers the 
>tribal peoples as remnants of some "hoary past 
>who have preserved their culture unchanged from 
>time immemorial. Backward and childlike, they 
>need to be protected, educated and disciplined 
>by those who are more advanced socially" (van 
>Schendel, 1995: 128).  The visual label of race 
>that transcends the colonial categories of 
>tribal and non-tribal and reaches out to 
>pre-colonial categories such as the Kirata 
>people -- used to describe the people of the 
>periphery - may now give a new lease of life 
>some old Indian prejudices.
>
>Responsible Indian officials have from time to 
>time used the metaphor of children to describe 
>the peoples of Northe! ast India.  In February 
>2004 the Mizoram Governor A.R. Kohli described 
>the entire region as a spoilt child. Contrary to 
>the charge that the Northeast is "the most 
>neglected region," he said it is "in fact, the 
>most spoilt child in the country." The central 
>government, he said, "showers funds and other 
>goodies" liberally on the region. But the funds 
>are not properly utilized or they do not reach 
>the intended beneficiaries. A news report 
>paraphrased the Governor as comparing the region 
>"to a petulant child who is showered with 
>goodies but does not know what to do with them" 
>(Telegraph 2004). 
>
>Such sentiments are also found in the language 
>used by B.P. Singh - the former civil servant 
>who played a key role in the creating the 
>Northeast as an administrative category. In an 
>article published in 1987, he concluded: 
>
>There is no tangible threat to the national 
>integration ethos in the region despite the 
>operation of certain disgruntled elements within 
>the ! region and outside the country. But in the 
>context of a history of limited socialization 
>and ethnic conflicts, and rapid modernization 
>after 1947 the unruly class-room scenario is 
>likely to continue in the region for years to 
>come (Singh, 1987b: 281-82).
>
>  "Unruly class-room" is a telling metaphor.  In 
>the Northeast, Singh seems to imply, what is 
>needed is a paternalistic and disciplinarian 
>teacher - someone who knows what is good for 
>children and, occasionally uses the stick for 
>their own good, the role that he probably sees 
>the coercive apparatus of the Indian state 
>playing in the region.
>
>These passages smack of attitudes and habits of 
>mind that long predate the politics of 
>counter-insurgency.  But while these prejudices 
>are old, they have acquired new meaning in the 
>context of India's failed policies in the 
>Northeast. While Singh's metaphor of an "unruly 
>class-room" rationalises the coercive response 
>to insurgency, Kohli's description of the region 
>a! s a "spoilt child" expresses the frustration 
>with the failures of a policy of nation-building 
>through corruption or what Jairam Ramesh calls 
>"using corruption as a mode of cohesion" 
>(Ramesh, 2005: 18).
>V
>What are the some of the consequences of the 
>racialisation of the divide between India and 
>its Northeast? 
>1, Motivation for militancy: According to 
>Manipuri intellectual and politician Gangmumei 
>Kamei, a major motivation for joining insurgent 
>groups in Manipur is the social discrimination 
>that young Manipuris face in different parts of 
>India because of their appearance (cited in Ray 
>2005).  Race has been a factor in the Meitei 
>religious revival movement of the 1940s as well. 
>Some revivalists converted to the newly formed 
>faith "only after returning from pilgrimages to 
>Mathura and Brindavan, where their Southeast 
>Asian features raised curiosity and animosity 
>among the local population." The racial divide, 
>according to anthropologist Sohini Ray,! is 
>central to understanding the Meitei urge for 
>constructing an alternative history.  A 
>constituency for an alternative geneology 
>emerged when "the whole idea of sharing a common 
>ancestry with the people who are hostile to them 
>for their looks" became unacceptable (Ray 2005).
>2.  Perpetuating a divide: While official 
>narratives about counter-insurgency view each 
>Northeastern insurgency as distinct; the racial 
>label disrupts this narrative.  As a result the 
>differences between political conditions in 
>different parts of the Northeast have no effect 
>on popular perceptions about the 'disturbed' 
>region, since racial thinking do not allow for 
>such distinctions. For instance, the Mizo 
>insurgency that ended with a peace accord in 
>1986 is usually portrayed as a success story. 
>Yet that does not mean that Mizo relations with 
>mainland India are any different from that with 
>other parts of the Northeast.  Even today Mizos 
>such as Laltluangliana Khiangte complain! about 
>mainstream India not understanding their culture 
>and traditions, and about Mizos being mistaken 
>as South-east Asian tourists in the national 
>capital (cited in Singh, 2004). After nearly two 
>decades of a peaceful Mizoram, as Manipuri 
>journalist Khogen Singh puts it, Mizos "still 
>don't feel fully at home outside the North-east" 
>(Singh, 2004).
