[Assam] NY Times Editorial
Chan Mahanta
cmahanta at charter.net
Tue Oct 24 08:23:34 PDT 2006
This is a watershed editorial from the country's most prestigious
paper. Along with Bush's abandonment of the "stay the course" slogan
during the last couple of days, the rabidly right-wing columnist Noah
Goldberg's admission on print yesterday that he was wrong about the
war and numerous other right-wingers heading for the tall-grass
looking for cover; the pigeons have come home to roost.
As we can see there is nothing to be happy about the sordid mess we are in.
Just like there is nothing for Indians to be happy about the mess it
is in, be it Kashmir, be it Assam; except that its intelligentsia
continues to remain smug in its ignorance and its appalling apathy.
The lesson, that even overwhelming force cannot extinguish hatred of
the intruder fits Indian military operations like a glove . Time
alone will tell if they have the wisdom to pay heed.
cm
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/24/opinion/24tues1.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all
Editorial
Trying to Contain the Iraq Disaster
Published: October 24, 2006
No matter what President Bush says, the question is not whether
America can win in Iraq. The only question is whether the United
States can extricate itself without leaving behind an unending civil
war that will spread more chaos and suffering throughout the Middle
East, while spawning terrorism across the globe.
The prospect of what happens after an American pullout haunts the
debate on Iraq. The administration, for all its hints about new
strategies and timetables, is obviously hoping to slog along for two
more years and dump the problem on Mr. Bush's successor. This fall's
election debates have educated very few voters because neither side
is prepared to be honest about the terrible consequences of military
withdrawal and the very long odds against success if American troops
remain.
This page opposed a needlessly hurried and unilateral invasion, even
before it became apparent that the Bush administration was unprepared
to do the job properly. But after it happened, we believed that
America should stay and try to clean up the mess it had made - as
long as there was any conceivable road to success.
That road is vanishing. Today we want to describe a strategy for
containing the disaster as much as humanly possible. It is hardly a
recipe for triumph. Americans can only look back in wonder on the
days when the Bush administration believed that success would turn
Iraq into a stable, wealthy democracy - a model to strike fear into
the region's autocrats while inspiring a new generation of democrats.
Even last fall, the White House was dividing its strategy into a
series of victorious outcomes, with the short-term goal of an Iraq
"making steady progress in fighting terrorists." The medium term had
Iraq taking the lead in "providing its own security" and "on its way
to achieving its economic potential," with the ultimate outcome being
a "peaceful, united, stable and secure" nation.
If an American military occupation could ever have achieved those
goals, that opportunity is gone. It is very clear that even with the
best American effort, Iraq will remain at war with itself for years
to come, its government weak and deeply divided, and its economy
battered and still dependent on outside aid. The most the United
States can do now is to try to build up Iraq's security forces so
they can contain the fighting - so it neither devours Iraqi society
nor spills over to Iraq's neighbors - and give Iraq's leaders a start
toward the political framework they would need if they chose to try
to keep their country whole.
The tragedy is that even this marginal sort of outcome seems nearly
unachievable now. But if America is to make one last push, there are
steps that might lessen the chance of all-out chaos after the troops
withdraw:
Start at Home
For all the talk of timetables for Iraq, there has been little
discussion of the timetable that must be handed to George W. Bush.
The president cannot leave office with American troops still dying in
an Iraq that staggers along just short of civil war, on behalf of no
concrete objective other than "get the job done," which is now Mr.
Bush's rhetorical substitute for "stay the course." The
administration's current vague talk about behind-the-scenes
agreements with Iraqi politicians is next to meaningless. Americans,
Iraqis and the rest of the world need clear, public signs of progress.
Mr. Bush can make the first one by firing Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld. There is no chance of switching strategy as long as he is
in control of the Pentagon. The administration's plans have gone
woefully wrong, and while the president is unlikely to admit that, he
can send a message by removing Mr. Rumsfeld. It would also be a
signal to the military commanders in the field that the
administration now wants to hear the truth about what they need, what
can be salvaged out of this mess, and what cannot.
The president should also make it clear, once and for all, that the
United States will not keep permanent bases in Iraq. The people in
Iraq and across the Middle East need a strong sign that the troops
are not there to further any American imperial agenda.
Demand Reconciliation Talks
Iraq's prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, has indefinitely
postponed reconciliation talks among the nation's top politicians. He
must receive an immediate deadline to start the process. Tomorrow
would not be too soon; the end of the year would be too late.
