[Assam] assam Digest, Vol 30, Issue 17

Fri Jan 18 05:17:06 PST 2008

  Why not have an expiry date for PhDs?

T C A Srinivasa-Raghavan 

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January 18, 2008

Can just one degree, or success in one examination, make a person fit for jobs needing very high skill levels for 37-40 years?

Instead of writing about a research paper this time, I am going to tell you about a novel suggestion about research itself. It comes from Ram Gopal Agarwal, formerly of the World Bank.

The suggestion is this: All PhD degrees must have an expiry date. The reasons for putting in an expiry date are so self-evident that they do not merit reiteration.

We did not get the opportunity to discuss just how long the validity period should be. But I imagine 10 -12 years would do nicely.

So the real question to be answered is how best renewal is to be achieved. Agarwal thinks a strong record of publications should suffice.

But, as they say, this suggestion needs to be treated with caution because there are far too many what can be called farzi journals around, especially in India. I know of 'professors' who, in order to get published before the promotion interview comes around, have started their own journals!

Nor, as I have had occasion to point out before, is peer review a fool-proof solution. With as many as 25,000 journals published every year in all subjects taken together, each with about 12 papers on average, you need 300,000 reviewers each year if each reviewer reads only one paper. 

Even if each one reads five papers per year, you'd need 60,000 top-class peer reviewers. There's no way anyone can claim that such a large number is indeed available and ready. So how can peer reviewing help if the reviewer himself or herself is third rate?

In the case of economics, an economist called Glen Ellison from MIT in the US says there has been a decline in the number of peer-reviewed papers in top economics journals that are written by economists from the highest-ranked economics departments. 

The system had become dysfunctional long ago but I imagine the data is only now seeping through. Not just this, top economists from the best departments in the US are publishing less in peer-reviewed journals. So it would seem that the big frogs in the well are doing as they please while insisting that lesser colleagues follow the rules.

So if publications, even in the best peer-reviewed journals, won't deliver foolproof results -- and this is all too evident in economics -- what is the way out for qualifications renewal? The US medical profession offers a good solution.

There, after every ten years, every doctor has to pass an examination which is of the most exacting standards. The idea is to make sure that the person has kept abreast of new developments.

In India, a very minor step in this direction has been taken by those universities (like the JNU) which insist that assistant professors, in order to become associate professors, must undergo an orientation course. But there is no exam at the end of the course. Only attendance is necessary. I wonder how many other universities and institutes like the IITs and the IIMs have even this requirement.

While Agarwal and I were discussing this, someone asked why, if a PhD could 'expire', persons who on the dint of passing just one exam (like the IAS one) should not be required to pass more exams during their career. Imagine, someone who passed the IAS exam in 1972 can float along until one day he reaches the top policymaking posts merely because he didn't, along the way, severely piss off some boss. Indeed, that is the only requirement in government service to reach the top.

Agarwal, because he is very modest, murmurs gently that it is not original an idea. Be that as it may, it is a brilliant idea which needs to be examined very seriously.

