[Assam] RIGHTS demand is SUICIDAL in Assam, because of India's EXTERMINATION policy.

[Bartta Bistar]

EPW Commentary
March 4, 2006
http://www.lettera22.it/showart.php?id=4443&rubrica=177
Assam: 'Talking about Talks'

After two rounds of preparatory discussions between the ULFA-nominated
consultative group and the government of India, Assam is no closer to the
commencement of genuine talks. As elections loom in the state, different
political groups jostle for advantage in a situation where human rights are
regularly violated. The monotony of these terrible incidents means they are
quickly forgotten.
M S Prabhakara


Ever since the first, hesitant initiatives were taken in September 2005 to
get some sort of a dialogue going between the government of India and the
armed and proscribed separatist outfit, the United Liberation Front of Asom
(ULFA), there has been very little clarity on what the talks, or even the
"talks about talks", are supposed to achieve – allowing for the opaqueness
and misdirection that surrounds all such initiatives. Such opaqueness was
indeed a feature of the very initiation of this process.

Characteristically, ULFA is even now not directly in the picture. Rather,
the present talks are being held, more accurately "facilitated" (part of the
new jargon of negotiations with separatist groups, like "talks about talks",
"confidence building measures" and such), by an ULFA-nominated nine-member
People's Consultative Group (PCG) that moreover has two "convenors" over and
above the nine. Their aim is to enable the eventual, perhaps direct, "real
talks about talks" between the government of India and ULFA.

ULFA's Objective

There is little ambiguity over the stated, and ultimate objective of the
ULFA – the attainment of a sovereign, independent Assam. Rather less clear
is what the government of India expects to achieve in these talks. Its stand
has been often spelt out: that the government will hold talks with any
separatist/militant/insurgent/terrorist outfit provided these first abjure
violence; and agree to situate their objective within the framework of the
Constitution. In practice, however, there has been much flexibility, with
the stated framework not always as rigidly defined as it is made out.
Modifications have been made depending on the strength, durability and will
of the opponent, as also on the perceived need to secure a settlement. This
is evident both in the Kashmir talks and the talks with the National
Socialist Council of Nagalim. It is to be seen whether such flexibility will
also be evident when, eventually, direct talks are held with ULFA.

Ever since the organisation came into being over a quarter of a century ago,
more or less conterminously with the onset of the Assam agitation on the
issue of foreign nationals, ULFA's objective has remained the same – the
attainment of 'Swadhin Asom', a sovereign, independent Asom. To be more
precise, ULFA's objective, as it sees it, is to regain the lost sovereignty
of Asom – the correct name of the land that got corrupted by getting
anglicised into Assam following British colonial occupation and continued to
be used under Indian colonial occupation.1

The sovereignty was lost way back in 1826 when, following British victory
over Burma in the Anglo-Burmese war, which was preceded by the invasion and
occupation of the land by Burma, Britain annexed the erstwhile kingdom of
Assam, as part of its policy of extension and consolidation of its eastern
frontiers. A little over a century and a half later, the armed struggle to
regain that lost sovereignty began with the founding of ULFA in April 1979.

This reading of the events and circumstances of Assam's loss of independence
and the path being charted by ULFA to redeem it might not be quite accurate
and also have elements of myth, fantasy and imagination. There are certainly
other narratives and perspectives of this past, present and the future.
However, in matters like this, imagination and belief are more important
than so-called historical facts about which there has never been any
agreement. What is more material is that a certain wistfulness and nostalgia
over a past when Assam was a sovereign and independent political entity has
been a persistent element in the imagination of the Assamese people. This is
reflected in folk memories, literature, cultural and political polemics
about identity assertion, links and relations vis-à-vis the rest of India
with which, like every other constituent of the modern Indian state, Assam
too has an ambiguous relation, a part and apart, an integral part as well as
jealously asserting its unique identity.

Conditions for Talks

ULFA has till now refused to come on board of any kind of negotiations until
and unless the sovereignty issue is made part of the agenda. Thus, the
constitution of the ULFA-nominated PCG, one of whose tasks is to persuade
the government to include the issue of Assam's sovereignty in the agenda for
the talks, if and when they are held. During a mass rally organised by
People's Committee for Peace Initiative in Assam, described as a
conglomeration of 2l organisations, in Guwahati on January 30, by when the
PCG had been invited for the second round of talks, a resolution was adopted
demanding any discussion that may eventually take place between the
government of India and ULFA must focus on finding a "justice-oriented
solution without compromising on the dignity of the people and the demand
for the restoration of sovereignty to them". The rally was addressed by many
leading public figures and intellectuals of the state, as well as some PCG
members and Mamoni Goswami, the Assamese writer and one of the two convenors
of the PCG.