Whatever decisions Iraqi leaders reached over the past few years were
achieved by pushing aside all the critical questions that were
hardest to address. The Bush administration must demand not only that
new talks start, but that they continue until some agreement is
reached on protecting minority rights, dividing up Iraq's oil
revenues, the role of religion in the state, providing an amnesty for
insurgents willing to put down their weapons, and demobilizing and
disarming the militias.
More outside aid could increase their incentive to talk. Even then,
the threat of an American withdrawal may be the only way to extract
real concessions. In parallel with the reconciliation talks, the
United States should begin its own negotiations with the Iraqi
leadership about a timetable for withdrawing American troops - making
clear that America's willingness to stay longer will depend on the
Iraqis' willingness to make real compromises. Iraqi politicians have
to know that they have even more to lose if their country plunges
into complete civil war.
We are skeptical of calls to divide the country into three ethnically
controlled regions, using the model that finally ended the Bosnian
war. Most Iraqis, except for the Kurds, show little enthusiasm for
the idea. Clear ethnic boundaries could not be drawn without driving
many people from their homes - though an intolerable level of ethnic
cleansing is already pushing things in that direction. Any effort at
reconciliation will almost certainly require a transfer of power and
resources to provincial and local governments. But it must be up to
the Iraqis to decide the ultimate shape of their country.
Stabilize Baghdad
Most Iraqis have forgotten what security is - or if they remember, it
is an idealized vision of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. Since
neither the government nor the American occupation is able to provide
basic services or safety, it is little wonder that Iraqis have turned
to the militias for protection. In such a world, retribution will
always take precedence over the uncertainties of political compromise.
American commanders have launched a series of supposedly
make-or-break campaigns to take back the streets of Baghdad. The
problem is not one of military strategy; their idea of "clearing" out
insurgents, "holding" neighborhoods and quickly rebuilding
infrastructure is probably the only thing that could work. The
problem is that commanders in Baghdad have been given only a fraction
of the troops - American and Iraqi - they need.
There have never been enough troops, the result of Mr. Rumsfeld's
negligent decision to use Iraq as a proving ground for his pet
military theories, rather than listen to his generals. And since the
Army and Marines are already strained to the breaking point, the only
hope of restoring even limited sanity to Baghdad would require the
transfer of thousands of American troops to the capital from
elsewhere in the country. That likely means moving personnel out of
the Sunni-dominated west, and more mayhem in a place like Anbar.
But Iraqis need a clear demonstration that security and rebuilding
is possible. So long as Baghdad is in chaos they will have no reason
to believe in anything but sectarian militias and vigilante justice.
Once Washington is making a credible effort to stabilize Baghdad,
Iraqi politicians will have more of an incentive to show up for
reconciliation talks. No one wants to be a rejectionist if it looks
like the tide might be turning.
Convene the Neighbors
America's closest allies in the region are furious about America's
gross mismanagement of the war. But even Iran and Syria, which are
eager to see America bloodied, have a great deal to lose if all-out
civil war erupts in Iraq, driving refugees toward their borders. That
self-interest could be the start of a discussion about how Iraq's
neighbors might help pressure their clients inside Iraq to step back
from the brink. Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich neighbors - whose own
stability could be threatened by an Iraqi collapse - need to be
pressed into providing major financing to underwrite jobs programs
and reconstruction.
Enlightened self-interest is a rarity in the Middle East. The Bush
administration will most likely have to go further to elicit real
help, showing a serious willingness to expand its dialogue with
Damascus and Tehran beyond the issue of Iraq and to be a genuine
broker for Middle East peace. That should be the easiest part of the
strategy - only this White House regards the willingness to talk to
another country as a major concession.
Acknowledge Reality
While the strategy described above seems the best bet to us, the odds
are still very much against it working. At this point, all plans to
avoid disaster involve the equivalent of a Hail Mary pass. In
America, almost no one - even the administration's harshest critics -
wants to tell people the bitter truth about how few options remain on
the table, and about the mayhem that will almost certainly follow an
American withdrawal unless more is done.
Truth will only take us so far, but it is the right way to begin.
Americans will probably spend the next generation debating whether
the Iraq invasion would have worked under a competent administration.
Right now, the best place to express bitterness about what may become
the worst foreign policy debacle in American history is at the polls.
But anger at a president is not a plan for what happens next.
When it comes to Iraq the choices in the immediate future are scant
and ugly. But there are still a few options to pursue, and the
alternatives are so horrible that it is worth trying once again - as
long as everyone understands that there is little time left and the
odds are very long.
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