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On Tue, 15 Jan 2008 assam-request at assamnet.org wrote :
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>When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>than "Re: Contents of assam digest..."
>Today's Topics:
>
>    1. Vajpayee recalls his close bond with Ashok Saikia
>       (Pradip Kumar Datta)
>    2. DoNER bid to lure tourists to NE(The Assam Tribune,
>       15.01.2008) (Buljit Buragohain)
>    3. Pakistan Struggles Against Militants Trained by Agency -NYT
>       (Ram Sarangapani)
>    4. Re: Pakistan Struggles Against Militants Trained by Agency
>       -NYT (Chan Mahanta)
>    5. Re: Pakistan Struggles Against Militants Trained by Agency /
>       TYPO -NYT (Chan Mahanta)
>Vajpayee recalls his close bond with Ashok Saikia
>
> >From Our Spl Correspondent Assam Tribune
>  NEW DELHI, Jan 14  Former Prime Ministe Atal Behari Vajpayee has mourned the passing away of his most trusted aide, Ashok Saikia, describing him as one of the most outstanding officers and a close family friend.
>
>At a prayer meeting held at Chinmaya Mission here yesterday, Saikias family members, friends and colleagues gathered to pay glowing tributes to the late bureaucrat. The prayer meeting, presided over by former BJP minister Vijay Goel, was attended by Saikias wife Ranjana Saikia, his two sons Anshuman and Aditya besides his daughter-in-law, Aarti and other close family members.
>
>In a message, read out by Goel, the former Prime Minister grieved Saikias untimely death. Vajpayee recalled his close bond with Ashok. When I met him little did I realise that relation with this 18-year-old lad from Assam would grow into close family tie, the message read. The message also contained a poem composed by him.
>
>If Vajpayees message was emotional, his foster daughter Namita was inconsolable. Recalling her association with Saikia since she was four years old, she said, it started with a fight because he had taken away her tri-cycle. This fight continued until he passed away on December 30, said a teary-eyed Namita, paying him a rich tribute.
>
>Vajpayees family members including his daughter and son-in-law Ranjan Bhattacharya were personally coordinating the prayer meeting, receiving the guests at the gate. Present on the occasion were top political leaders, senior bureaucrats, lawyers, editors and journalists including former minister Arun Jetley, Arun Shourie, principal secretary to the Prime Minister, TKA Nair, Nobel Laureate RK Pachouri, former home secretary, VK Duggal, many retired and serving officers of Assam Cadre.
>
>Also those who attended the prayer meeting included Editor-in-Chief of The Indian Express, Shekhar Gupta, Prabhu Chawla of India Today Group, columnist Coomi Kapoor, among others.
>
>Saikia was described as one of the most able bureaucrats with a great sense of humour. His batch-mate Amitabh Pandey recalled their early years at the IAS academy. His colleagues reminisced his role in the aftermath of the super-cyclone in Orissa, how, as a joint secretary in the PMO, he had flown down to the state to personally take stock of the situation. Once in Orissa he shunned all formalities and reached the affected areas with the help of an NGO.
>
>Saikias handling of the relief and rehabilitation in the aftermath of the Kutch earthquake has become a country model for disaster management, his colleagues recalled.
>
>
>
>---------------------------------
>Be a better friend, newshound, and know-it-all with Yahoo! Mobile.  Try it now.
>DoNER bid to lure tourists to NE
> >From Our Spl Correspondent
>  NEW DELHI, Jan 14  In what could be described as a classic case of out-of-the-box thinking, the Ministry for Development of North Eastern Region (DoNER), in a bid to boost tourism into the region, has convened a National Conclave on Promoting North-east as a Destination for Leave Travel Concession (LTC) Travellers here on Wednesday. The first of its kind conclave has been organised in association with the Ministry of Tourism and is expected to be joined by over 500 delegates representing various tour operators, representatives from North-eastern States and Central Ministries.
>
>The conclave will be inaugurated by Minister of DoNER, Panchayati Raj and Youth Affairs and Sports, Mani Shankar Aiyar.
>
>Tour operators, trade bodies, besides officials from State tourism departments of the region are scheduled to make presentation on destination North-east. An exhibition has also been organised by the Ministry to highlight the places of tourist attraction.
>
>Hoping to change the general perception about the North-east as a troubled and dangerous spot, the Ministry DoNER, in an innovative move, is planning to persuade the Central Ministries to encourage its employees to use their (LTC) to visit the region.
>
>The idea, which was first mooted by the Minister during the North East Business Summit here last year, gathered momentum after Aiyar began to actively pursue it with the Central Ministries. However, initial response to his proposal was not encouraging with the Union Finance Ministry declining to endorse it.
>
>Aiyar proposes to press the Centre to amend the guideline for LTC by including airfare for travel to the North-east. Currently, only senior government officials are entitled to travel by air on LTC.
>
>The idea is to woo the government employees with attractive packages to visit the region. Aiyar is eying the thousands of government employees and their families, who travel using their LTC, sources said.
>
>The Ministry has invited the Central Ministries to send delegations to participate in the conclave. And assuring them about safety of travelling to the region would be the Minister himself, who is going to allay apprehensions over the law and order situation in the region.
>
>That not all the States in the region are militancy  affected is proposed to be highlighted. That even in those States hit by militancy, only certain pockets are affected is also going to be impressed upon, sources said.
>
>The State tourism departments of the NE States and the regions tour operators are being prodded by the Ministry to come out with attractive packages for government employees to lure them to travel to the region using their LTC, the sources added.
>
>As reported by newspapers, the response in the session on tourism in the North East Business Summit in Bangkok was so encouraging that Aiyar agreed to bring over a delegation of Thai tour operators, journalists and travel writers to the North-east. A suggestion had come from the Thai business body that the old linkages between the Thai and Ahom communities should be exploited to tailor packages to woo Thai tourists.
>
>   (The Assam Tribune,15.01.2008)
>
>
>
>
>---------------------------------
>  Unlimited freedom, unlimited storage. Get it now
>It is astonishing that the Western press is still surprised by the fact that
>the ISI can only spew militancy, but has little or no control of such groups
>operating in Pakistan.
>Unfortunately, our own home-grown varieties seem downright enamored with the
>ISI and Bangladesh Intelligence (an oxymoron?).
>
>--Ram
>  ------------------------------
>  January 15, 2008
>  Pakistan Struggles Against Militants Trained by Agency By CARLOTTA
>GALL<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/g/carlotta_gall/index.html?inline=nyt-per>and
>DAVID
>ROHDE<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/r/david_rohde/index.html?inline=nyt-per>
>
>ISLAMABAD, Pakistan<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/pakistan/index.html?inline=nyt-geo>
>Pakistan's premier military intelligence agency has lost control of
>some
>of the networks of Pakistani militants it has nurtured since the 1980s, and
>is now suffering the violent blowback of that policy, two former senior
>intelligence officials and other officials close to the agency say.
>
>As the military has moved against them, the militants have turned on their
>former handlers, the officials said. Joining with other extremist groups,
>they have battled Pakistani security forces and helped militants carry out a
>record number of suicide attacks last year, including some aimed directly at
>army and intelligence units as well as prominent political figures, possibly
>even Benazir Bhutto<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/benazir_bhutto/index.html?inline=nyt-per>.
>
>
>The growing strength of the militants, many of whom now express support for Al
>Qaeda<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda/index.html?inline=nyt-org>'s
>global jihad, presents a grave threat to Pakistan's security, as well as
>NATO<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/north_atlantic_treaty_organization/index.html?inline=nyt-org>efforts
>to push back the
>Taliban<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/taliban/index.html?inline=nyt-org>in
>Afghanistan. American officials have begun to weigh more robust covert
>operations to go after Al Qaeda in the lawless border areas because they are
>so concerned that the Pakistani government is unable to do so.
>
>The unusual disclosures regarding Pakistan's leading military intelligence
>agency  Inter-Services
>Intelligence<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/i/interservices_intelligence/index.html?inline=nyt-org>,
>or the ISI  emerged in interviews last month with former senior Pakistani
>intelligence officials. The disclosures confirm some of the worst fears, and
>suspicions, of American and Western military officials and diplomats.
>