The sum total of the pursuance of this objective by ULFA through what it
calls "armed struggle", and the efforts of the government to suppress and
defeat them by use of force, over the last quarter of a century has been the
death and maiming and destruction of the homesteads of many thousands of
persons, actively involved and entirely unimplicated in such enterprises, by
the security forces and ULFA in confrontations that have received little
national attention except of the most cursory kind. Barring ULFA which,
despite tactical shifts, has remained firm in its objective, one is not sure
if the administrative and political structures in the state and at the
centre have any long-term perspective on the problem. Since ULFA became part
of the security concerns of the state in the late 1980s, its anticipated
violent interventions in the run-up to the official observances of the
Independence Day and Republic Day lead to a flurry of "state-wide alerts"
and such demonstrative gestures of strengthening of security. Few, least of
all ULFA, take these seriously, for all these are forgotten when the
appointed day passes. The economy of the state, despite the current
appearance in urban and semi-urban enclaves of boom and prosperity in the
midst of an unbelievably degraded broader environment contributed as much by
the "reforms" of the early 1990s as by the large inflow of unaccounted
liquid cash is marked by stagnation, though motions of vibrancy are
generated by ad hoc interventions from the top, or harebrained agendas for
investment, growth and diversification that seldom go beyond their initial,
breathless articulation. It is unlikely that the current or eventual talks
about talks will even consider such issues.

Howsoever, unrealistic ULFA's articulation of ideas like the restoration of
the lost sovereignty of Assam and its prosecution of this objective through
armed struggle may seem to the people in the rest of India, including many
Assamese people, it is also true that such ideas do generate sympathetic
resonances in the state, even among those who are not persuaded either of
their attainability or even their desirability, given the complex
international environment. This is a new dynamic of Assamese society that
was not prominent when the organisation took its birth. The reasons for such
ambiguity – support to a cause that is in the final analysis is not really a
desirable objective and may even be suicidal – are complex and are not
anyway relevant to the context and substance of the present and prospective
"talks about talks".

The first meeting between the government of India and the PCG took place in
Delhi on October 26 last year. The prime minister attended these talks.
There were assurances that the government was willing to discuss all issues
raised by ULFA, though there was no explicit reference to the issue of
sovereignty.

Second Round

The second meeting took place on February 7 this year. Though the date for
the second meeting had apparently been decided and also conveyed to the
facilitators well in advance, the actual announcement of the date was
preceded by yet another demonstration across the state by ULFA of its
capacity to strike at will, in the run up to the Republic Day ceremonies.
Indeed, one of the facilitators explicitly said that ULFA had resorted to
such violence because its leadership felt "insulted and frustrated" due to
the centre's delay in taking the peace process forward. In further
demonstration of its resentment, incidents of violence continued even after
the February 7 date was announced. In the event, when the actual date was
announced in the midst of the violence, the impression was created that the
government would only respond to coercion. The message seems to have gone
home, considering the satisfaction expressed by PCG about the progress made
in the second round of talks.

Though little has been revealed about the substance of these talks, one can
draw some broad inferences, based on past experience of 1991-92 when ULFA,
following the two military operations (Bajrang and Rhino), initiated on its
own talks with the centre, an initiative that fizzled out with accusations
of bad faith on both sides, and on the existing reality following the
setbacks it has received after the Bhutan operations. Two communications
sent by Arobindra Rajkhowa (that is how Arabinda Rajkhowa, itself an assumed
name, spelt his name in those communications), then as now ULFA's chairman,
to prime minister Narasimha Rao on December 18, 1991 and January 1, 1992
encapsulated ULFA's concerns and demands as they existed then: Immediate
stoppage of army operations, withdrawal of all black laws like Armed Forces
Special Powers Act, TADA, Disturbed Areas Act, as well as lifting of the ban
on the organisation; and release of its leaders in prison in order to
facilitate the adoption and endorsement of the conditions required by the
government of India – the acceptance of a solution within the framework of
the Constitution, abjuring of violence and the surrender of arms. However,
those released by the government as required by ULFA promptly disappeared.

Core Demands

The core demands reflected in the preconditions that ULFA then insisted on,
especially suspension if not an end to army operations and release of its
leaders and cadres in prison, remain the same. Apart from the release of
five members of its central committee (vice chairman Pradip Gogoi, in prison
in Guwahati in the middle of a prolonged trial, publicity secretary Mithinga
Daimary, Ramu Mech, Arpan Saikia and founder adviser Bhimkanta Buragohain),
ULFA is also now demanding the release, or at last to know the whereabouts,
of several of its leaders and cadres, including Ashanta Bagphukan, Bening
Rabha, Nilu Chakravarti, Abhijit Deka and Prakash Gogoi, the last news about
whom was that they had all been captured by the army during the Bhutan
operations. There are reports of at least 25 children of ULFA cadres, born
in jails, still languishing in prison. There is also the question of the
future of Golap Barua, another central committee member apparently still in
custody in Bangladesh. At one point there were reports about persons known
to be close to ULFA demanding that the government of India should facilitate
Golap Barua's release and return home.

The most important difference between then and now is that while 15 years
ago there was a formal commitment (whose sincerity was suspect even then in
official circles, that turned out to be justified) to strive for a solution
to the issues raised by ULFA within the framework of the Constitution –
pending of course endorsement by ULFA's central executive committee many of
whose members were then in prison – such a commitment is not there, not even
for form's sake, in the present situation.