>3. Hijacking of counter-insurgency: There is 
>evidence that the racial divide sometimes 
>subverts counter-insurgency operations and they 
>get hijacked for other purposes. For instance, 
>it was reported that in the Karbi Anglong 
>district of Assam, Indian security forces, 
>ostensibly there to deal with the security 
>threat posed by insurgencies, became partisans 
>in local land conflicts between tribal Karbi and 
>Hindi-speaking settlers.  The settlers whom 
>Karbis refer to as Biharis had over time 
>acquired informal control over what is formally 
>designated as public lands and had consolidated 
>a "considerable amount of economic and political 
>power."  They now seek formal change in the 
>status of those lands and formal land titles 
>(MASS 2002, 11-13). In Karbi Anglong's ethnic 
>configuration and the growth of insurgency, the 
>loss of land by Karbis to "Biharis" is a factor. 
>Many Karbi young people have come under the 
>influence of the United People's Democratic 
>Solidarity (UPDS).  But in local armed land 
>conflicts, because of racial solidarity, 
>"Bihari" settlers have occasionally secured the 
>informal backing of Indian security personnel 
>stationed in the area to fight the UPDS (MASS, 
>2002: 21).
>4. Facilitating militarisation: The racial 
>divide facilitates the relentless militarisation 
>of the region.  Consider for instance, the 
>recommendation to strengthen Indian military 
>presence in Manipur made by E.N. Rammohan -- a 
>senior Indian police official, who was Advisor 
>to the Governor of Manipur.  In order to stop 
>the penetration of the government departments by 
>militants, Rammohan recommended that ba! 
>ttalions of the Central Reserve Police Force 
>(CRPF) should guard all government offices and 
>the residential neighborhoods housing central 
>and state government officials in the state. 
>Furthermore, he recommended that ten battalions 
>of the Central Para-Military Force (CPMF) be 
>deployed in the Manipur Valley in a 
>"counter-insurgency grid", and six to eight 
>battalions be deployed in each hills district, 
>where roads are few, with "helicopter support to 
>effectively dominate them" (Rammohan, 2002: 15). 
>Were it not for the racial fault-line it is 
>unlikely that such policy options would have 
>been seriously considered.
>
>5. Legitimisation of corruption: The leakage of 
>funds allocated for Northeast India's 
>development can be best described as insurgency 
>dividend.  The figures are staggering. Jairam 
>Ramesh estimates that the annual expenditure of 
>the Government of India on the eight states of 
>Northeast India, including Sikkim, is about 30, 
>000 crores a year. With the re! gion's 
>population at about 32 million, he estimates 
>that the Government annually spends about 10,000 
>rupees per person in the Northeast.  This money 
>is not going for development. In Ramesh's words, 
>it is going to 
>
>ensure cohesiveness of this society with the 
>rest of India through a series of interlocutors 
>who happen to be politicians, expatriate 
>contractors, extortionists, anybody but people 
>working to deliver benefits to the people for 
>whom these expenditures are intended.
>
>A surer way of improving the economic conditions 
>of the intended beneficiaries, he suggests, 
>might be for the Indian government to open bank 
>accounts and deposit an annual cheque of Rs. 
>10,000 for every poor family in the Northeast 
>(Ramesh, 2005: 18-19).
>
>The racial divide facilitates the sharing of the 
>insurgency dividend between local political and 
>bureaucratic elites and outside contractors and 
>suppliers.  Not unlike western businessmen who 
>justify bribing politicians and bureaucrats in 
>the Third World in terms of local norms, the 
>image of the Northeast and its people in this 
>new visual regime is that of a modern frontier 
>where corruption is just a part of the natural 
>landscape.  Even the "chinky" students from the 
>Northeast in Delhi, after all, appear more 
>"modern," "westernized" and affluent than many 
>of their mainland peers apparently confirming 
>the corruption-friendly image of the region. It 
>is hardly surprising that when it comes to doing 
>business in the region 'make a fast buck and 
>run' appears to have become accepted practice. 
>Even today's much-lowered levels of inhibition 
>and moral compunctions do not apply to India's 
>modern but wild Northeast Frontier.