>The interviews, a rare glimpse inside a notoriously secretive and opaque
>agency, offered a string of other troubling insights likely to refocus
>attention on the ISI's role as Pakistan moves toward elections on Feb. 18
>and a battle for control of the government looms:
>
>¶One former senior Pakistani intelligence official, as well as other people
>close to the agency, acknowledged that the ISI led the effort to manipulate
>Pakistan's last national election in 2002, and offered to drop corruption
>cases against candidates who would back President Pervez
>Musharraf<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/pervez_musharraf/index.html?inline=nyt-per>.
>
>
>A person close to the ISI said Mr. Musharraf had now ordered the agency to
>ensure that the coming elections were free and fair, and denied that the
>agency was working to rig the vote. But the acknowledgment of past rigging
>is certain to fuel opposition fears of new meddling.
>
>¶The two former high-ranking intelligence officials acknowledged that after
>Sept. 11, 2001, when President Musharraf publicly allied Pakistan with the
>Bush administration, the ISI could not rein in the militants it had nurtured
>for decades as a proxy force to exert pressure on India and Afghanistan.
>After the agency unleashed hard-line Islamist beliefs, the officials said,
>it struggled to stop the ideology from spreading.
>
>¶Another former senior intelligence official said dozens of ISI officers who
>trained militants had come to sympathize with their cause and had had to be
>expelled from the agency. He said three purges had taken place since the
>late 1980s and included the removal of three ISI directors suspected of
>being sympathetic to the militants.
>
>None of the former intelligence officials who spoke to The New York Times
>agreed to be identified when talking about the ISI, an agency that has
>gained a fearsome reputation for interfering in almost every aspect of
>Pakistani life. But two former American intelligence officials agreed with
>much of what they said about the agency's relationship with the militants.
>
>So did other sources close to the ISI, who admitted that the agency had
>supported militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir, although they said they had
>been ordered to do so by political leaders.
>
>The former intelligence officials appeared to feel freer to speak as Mr.
>Musharraf's eight years of military rule weakened, and as a power struggle
>for control over the government looms between Mr. Musharraf and opposition
>political parties.
>
>The officials were interviewed before the assassination of Ms. Bhutto, the
>opposition leader, on Dec. 27. Since then, the government has said that
>Pakistani militants linked to Al Qaeda are the foremost suspects in her
>killing. Her supporters have accused the government of a hidden hand in the
>attack.
>
>While the author of Ms. Bhutto's death remains a mystery, the interviews
>with the former intelligence officials made clear that the agency remained
>unable to control the militants it had fostered.
>
>The threat from the militants, the former intelligence officials warned, is
>one that Pakistan is unable to contain. "We could not control them," said
>one former senior intelligence official, who spoke on condition of
>anonymity. "We indoctrinated them and told them, 'You will go to heaven.'
>You cannot turn it around so suddenly."
>
>The Context
>
>After 9/11, the Bush administration pressed Mr. Musharraf to choose a side
>in fighting Islamist extremism and to abandon Pakistan's longtime support
>for the Taliban and other Islamist militants.
>
>In the 1990s, the ISI supported the militants as a proxy force to contest
>Indian-controlled Kashmir, the border territory that India and Pakistan both
>claim, and to gain a controlling influence in neighboring Afghanistan. In
>the 1980s, the United States supported militants, too, funneling billions of
>dollars to Islamic fighters battling Soviet forces in Afghanistan through
>the ISI, vastly increasing the agency's size and power.
>
>Publicly, Mr. Musharraf agreed to reverse course in 2001, and he has
>received $10 billion in aid for Pakistan since then in return. In an
>interview in November, he vehemently defended the conduct of the ISI, an
>agency that, according to American officials, was under his firm control for
>the last eight years while he served as both president and army chief.
>
>Mr. Musharraf dismissed criticism of the ISI's relationship with the
>militants. He cited the deaths of 1,000 Pakistani soldiers and police
>officers in battles with the militants in recent years  as well as several
>assassination attempts against himself  as proof of the seriousness of
>Pakistan's counterterrorism effort.
>
>"It is quite illogical if you think those people who have suffered 1,000
>people dead, and I who have been attacked thrice or four or five times, that
>I would be supportive towards Taliban, towards Al Qaeda," Mr. Musharraf
>said. "These are ridiculous things that discourages and demoralizes."
>
>But some former American intelligence officials have argued that Mr.
>Musharraf and the ISI never fully jettisoned their militant protégés, and
>instead carried on a "double-game." They say Mr. Musharraf cooperated with
>American intelligence agencies to track down foreign Qaeda members while
>holding Taliban commanders and Kashmiri militants in reserve.
>
>In order to undercut major opposition parties, he wooed religious
>conservatives, according to analysts. And instead of carrying out a
>crackdown, Mr. Musharraf took half-measures.
>
>"I think he would make a decision when a situation arises," said Hasan
>Askari Rizvi, a leading Pakistani military analyst, referring to militants
>openly confronting the government. "But before that he would not alienate
>any side."
>
>There is little dispute that Pakistan's crackdown on the militants has been
>at best uneven, but key sources interviewed by The Times disagreed on why.
>
>Most Western officials in Pakistan say they believe, as Pakistani officials,
>including President Musharraf, insist, that the agency is well disciplined,
>like the army, and is in no sense a rogue or out-of-control organization
>acting contrary to the policies of the leadership.
>
>A senior Western military official in Pakistan said that if the ISI was
>covertly aiding the Taliban, the decision would come from the top of the
>government, not the agency. "That's not an ISI decision," the official said.
>"That's a government-of-Pakistan decision."
>
>But former Pakistani intelligence officials insisted that Mr. Musharraf had
>ordered a crackdown on all militants. It was never fully carried out,
>however, because of opposition within his government and within ISI, they
>said.
>
>One former senior intelligence official said that some officials in the
>government and the ISI thought the militants should be held in reserve, as
>insurance against the day when American and NATO forces abandoned the region
>and Pakistan might again need them as a lever against India.
>
>"We had a school of thought that favored retention of this capability," the
>former senior intelligence official said.
>
>Some senior ministers and officials in Mr. Musharraf's government
>sympathized with the militants and protected them, former intelligence
>officials said. Still others advised a go-slow approach, fearing a backlash
>against the government from the militants.
>
>When arrests were ordered, the police refused to carry them out in some
>cases until they received written orders, believing the militants were still
>protected by the ISI, as they had been for years.
>
>Inside the ISI, there was division as well. One part of the ISI hunted down
>militants, the officials said, while another continued to work with them.
>The result was confusion.
>
>In interviews in 2002, Kashmiri militants in Pakistan said they had been
>told by the government to maintain a low profile and wait. But as Pakistani
>military operations in the tribal areas intensified, along with airstrikes
>by C.I.A.<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c/central_intelligence_agency/index.html?inline=nyt-org>-operated
>drones, militant groups there issued highly charged and sometimes
>exaggerated accounts of women and children being killed.
>
>The first suicide bombing attack on a military target outside the tribal
>areas came days after an airstrike on a madrasa in the tribal area of Bajaur
>in October 2006 killed scores of people.
>
>Another turning point came last July when Pakistani forces stormed the Red
>Mosque in Islamabad, where militants had armed themselves in a compound less
>than a mile from ISI headquarters and demanded the imposition of Islamic
>law. Government officials said that more than 100 people died. The militants
>have insisted that thousands did.
>
>Several weeks later, militants carried out the first direct attacks on ISI
>employees. Suicide bombers twice attacked buses ferrying agency employees,
>killing 18 on Sept. 4 and 15 more on Nov. 24. According to Pakistani
>analysts, the attacks signaled that enraged militants had turned on their
>longtime patrons.
>
>The Militant
>
>One militant leader, Maulana Masood Azhar, typifies how extremists once
>trained by the ISI have broken free of the agency's control, turned against
>the government and joined with other militants to create powerful new
>networks.
>
>In 2000, Mr. Azhar received support from the ISI when he founded
>Jaish-e-Muhammad, or Army of Muhammad, a Pakistani militant group fighting