What, then, are the prospects for the next round of talks? A clue can be had
in the joint statement released on February 7, at the end of the second
round. A sentence from the joint statement, as reported in the press, reads
thus: "The Government of India has agreed to examine and initiate a series
of confidence building measures with regard to instances of human rights
violations and examine the issue of release of certain detainees in
consultation with the state government." However, the statement makes no
reference to ULFA's core demand – the suspension of army operations – much
less to the government's expectations that ULFA has to agree to situate its
demands and grievances within the framework of the Constitution. Such issues
may be taken up only when direct talks are held.

There is also the little matter of the forthcoming elections. Any progress
or even the appearance of progress on such issues will surely help the
ruling Congress Party, a key stakeholder in the ongoing process, though it
has till now kept a low profile. This will not be the first time that
political parties seeking to retain or regain office have played, or at
least tried to play, the ULFA card, though the organisation itself loftily
claims that it has in no manner intervened in the "Indian political process"
and indeed wants no piece of it.

Despite this appearance of deadlock, if progress were to be made on the
promise to "initiate a series of confidence building measures with regard to
instances of human rights violations", that would be a positive gain.
Sovereignty can wait; what most people really want is peace. Indeed, even if
the talks were to drag on, as they necessarily will since the issue is
complex and near irresolvable, such an impasse too would be welcome if only
peace were to prevail, if there were to be end to raids, arrests and
disappearances, extortions and killings, violence and counter-violence.

Trigger-Happy Outbursts

The problem is what are seen as instances of human rights violations are
seen by the security forces as merely "unfortunate excesses", inevitable and
unavoidable in the course of legitimate anti-insurgency operations. When
forces with a deeply entrenched security mindset operate in an environment
about which they have no understanding, trigger-happy outbursts are bound to
get more and more common. In one of the most bizarre instances of its kind,
personnel of the Border Security Force recently went berserk at the Kamakhya
temple in Guwahati because others in the line ahead of them objected to
their trying to jump the queue to secure precedence in darshan.

Reports of less bizarre, but far more grim and tragic, incidents create a
stir for a day or two and are forgotten, except when they involve victims in
high profile areas, as in the recent army raid in Jeraigaon, the village
near Chabua in Tinsukia district, home to many ULFA leaders including its
army chief, Paresh Barua, that led to the blockade of NH-37 on January 31.
The blockade was lifted only after the army handed over the two young men it
had picked up to the state police. A few days later, in another incident in
a village under the Kakopathar police station, also in Tinsukia district, a
young man, Ajit Mahanta, supposedly a "ULFA linkman", was picked up by the
army authorities on the night of February 4-5 from his village home. A day
later, he was dead.

The denouement of this incident is still being played out. A prolonged
blockade of NH-37 turned violent on February 10, when the police opened fire
on a crowd that had earlier attacked a police station, resulting in the
death of eight civilians, apart from the lynching of a policeman. The
resulting rage and statewide protests are yet to subside.

It is difficult to say what impact incidents like those in Kakopathar, whose
origins are controversial and whose aftermath is unclear, will have on the
peace process. Interestingly, while some of ULFA's over-ground supporters
(including some engaged as facilitators of the peace process) have demanded
that the security forces should be withdrawn from the "affected areas", ULFA
has accused unnamed "vested interests" of provoking a confrontation in
Kakopathar with a view to derailing the peace process, virtually endorsing
the stand of chief minister Tarun Gogoi who has accused the opposition, Asom
Gana Parishad of instigating the villagers to attack the police station,
leading to the police firing and the deaths. "Those who are involved in
provoking and instigating the people of Kakopathar to attack the police
station do not want a political settlement to our problems and simply want
to derail the peace process", a statement issued by ULFA chairman Arobinda
Rajkhowa said. Only one thing is clear: powerful lobbies pressing for the
continuation of the talks are as active as those pressing for aborting the
whole peace process.

Finally, there are varieties of state violence that provoke equally varied
responses by way of popular mobilisation of rage. After all, such
mobilisation has also to be sustained by the media which, despite all
pretensions to the contrary, has its own agenda, especially in a highly
politically charged environment as in Assam. Thus, one notes that between
February 18 and February 25, two English dailies of Guwahati carried 24
photographs (including one of a well known artist "reliving on canvass the
incidents at Kakopathar") highlighting the mobilisation of rage. One also
notes, in contrast, that the incident at Salakati Railway Station near
Kokrajhar in the Bodoland Territorial Autonomous District area on December
23 last year in which three young men were shot dead by the Indian Reserve
Battalion (IRB) during a fracas following an incident of alleged molestation
of local girls in the train by the IRB personnel, one of whom also died in
gunfire, is now little more than a speck of smouldering rage and memory
among its victims.


Notes

1 On February 28, 2006, the Congress government in Assam led by Tarun Gogoi
decided to revert to the original name of 'Asom' for the state.
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