>VI
>Things did not have to turn out this way. As an 
>Arunachali minister once said at a meeting in 
>Mumbai, "Why can't you think that in a big 
>country like ours a few people may even look 
>Chinese? Come to Arunachal Pradesh, he said, 
>people in areas bordering China will g! reet you 
>by saying Jai Hind" (cited in Das, 2004).
>In everyday conversations Northeasterners resist 
>mainland India's representation of the region. 
>But intellectuals, artists and activists will 
>have to develop what bell hooks calls an 
>oppositional gaze. Khasi commentator Patricia 
>Mukhim believes that because of its geographical 
>location policy makers in Delhi think of the 
>Northeast primarily in terms of its "strategic 
>importance."  The region, she suggests, is 
>treated as "enemy territory, which needs to be 
>subdued by force."  But "you cannot buy 
>allegiance with force," she warns and calls for 
>'an entirely new approach' to the region 
>(Mukhim, 2004). 
>A new approach must start with the domain of 
>representation. Our policies have an impact on 
>the way the Northeast and its people are 
>represented.  For instance, softening our 
>international borders -- opening up the region 
>on the east and the north, and encouraging close 
>cross-border interaction  -- can slowl! y change 
>perceptions.  The region seen as a gateway to a 
>friendly transnational neighbourhood will evoke 
>very different emotions than those of a frontier 
>or an "enemy territory"  -- a danger zone where 
>foreign and domestic enemies conspire against 
>the Indian nation. Policies could transform the 
>Southeast Asia within India into a dynamic 
>gateway to the Southeast Asia of world political 
>maps. This could be the foundation for a new 
>social contract between India and its Northeast. 
>This could radically change what it means to 
>look Northeastern in India. The battle for the 
>future of Northeast India is also a battle over 
>images.
>References:
>Bowles, Gordon 1977. The People of Asia. New York: Scribner.
>
>Das, Arup Jyoti.  2004. "The Half-Indians" (Unpublished essay)
>Goswami, Uddipana 2004 "Misrecognition" (Unpublished essay) 
>hooks, bell 1992. Black Looks: Race and 
>Representation. Cambridge, MA: South End Press
>Keyes, Charles 2002 "Presidential Address: "The 
>Peoples of Asia" - Science and Politics in the 
>Classification of Ethnic Groups in Thailand, 
>China and Vietnam," Journal of Asian Studies 61 
>(4) November, pp. 1163-1203.
>
>Leshin, Len  2003 "What's in a name The "Mongol" 
>Debate," Down Syndrome: Health Issues (website) 
>http://www.ds-health.com/name.htm (Accessed 
>September 16th 2005)
>Manipur Diaspora. 2004. 
>Manipur_Diaspora at yahoo-groups.com Archives, 
>E-mail No. 367.
>MASS (Manab Adhikar Sangram Samiti). 2002.  And 
>Quiet Flows the Kopili [A Fact-finding Report on 
>Human Rights Violation in the Karbi Anglong 
>District of Assam] Guwahati:  Manab Adhikar 
>Sangram Samiti.
>Mukhim, Patricia.  2004.  "Life under Martial 
>Law," [Shillong Notes]; The Telegraph (Guwahati 
>edition) September 21.
>
>Rai, Aishwarya. 2000. 'I've not come here 
>looking for fame,' Interview by Kanchana Suggu, 
>http://www.rediff.com/entertai/2000/mar/29ash.htm 
>(Accessed September 16th 2005).
>Ramesh, Jairam 200! 5. "Northeast India in a New 
>Asia," Seminar (550) June, pp. 17-21.
>Rammohan, E.N. 2002. "Manipur: A Degenerated 
>Insurgency," in K.P.S. Gill and Ajai Sahni 
>(eds.), Faultlines. Vol. 11, New Delhi: Bulwark 
>Books and the Institute of Conflict Management: 
>1-15.
>Ray, Sohini. 2005. "Boundary blurred? 
>Folklore/Mythology, History and the Quest for an 
>Alternative Geneology in Northeast India" 
>(Unpublished manuscript).
>Singh, B.P.  (1987a) The Problem of Change: A 
>Study of Northeast India, New Delhi: Oxford 
>University Press.
>Singh, B.P.1987b. "North-East India: Demography, 
>Culture and Identity Crisis," Modern Asian 
>Studies 21 (2): April: 257-82.
>Singh, M. Khogen. 2004. "As Indian as You and 
>I," Hindustan Times, September 10th 2004.
>Telegraph 2004. "Governor Slaps Spoilt-child Tag 
>on Northeast," The Telegraph (Guwahati edition) 
>14 February.
>
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