>Indian forces in Kashmir, according to Robert Grenier, who served as the
>Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Islamabad from 1999 to 2002.
>The ISI intermittently provided training and operational coordination to
>such groups, he said, but struggled to fully control them.
>
>Mr. Musharraf banned Jaish-e-Muhammad and detained Mr. Azhar after militants
>carried out an attack on the Indian Parliament building in December 2001.
>Indian officials accused Jaish-e-Muhammad and another Pakistani militant
>group of masterminding the attack. After India massed hundreds of thousands
>of troops on Pakistan's border, Mr. Musharraf vowed in a nationally
>televised speech that January to crack down on all militants in Pakistan.
>
>"We will take strict action against any Pakistani who is involved in
>terrorism inside the country or abroad," he said. Two weeks later, a
>British-born member of Mr. Azhar's group, Ahmed Omar
>Sheikh<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/ahmed_omar_sheikh/index.html?inline=nyt-per>,
>kidnapped Daniel
>Pearl<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/p/daniel_pearl/index.html?inline=nyt-per>,
>a reporter for The Wall Street Journal who was beheaded by his captors. Mr.
>Sheikh surrendered to the ISI, the agency that had supported
>Jaish-e-Muhammad, and was sentenced to death for the kidnapping.
>
>After Mr. Pearl's killing, Pakistani officials arrested more than 2,000
>people in a crackdown. But within a year, Mr. Azhar and most of the 2,000
>militants who had been arrested were freed. "I never believed that
>government ties with these groups was being irrevocably cut," said Mr.
>Grenier, now a managing director at Kroll, a risk consulting firm.
>
>At the same time, Pakistan seemingly went "through the motions" when it came
>to hunting Taliban leaders who fled into Pakistan after the 2001 American
>invasion of Afghanistan, he said.
>
>Encouraged by the United States, the Pakistanis focused their resources on
>arresting senior Qaeda members, he said, which they successfully did from
>2002 to 2005. Since then, arrests have slowed as Al Qaeda and other militant
>groups have become more entrenched in the tribal areas.
>
>Asked in 2006 why the Pakistani government did not move against the leading
>Taliban commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his son Sirajuddin, who are based
>in the tribal areas and have long had links with Al Qaeda, one senior ISI
>official said it was because Pakistan needed to retain some assets of its
>own.
>
>That policy haunts Mr. Musharraf and the United States, according to
>American and Pakistani analysts. Today Pakistan's tribal areas are host to a
>lethal stew of foreign Qaeda members, Uzbek militants, Taliban, ISI-trained
>Pakistani extremists, disgruntled tribesmen and new recruits.
>
>The groups carried out a record number of suicide bombings in Pakistan and
>Afghanistan last year and have been tied to three major terrorist plots in
>Britain and Germany since 2005.
>
>Mr. Azhar, who once served his ISI mentors in Kashmir, is thought to be
>hiding in the tribal area of Bajaur, or nearby Dir, and fighting Pakistani
>security forces, according to one former intelligence official. Militants
>who took part in the Red Mosque siege in Islamabad in July were closely
>affiliated with Mr. Azhar's group. This fall, his group fielded fighters in
>the Swat Valley, the famous tourist spot, where the militants presented a
>challenge of new proportions to the government, seizing several districts
>and mounting battles against Pakistani forces that left scores dead.
>
>One militant from a banned sectarian group who joined Mr. Azhar's group,
>Qari Zafar, now trains insurgents in South Waziristan on how to rig roadside
>bombs and vests for suicide bombings, according to the former intelligence
>official.
>
>Cooperation against the Taliban fighting in Afghanistan has improved since
>2006, and three senior Taliban figures have been caught, according to
>Western officials and sources close to the ISI. Yet doubts remain about the
>Pakistani government's intentions.
>
>Senior provincial ISI officials continue to meet with high-level members of
>the Taliban in the border provinces, according to one Western diplomat. "It
>is not illogical to surmise that cooperation is on the agenda, and not just
>debriefing," the diplomat said.
>
>"There are groups they know they have lost control of," the Western diplomat
>added. But the government moved only against those groups that have attacked
>the Pakistani state, the diplomat said, adding, "It seems very difficult for
>them to write them off."
>
>The Agency Now
>
>Western officials say that before Mr. Musharraf resigned as army chief in
>December, he appointed a loyalist to run the ISI and appears determined to
>retain power over the agency even as a civilian president.
>
>"For as long as he can, Musharraf will keep trying to control these
>organizations," a Western diplomat said. "I don't think we should expect
>this man to become an elder statesman as we know it."
>
>That puts Mr. Musharraf's successor as army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez
>Kayani, who headed the ISI from 2004 to 2007, in a potentially pivotal
>position. General Kayani, a pro-American moderate, is loyal to Mr. Musharraf
>to a point, according to retired officers. But he will abandon him if he
>thinks Mr. Musharraf's actions are significantly undermining the standing of
>the Pakistani army.
>
>Mr. Musharraf will maintain control over the agency as long as his interests
>coincide with General Kayani's, they said, while the new civilian prime
>minister who emerges from February's elections is likely to have far less
>authority over the agency. Opposition political parties already accuse the
>agency of meddling in next month's election. The Western diplomat called the
>ISI "the army's dirty bag of tricks."
>
>Since Ms. Bhutto's assassination, members of her party have accused
>government officials, including former ISI agents, of having a hidden hand
>in the attack or of knowing about a plot and failing to inform Ms. Bhutto.
>
>American experts played down the chances of a government conspiracy against
>Ms. Bhutto. They also said it was unlikely that low-level or retired
>officers working alone or with militants carried out the attack.
>
>But nearly half of Pakistanis said in a recent poll that they suspected that
>government agencies or pro-government politicians had assassinated Ms.
>Bhutto. Such suspicion stems from decades of interference in elections and
>politics by the ISI, according to analysts, as well as a high level of
>domestic surveillance, intimidation and threats to journalists, academics
>and human rights activists, which former intelligence officials also
>acknowledged.
>
>Pakistani and American experts say that distrust speaks to the urgent need
>to reform a hugely powerful intelligence agency that Pakistan's military
>rulers have used for decades to suppress political opponents, manipulate
>elections and support militant groups.
>
>"Pakistan would certainly be better off if the ISI were never used for
>domestic political purposes," said Mr. Grenier, the former C.I.A. Islamabad
>station chief. "That goes without saying."
>
>Pakistani analysts and Western diplomats argue that the country will remain
>unstable as long as the ISI remains so powerful and so unaccountable. The
>ISI has grown more powerful in each period of military rule, they said.
>
>Civilian leaders, including Mrs. Bhutto, could not resist using it to secure
>their political aims, but neither could they control it. And the army
>continues to rely on the ISI for its own foreign policy aims, particularly
>battling India in Kashmir and seeking influence in Afghanistan.
>
>"The question is, how do you change that?" asked one Western diplomat.
>"Their tentacles are everywhere."
>
>
>    Copyright 2008<http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/help/copyright.html>
>The
>    New York Times Company <http://www.nytco.com/>
>
>>  >Unfortunately, our own home-grown varieties seem downright enamored with the
>>ISI and Bangladesh Intelligence (an oxymoron?).
>
>
>
>*** The comment displays a rather simpleminded view of things at best.
>
>Do the 'home-grown varieties'  associate with ISI, IF they DO, as their detractors claim, because they are 'enamored' of their ideology or mission?  Or they do so, because they are DRIVEN to seeking  help from the ENEMY of their ENEMIEs?
>
>
>*** Did these 'home-grown varieties'  begin their struggles against Indian rule to advance ISI's or Pakistan's cause?  Or were they DRIVEN to its fold, if they were, because of decades of Indian intransigence?  Could India imagine that such a consequence could evolve from its policies, or was it
>not smart enough to foresee it?
>
>Hasn't India and its apologists not been crying hoarse for decades that the NE insurgents are getting increasing help from ISI or Pakistan or who-have-you? But has that deterred it from engaging them in finding a political solution?
>
>Does it not smack of appalling hypocrisy laced with a liberal dose of clueless propaganda that would be apparent to anyone with half a working brain? Or is it a case of abject Indian stupidity? Or a combination of both?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>At 9:35 AM -0600 1/15/08, Ram Sarangapani wrote:
>>It is astonishing that the Western press is still surprised by the fact that
>>the ISI can only spew militancy, but has little or no control of such groups
>>operating in Pakistan.
>>Unfortunately, our own home-grown varieties seem downright enamored with the
>>ISI and Bangladesh Intelligence (an oxymoron?).
>>
>>--Ram
>>  ------------------------------
>>  January 15, 2008
>>  Pakistan Struggles Against Militants Trained by Agency By CARLOTTA
>>GALL<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/g/carlotta_gall/index.html?inline=nyt-per>and
>>DAVID
>>ROHDE<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/r/david_rohde/index.html?inline=nyt-per>
>>
>>ISLAMABAD, Pakistan<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/pakistan/index.html?inline=nyt-geo>-
>>Pakistan's premier military intelligence agency has lost control of
>>some
>>of the networks of Pakistani militants it has nurtured since the 1980s, and
>>is now suffering the violent blowback of that policy, two former senior
>>intelligence officials and other officials close to the agency say.
>>
>>As the military has moved against them, the militants have turned on their
>>former handlers, the officials said. Joining with other extremist groups,
>>they have battled Pakistani security forces and helped militants carry out a
>>record number of suicide attacks last year, including some aimed directly at
>>army and intelligence units as well as prominent political figures, possibly
>>even Benazir Bhutto<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/benazir_bhutto/index.html?inline=nyt-per>.
>>
>>
>>The growing strength of the militants, many of whom now express support for Al
>>Qaeda<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda/index.html?inline=nyt-org>'s
>>global jihad, presents a grave threat to Pakistan's security, as well as
>>NATO<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/north_atlantic_treaty_organization/index.html?inline=nyt-org>efforts
>>to push back the
>>Taliban<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/taliban/index.html?inline=nyt-org>in
>>Afghanistan. American officials have begun to weigh more robust covert
>>operations to go after Al Qaeda in the lawless border areas because they are
>>so concerned that the Pakistani government is unable to do so.
>>
>>The unusual disclosures regarding Pakistan's leading military intelligence
>>agency - Inter-Services
>>Intelligence<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/i/interservices_intelligence/index.html?inline=nyt-org>,
>>or the ISI - emerged in interviews last month with former senior Pakistani
>>intelligence officials. The disclosures confirm some of the worst fears, and
>>suspicions, of American and Western military officials and diplomats.
>>
>>The interviews, a rare glimpse inside a notoriously secretive and opaque
>>agency, offered a string of other troubling insights likely to refocus
>>attention on the ISI's role as Pakistan moves toward elections on Feb. 18
>>and a battle for control of the government looms:
>>
>>¶One former senior Pakistani intelligence official, as well as other people
>>close to the agency, acknowledged that the ISI led the effort to manipulate
>>Pakistan's last national election in 2002, and offered to drop corruption
>>cases against candidates who would back President Pervez
>>Musharraf<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/pervez_musharraf/index.html?inline=nyt-per>.
>>
>>
>>A person close to the ISI said Mr. Musharraf had now ordered the agency to
>>ensure that the coming elections were free and fair, and denied that the
>>agency was working to rig the vote. But the acknowledgment of past rigging
>>is certain to fuel opposition fears of new meddling.
>>
>>¶The two former high-ranking intelligence officials acknowledged that after
>>Sept. 11, 2001, when President Musharraf publicly allied Pakistan with the
>>Bush administration, the ISI could not rein in the militants it had nurtured
>>for decades as a proxy force to exert pressure on India and Afghanistan.
>>After the agency unleashed hard-line Islamist beliefs, the officials said,
>>it struggled to stop the ideology from spreading.
>>
>>¶Another former senior intelligence official said dozens of ISI officers who
>>trained militants had come to sympathize with their cause and had had to be
>>expelled from the agency. He said three purges had taken place since the
>>late 1980s and included the removal of three ISI directors suspected of
>>being sympathetic to the militants.
>>
>>None of the former intelligence officials who spoke to The New York Times
>>agreed to be identified when talking about the ISI, an agency that has
>>gained a fearsome reputation for interfering in almost every aspect of
>>Pakistani life. But two former American intelligence officials agreed with
>>much of what they said about the agency's relationship with the militants.
>>
>>So did other sources close to the ISI, who admitted that the agency had
>>supported militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir, although they said they had
>>been ordered to do so by political leaders.
>>
>>The former intelligence officials appeared to feel freer to speak as Mr.
>>Musharraf's eight years of military rule weakened, and as a power struggle
>>for control over the government looms between Mr. Musharraf and opposition
>>political parties.
>>
>>The officials were interviewed before the assassination of Ms. Bhutto, the
>>opposition leader, on Dec. 27. Since then, the government has said that
>>Pakistani militants linked to Al Qaeda are the foremost suspects in her
>>killing. Her supporters have accused the government of a hidden hand in the
>>attack.
>>
>>While the author of Ms. Bhutto's death remains a mystery, the interviews
>>with the former intelligence officials made clear that the agency remained
>>unable to control the militants it had fostered.
>>
>>The threat from the militants, the former intelligence officials warned, is
>>one that Pakistan is unable to contain. "We could not control them," said
>>one former senior intelligence official, who spoke on condition of
>>anonymity. "We indoctrinated them and told them, 'You will go to heaven.'
>>You cannot turn it around so suddenly."
>>
>>The Context
>>
>>After 9/11, the Bush administration pressed Mr. Musharraf to choose a side
>>in fighting Islamist extremism and to abandon Pakistan's longtime support
>>for the Taliban and other Islamist militants.
>>
>>In the 1990s, the ISI supported the militants as a proxy force to contest
>>Indian-controlled Kashmir, the border territory that India and Pakistan both
>>claim, and to gain a controlling influence in neighboring Afghanistan. In
>>the 1980s, the United States supported militants, too, funneling billions of
>>dollars to Islamic fighters battling Soviet forces in Afghanistan through
>>the ISI, vastly increasing the agency's size and power.
>>
>>Publicly, Mr. Musharraf agreed to reverse course in 2001, and he has
>>received $10 billion in aid for Pakistan since then in return. In an
>>interview in November, he vehemently defended the conduct of the ISI, an
>>agency that, according to American officials, was under his firm control for
>>the last eight years while he served as both president and army chief.
>>
>>Mr. Musharraf dismissed criticism of the ISI's relationship with the
>>militants. He cited the deaths of 1,000 Pakistani soldiers and police
>>officers in battles with the militants in recent years - as well as several
>>assassination attempts against himself - as proof of the seriousness of
>>Pakistan's counterterrorism effort.
>>
>>"It is quite illogical if you think those people who have suffered 1,000
>>people dead, and I who have been attacked thrice or four or five times, that
>>I would be supportive towards Taliban, towards Al Qaeda," Mr. Musharraf
>>said. "These are ridiculous things that discourages and demoralizes."
>>
>>But some former American intelligence officials have argued that Mr.
>>Musharraf and the ISI never fully jettisoned their militant protégés, and
>>instead carried on a "double-game." They say Mr. Musharraf cooperated with
>>American intelligence agencies to track down foreign Qaeda members while
>>holding Taliban commanders and Kashmiri militants in reserve.
>>
>>In order to undercut major opposition parties, he wooed religious
>>conservatives, according to analysts. And instead of carrying out a
>>crackdown, Mr. Musharraf took half-measures.
>>
>>"I think he would make a decision when a situation arises," said Hasan
>>Askari Rizvi, a leading Pakistani military analyst, referring to militants
>>openly confronting the government. "But before that he would not alienate
>>any side."
>>
>>There is little dispute that Pakistan's crackdown on the militants has been
>>at best uneven, but key sources interviewed by The Times disagreed on why.
>>
>>Most Western officials in Pakistan say they believe, as Pakistani officials,
>>including President Musharraf, insist, that the agency is well disciplined,
>>like the army, and is in no sense a rogue or out-of-control organization
>>acting contrary to the policies of the leadership.
>>
>>A senior Western military official in Pakistan said that if the ISI was
>>covertly aiding the Taliban, the decision would come from the top of the
>>government, not the agency. "That's not an ISI decision," the official said.
>>"That's a government-of-Pakistan decision."
>>
>>But former Pakistani intelligence officials insisted that Mr. Musharraf had
>>ordered a crackdown on all militants. It was never fully carried out,
>>however, because of opposition within his government and within ISI, they
>>said.
>>
>>One former senior intelligence official said that some officials in the
>>government and the ISI thought the militants should be held in reserve, as
>>insurance against the day when American and NATO forces abandoned the region
>>and Pakistan might again need them as a lever against India.
>>
>>"We had a school of thought that favored retention of this capability," the
>>former senior intelligence official said.
>>
>>Some senior ministers and officials in Mr. Musharraf's government
>>sympathized with the militants and protected them, former intelligence
>>officials said. Still others advised a go-slow approach, fearing a backlash
>>against the government from the militants.
>>
>>When arrests were ordered, the police refused to carry them out in some
>>cases until they received written orders, believing the militants were still
>>protected by the ISI, as they had been for years.
>>
>>Inside the ISI, there was division as well. One part of the ISI hunted down
>>militants, the officials said, while another continued to work with them.
>>The result was confusion.
>>
>>In interviews in 2002, Kashmiri militants in Pakistan said they had been
>>told by the government to maintain a low profile and wait. But as Pakistani
>>military operations in the tribal areas intensified, along with airstrikes
>>by C.I.A.<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c/central_intelligence_agency/index.html?inline=nyt-org>-operated
>>drones, militant groups there issued highly charged and sometimes
>>exaggerated accounts of women and children being killed.
>>
>>The first suicide bombing attack on a military target outside the tribal
>>areas came days after an airstrike on a madrasa in the tribal area of Bajaur
>>in October 2006 killed scores of people.
>>
>>Another turning point came last July when Pakistani forces stormed the Red
>>Mosque in Islamabad, where militants had armed themselves in a compound less
>>than a mile from ISI headquarters and demanded the imposition of Islamic
>>law. Government officials said that more than 100 people died. The militants
>>have insisted that thousands did.
>>
>>Several weeks later, militants carried out the first direct attacks on ISI
>>employees. Suicide bombers twice attacked buses ferrying agency employees,
>>killing 18 on Sept. 4 and 15 more on Nov. 24. According to Pakistani
>>analysts, the attacks signaled that enraged militants had turned on their
>>longtime patrons.
>>
>>The Militant
>>
>>One militant leader, Maulana Masood Azhar, typifies how extremists once
>>trained by the ISI have broken free of the agency's control, turned against
>>the government and joined with other militants to create powerful new
>>networks.
>>
>>In 2000, Mr. Azhar received support from the ISI when he founded
>>Jaish-e-Muhammad, or Army of Muhammad, a Pakistani militant group fighting
>>Indian forces in Kashmir, according to Robert Grenier, who served as the
>>Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Islamabad from 1999 to 2002.
>>The ISI intermittently provided training and operational coordination to
>>such groups, he said, but struggled to fully control them.
>>
>>Mr. Musharraf banned Jaish-e-Muhammad and detained Mr. Azhar after militants
>>carried out an attack on the Indian Parliament building in December 2001.
>>Indian officials accused Jaish-e-Muhammad and another Pakistani militant
>>group of masterminding the attack. After India massed hundreds of thousands
>>of troops on Pakistan's border, Mr. Musharraf vowed in a nationally
>>televised speech that January to crack down on all militants in Pakistan.
>>
>>"We will take strict action against any Pakistani who is involved in
>>terrorism inside the country or abroad," he said. Two weeks later, a
>>British-born member of Mr. Azhar's group, Ahmed Omar
>>Sheikh<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/ahmed_omar_sheikh/index.html?inline=nyt-per>,
>>kidnapped Daniel
>>Pearl<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/p/daniel_pearl/index.html?inline=nyt-per>,
>>a reporter for The Wall Street Journal who was beheaded by his captors. Mr.
>>Sheikh surrendered to the ISI, the agency that had supported
>>Jaish-e-Muhammad, and was sentenced to death for the kidnapping.
>>
>>After Mr. Pearl's killing, Pakistani officials arrested more than 2,000
>>people in a crackdown. But within a year, Mr. Azhar and most of the 2,000
>>militants who had been arrested were freed. "I never believed that
>>government ties with these groups was being irrevocably cut," said Mr.
>>Grenier, now a managing director at Kroll, a risk consulting firm.
>>
>>At the same time, Pakistan seemingly went "through the motions" when it came
>>to hunting Taliban leaders who fled into Pakistan after the 2001 American
>>invasion of Afghanistan, he said.
>>
>>Encouraged by the United States, the Pakistanis focused their resources on
>>arresting senior Qaeda members, he said, which they successfully did from
>>2002 to 2005. Since then, arrests have slowed as Al Qaeda and other militant
>>groups have become more entrenched in the tribal areas.
>>
>>Asked in 2006 why the Pakistani government did not move against the leading
>>Taliban commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his son Sirajuddin, who are based
>>in the tribal areas and have long had links with Al Qaeda, one senior ISI
>>official said it was because Pakistan needed to retain some assets of its
>>own.
>>
>>That policy haunts Mr. Musharraf and the United States, according to
>>American and Pakistani analysts. Today Pakistan's tribal areas are host to a
>>lethal stew of foreign Qaeda members, Uzbek militants, Taliban, ISI-trained
>>Pakistani extremists, disgruntled tribesmen and new recruits.
>>
>>The groups carried out a record number of suicide bombings in Pakistan and
>>Afghanistan last year and have been tied to three major terrorist plots in
>>Britain and Germany since 2005.
>>
>>Mr. Azhar, who once served his ISI mentors in Kashmir, is thought to be
>>hiding in the tribal area of Bajaur, or nearby Dir, and fighting Pakistani
>>security forces, according to one former intelligence official. Militants
>>who took part in the Red Mosque siege in Islamabad in July were closely
>>affiliated with Mr. Azhar's group. This fall, his group fielded fighters in
>>the Swat Valley, the famous tourist spot, where the militants presented a
>>challenge of new proportions to the government, seizing several districts
>>and mounting battles against Pakistani forces that left scores dead.
>>
>>One militant from a banned sectarian group who joined Mr. Azhar's group,
>>Qari Zafar, now trains insurgents in South Waziristan on how to rig roadside
>>bombs and vests for suicide bombings, according to the former intelligence
>>official.
>>
>>Cooperation against the Taliban fighting in Afghanistan has improved since
>>2006, and three senior Taliban figures have been caught, according to
>>Western officials and sources close to the ISI. Yet doubts remain about the
>>Pakistani government's intentions.
>>
>>Senior provincial ISI officials continue to meet with high-level members of
>>the Taliban in the border provinces, according to one Western diplomat. "It
>>is not illogical to surmise that cooperation is on the agenda, and not just
>>debriefing," the diplomat said.
>>
>>"There are groups they know they have lost control of," the Western diplomat
>>added. But the government moved only against those groups that have attacked
>>the Pakistani state, the diplomat said, adding, "It seems very difficult for
>>them to write them off."
>>
>>The Agency Now
>>
>>Western officials say that before Mr. Musharraf resigned as army chief in
>>December, he appointed a loyalist to run the ISI and appears determined to
>>retain power over the agency even as a civilian president.
>>
>>"For as long as he can, Musharraf will keep trying to control these
>>organizations," a Western diplomat said. "I don't think we should expect
>>this man to become an elder statesman as we know it."
>>
>>That puts Mr. Musharraf's successor as army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez
>>Kayani, who headed the ISI from 2004 to 2007, in a potentially pivotal
>>position. General Kayani, a pro-American moderate, is loyal to Mr. Musharraf
>>to a point, according to retired officers. But he will abandon him if he
>>thinks Mr. Musharraf's actions are significantly undermining the standing of
>>the Pakistani army.
>>
>>Mr. Musharraf will maintain control over the agency as long as his interests
>>coincide with General Kayani's, they said, while the new civilian prime
>>minister who emerges from February's elections is likely to have far less
>>authority over the agency. Opposition political parties already accuse the
>>agency of meddling in next month's election. The Western diplomat called the
>>ISI "the army's dirty bag of tricks."
>>
>>Since Ms. Bhutto's assassination, members of her party have accused
>>government officials, including former ISI agents, of having a hidden hand
>>in the attack or of knowing about a plot and failing to inform Ms. Bhutto.
>>
>>American experts played down the chances of a government conspiracy against
>>Ms. Bhutto. They also said it was unlikely that low-level or retired
>>officers working alone or with militants carried out the attack.
>>
>>But nearly half of Pakistanis said in a recent poll that they suspected that
>>government agencies or pro-government politicians had assassinated Ms.
>>Bhutto. Such suspicion stems from decades of interference in elections and
>>politics by the ISI, according to analysts, as well as a high level of
>>domestic surveillance, intimidation and threats to journalists, academics
>>and human rights activists, which former intelligence officials also
>>acknowledged.
>>
>>Pakistani and American experts say that distrust speaks to the urgent need
>>to reform a hugely powerful intelligence agency that Pakistan's military
>>rulers have used for decades to suppress political opponents, manipulate
>>elections and support militant groups.
>>
>>"Pakistan would certainly be better off if the ISI were never used for
>>domestic political purposes," said Mr. Grenier, the former C.I.A. Islamabad
>>station chief. "That goes without saying."
>>
>>Pakistani analysts and Western diplomats argue that the country will remain
>>unstable as long as the ISI remains so powerful and so unaccountable. The
>>ISI has grown more powerful in each period of military rule, they said.
>>
>>Civilian leaders, including Mrs. Bhutto, could not resist using it to secure
>>their political aims, but neither could they control it. And the army
>>continues to rely on the ISI for its own foreign policy aims, particularly
>>battling India in Kashmir and seeking influence in Afghanistan.
>>
>>"The question is, how do you change that?" asked one Western diplomat.
>>"Their tentacles are everywhere."
>>
>>
>>    Copyright 2008<http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/help/copyright.html>
>>The
>>    New York Times Company <http://www.nytco.com/>
>>_______________________________________________
>>assam mailing list
>>assam at assamnet.org
>>http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org
>
>
>
>Dropped the NOT in the sentence:
>
>>  But has that NOT deterred it from
>engaging them in finding a political solution?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>At 10:49 AM -0600 1/15/08, Chan Mahanta wrote:
>>  >  >Unfortunately, our own home-grown varieties seem downright enamored with the
>>>ISI and Bangladesh Intelligence (an oxymoron?).
>>
>>
>>
>>*** The comment displays a rather simpleminded view of things at best.
>>
>>Do the 'home-grown varieties'  associate with
>>ISI, IF they DO, as their detractors claim,
>>because they are 'enamored' of their ideology or
>>mission?  Or they do so, because they are DRIVEN
>>to seeking  help from the ENEMY of their ENEMIEs?
>>
>>
>>*** Did these 'home-grown varieties'  begin their
>>struggles against Indian rule to advance ISI's or
>>Pakistan's cause?  Or were they DRIVEN to its
>>fold, if they were, because of decades of Indian
>>intransigence?  Could India imagine that such a
>>consequence could evolve from its policies, or
>>was it
>>not smart enough to foresee it?
>>
>>Hasn't India and its apologists not been crying
>>hoarse for decades that the NE insurgents are
>>getting increasing help from ISI or Pakistan or
>>who-have-you? But has that deterred it from
>>engaging them in finding a political solution?
>>
>>Does it not smack of appalling hypocrisy laced
>>with a liberal dose of clueless propaganda that
>>would be apparent to anyone with half a working
>>brain? Or is it a case of abject Indian
>>stupidity? Or a combination of both?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>At 9:35 AM -0600 1/15/08, Ram Sarangapani wrote:
>>>It is astonishing that the Western press is still surprised by the fact that
>>>the ISI can only spew militancy, but has little or no control of such groups
>>>operating in Pakistan.
>>>Unfortunately, our own home-grown varieties seem downright enamored with the
>>>ISI and Bangladesh Intelligence (an oxymoron?).
>>>
>>>--Ram
>>>   ------------------------------
>>>   January 15, 2008
>>>   Pakistan Struggles Against Militants Trained by Agency By CARLOTTA
>>>GALL<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/g/carlotta_gall/index.html?inline=nyt-per>and
>>>DAVID
>>>ROHDE<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/r/david_rohde/index.html?inline=nyt-per>
>>>
>>>ISLAMABAD,
>>>Pakistan<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/pakistan/index.html?inline=nyt-geo>-
>>>Pakistan's premier military intelligence agency has lost control of
>>>some
>>>of the networks of Pakistani militants it has nurtured since the 1980s, and
>>>is now suffering the violent blowback of that policy, two former senior
>>>intelligence officials and other officials close to the agency say.
>>>
>>>As the military has moved against them, the militants have turned on their
>>>former handlers, the officials said. Joining with other extremist groups,
>>>they have battled Pakistani security forces and helped militants carry out a
>>>record number of suicide attacks last year, including some aimed directly at
>>>army and intelligence units as well as prominent political figures, possibly
>>>even Benazir
>>>Bhutto<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/benazir_bhutto/index.html?inline=nyt-per>.
>>>
>>>
>>>The growing strength of the militants, many of whom now express support for Al
>>>Qaeda<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda/index.html?inline=nyt-org>'s
>>>global jihad, presents a grave threat to Pakistan's security, as well as
>>  >NATO<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/north_atlantic_treaty_organization/index.html?inline=nyt-org>efforts
>>>to push back the
>>>Taliban<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/taliban/index.html?inline=nyt-org>in
>>>Afghanistan. American officials have begun to weigh more robust covert
>>>operations to go after Al Qaeda in the lawless border areas because they are
>>>so concerned that the Pakistani government is unable to do so.
>>>
>>>The unusual disclosures regarding Pakistan's leading military intelligence
>>  >agency - Inter-Services
>>>Intelligence<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/i/interservices_intelligence/index.html?inline=nyt-org>,
>>>or the ISI - emerged in interviews last month with former senior Pakistani
>>>intelligence officials. The disclosures confirm some of the worst fears, and
>>>suspicions, of American and Western military officials and diplomats.
>>>
>>>The interviews, a rare glimpse inside a notoriously secretive and opaque
>>>agency, offered a string of other troubling insights likely to refocus
>>>attention on the ISI's role as Pakistan moves toward elections on Feb. 18
>>>and a battle for control of the government looms:
>>>
>>>¶One former senior Pakistani intelligence official, as well as other people
>>>close to the agency, acknowledged that the ISI led the effort to manipulate
>>>Pakistan's last national election in 2002, and offered to drop corruption
>>>cases against candidates who would back President Pervez
>>>Musharraf<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/pervez_musharraf/index.html?inline=nyt-per>.
>>>
>>>
>>>A person close to the ISI said Mr. Musharraf had now ordered the agency to
>>>ensure that the coming elections were free and fair, and denied that the
>>>agency was working to rig the vote. But the acknowledgment of past rigging
>>>is certain to fuel opposition fears of new meddling.
>>>
>>>¶The two former high-ranking intelligence officials acknowledged that after
>>>Sept. 11, 2001, when President Musharraf publicly allied Pakistan with the
>>>Bush administration, the ISI could not rein in the militants it had nurtured
>>>for decades as a proxy force to exert pressure on India and Afghanistan.
>>>After the agency unleashed hard-line Islamist beliefs, the officials said,
>>>it struggled to stop the ideology from spreading.
>>>
>>>¶Another former senior intelligence official said dozens of ISI officers who
>>>trained militants had come to sympathize with their cause and had had to be
>>>expelled from the agency. He said three purges had taken place since the
>>>late 1980s and included the removal of three ISI directors suspected of
>>>being sympathetic to the militants.
>>>
>>>None of the former intelligence officials who spoke to The New York Times
>>>agreed to be identified when talking about the ISI, an agency that has
>>>gained a fearsome reputation for interfering in almost every aspect of
>>>Pakistani life. But two former American intelligence officials agreed with
>>>much of what they said about the agency's relationship with the militants.
>>>
>>>So did other sources close to the ISI, who admitted that the agency had
>>>supported militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir, although they said they had
>>>been ordered to do so by political leaders.
>>>
>>>The former intelligence officials appeared to feel freer to speak as Mr.
>>>Musharraf's eight years of military rule weakened, and as a power struggle
>>>for control over the government looms between Mr. Musharraf and opposition
>>>political parties.
>>>
>>>The officials were interviewed before the assassination of Ms. Bhutto, the
>>>opposition leader, on Dec. 27. Since then, the government has said that
>>>Pakistani militants linked to Al Qaeda are the foremost suspects in her
>>>killing. Her supporters have accused the government of a hidden hand in the
>>>attack.
>>>
>>>While the author of Ms. Bhutto's death remains a mystery, the interviews
>>>with the former intelligence officials made clear that the agency remained
>>>unable to control the militants it had fostered.
>>>
>>>The threat from the militants, the former intelligence officials warned, is
>>  >one that Pakistan is unable to contain. "We could not control them," said
>>>one former senior intelligence official, who spoke on condition of
>>>anonymity. "We indoctrinated them and told them, 'You will go to heaven.'
>>>You cannot turn it around so suddenly."
>>>
>>>The Context
>>>
>>>After 9/11, the Bush administration pressed Mr. Musharraf to choose a side
>>>in fighting Islamist extremism and to abandon Pakistan's longtime support
>>>for the Taliban and other Islamist militants.
>>>
>>>In the 1990s, the ISI supported the militants as a proxy force to contest
>>>Indian-controlled Kashmir, the border territory that India and Pakistan both
>>  >claim, and to gain a controlling influence in neighboring Afghanistan. In
>>>the 1980s, the United States supported militants, too, funneling billions of
>>>dollars to Islamic fighters battling Soviet forces in Afghanistan through
>>>the ISI, vastly increasing the agency's size and power.
>>>
>>>Publicly, Mr. Musharraf agreed to reverse course in 2001, and he has
>>>received $10 billion in aid for Pakistan since then in return. In an
>>>interview in November, he vehemently defended the conduct of the ISI, an
>>>agency that, according to American officials, was under his firm control for
>>>the last eight years while he served as both president and army chief.
>>>
>>>Mr. Musharraf dismissed criticism of the ISI's relationship with the
>>>militants. He cited the deaths of 1,000 Pakistani soldiers and police
>>>officers in battles with the militants in recent years - as well as several
>>>assassination attempts against himself - as proof of the seriousness of
>>>Pakistan's counterterrorism effort.
>>>
>>>"It is quite illogical if you think those people who have suffered 1,000
>>>people dead, and I who have been attacked thrice or four or five times, that
>>>I would be supportive towards Taliban, towards Al Qaeda," Mr. Musharraf
>>>said. "These are ridiculous things that discourages and demoralizes."
>>>
>>>But some former American intelligence officials have argued that Mr.
>>>Musharraf and the ISI never fully jettisoned their militant protégés, and
>>>instead carried on a "double-game." They say Mr. Musharraf cooperated with
>>>American intelligence agencies to track down foreign Qaeda members while
>>>holding Taliban commanders and Kashmiri militants in reserve.
>>>
>>>In order to undercut major opposition parties, he wooed religious
>>>conservatives, according to analysts. And instead of carrying out a
>>>crackdown, Mr. Musharraf took half-measures.
>>>
>>>"I think he would make a decision when a situation arises," said Hasan
>>>Askari Rizvi, a leading Pakistani military analyst, referring to militants
>>>openly confronting the government. "But before that he would not alienate
>>>any side."
>>>
>>>There is little dispute that Pakistan's crackdown on the militants has been
>>>at best uneven, but key sources interviewed by The Times disagreed on why.
>>>
>>>Most Western officials in Pakistan say they believe, as Pakistani officials,
>>>including President Musharraf, insist, that the agency is well disciplined,
>>>like the army, and is in no sense a rogue or out-of-control organization
>>>acting contrary to the policies of the leadership.
>>>
>>>A senior Western military official in Pakistan said that if the ISI was
>>>covertly aiding the Taliban, the decision would come from the top of the
>>>government, not the agency. "That's not an ISI decision," the official said.
>>>"That's a government-of-Pakistan decision."
>>>
>>>But former Pakistani intelligence officials insisted that Mr. Musharraf had
>>>ordered a crackdown on all militants. It was never fully carried out,
>>>however, because of opposition within his government and within ISI, they
>>>said.
>>>
>>>One former senior intelligence official said that some officials in the
>>>government and the ISI thought the militants should be held in reserve, as
>>>insurance against the day when American and NATO forces abandoned the region
>>>and Pakistan might again need them as a lever against India.
>>>
>>>"We had a school of thought that favored retention of this capability," the
>>>former senior intelligence official said.
>>>
>>>Some senior ministers and officials in Mr. Musharraf's government
>>  >sympathized with the militants and protected them, former intelligence
>>>officials said. Still others advised a go-slow approach, fearing a backlash
>>>against the government from the militants.
>>>
>>>When arrests were ordered, the police refused to carry them out in some
>>>cases until they received written orders, believing the militants were still
>>>protected by the ISI, as they had been for years.
>>>
>>>Inside the ISI, there was division as well. One part of the ISI hunted down
>>>militants, the officials said, while another continued to work with them.
>>>The result was confusion.
>>>
>>>In interviews in 2002, Kashmiri militants in Pakistan said they had been
>>  >told by the government to maintain a low profile and wait. But as Pakistani
>>>military operations in the tribal areas intensified, along with airstrikes
>>>by
>>>C.I.A.<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c/central_intelligence_agency/index.html?inline=nyt-org>-operated
>>>drones, militant groups there issued highly charged and sometimes
>>>exaggerated accounts of women and children being killed.
>>>
>>>The first suicide bombing attack on a military target outside the tribal
>>>areas came days after an airstrike on a madrasa in the tribal area of Bajaur
>>>in October 2006 killed scores of people.
>>>
>>>Another turning point came last July when Pakistani forces stormed the Red
>>>Mosque in Islamabad, where militants had armed themselves in a compound less
>>>than a mile from ISI headquarters and demanded the imposition of Islamic
>>>law. Government officials said that more than 100 people died. The militants
>>>have insisted that thousands did.
>>>
>>>Several weeks later, militants carried out the first direct attacks on ISI
>>>employees. Suicide bombers twice attacked buses ferrying agency employees,
>>>killing 18 on Sept. 4 and 15 more on Nov. 24. According to Pakistani
>>>analysts, the attacks signaled that enraged militants had turned on their
>>>longtime patrons.
>>>
>>>The Militant
>>>
>>>One militant leader, Maulana Masood Azhar, typifies how extremists once
>>>trained by the ISI have broken free of the agency's control, turned against
>>>the government and joined with other militants to create powerful new
>>>networks.
>>>
>>>In 2000, Mr. Azhar received support from the ISI when he founded
>>>Jaish-e-Muhammad, or Army of Muhammad, a Pakistani militant group fighting
>>>Indian forces in Kashmir, according to Robert Grenier, who served as the
>>>Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Islamabad from 1999 to 2002.
>>>The ISI intermittently provided training and operational coordination to
>>>such groups, he said, but struggled to fully control them.
>>>
>>>Mr. Musharraf banned Jaish-e-Muhammad and detained Mr. Azhar after militants
>>>carried out an attack on the Indian Parliament building in December 2001.
>>>Indian officials accused Jaish-e-Muhammad and another Pakistani militant
>>>group of masterminding the attack. After India massed hundreds of thousands
>>>of troops on Pakistan's border, Mr. Musharraf vowed in a nationally
>>>televised speech that January to crack down on all militants in Pakistan.
>>>
>>>"We will take strict action against any Pakistani who is involved in
>>>terrorism inside the country or abroad," he said. Two weeks later, a
>>>British-born member of Mr. Azhar's group, Ahmed Omar
>>>Sheikh<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/ahmed_omar_sheikh/index.html?inline=nyt-per>,
>>>kidnapped Daniel
>>>Pearl<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/p/daniel_pearl/index.html?inline=nyt-per>,
>>>a reporter for The Wall Street Journal who was beheaded by his captors. Mr.
>>>Sheikh surrendered to the ISI, the agency that had supported
>>>Jaish-e-Muhammad, and was sentenced to death for the kidnapping.
>>>
>>>After Mr. Pearl's killing, Pakistani officials arrested more than 2,000
>>>people in a crackdown. But within a year, Mr. Azhar and most of the 2,000
>>>militants who had been arrested were freed. "I never believed that
>>>government ties with these groups was being irrevocably cut," said Mr.
>>>Grenier, now a managing director at Kroll, a risk consulting firm.
>>>
>>>At the same time, Pakistan seemingly went "through the motions" when it came
>>  >to hunting Taliban leaders who fled into Pakistan after the 2001 American
>>>invasion of Afghanistan, he said.
>>>
>>>Encouraged by the United States, the Pakistanis focused their resources on
>>>arresting senior Qaeda members, he said, which they successfully did from
>>>2002 to 2005. Since then, arrests have slowed as Al Qaeda and other militant
>>>groups have become more entrenched in the tribal areas.
>>>
>>>Asked in 2006 why the Pakistani government did not move against the leading
>>>Taliban commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his son Sirajuddin, who are based
>>>in the tribal areas and have long had links with Al Qaeda, one senior ISI
>>  >official said it was because Pakistan needed to retain some assets of its
>>>own.
>>>
>>>That policy haunts Mr. Musharraf and the United States, according to
>>>American and Pakistani analysts. Today Pakistan's tribal areas are host to a
>>>lethal stew of foreign Qaeda members, Uzbek militants, Taliban, ISI-trained
>>>Pakistani extremists, disgruntled tribesmen and new recruits.
>>>
>>>The groups carried out a record number of suicide bombings in Pakistan and
>>>Afghanistan last year and have been tied to three major terrorist plots in
>>>Britain and Germany since 2005.
>>>
>>>Mr. Azhar, who once served his ISI mentors in Kashmir, is thought to be
>>>hiding in the tribal area of Bajaur, or nearby Dir, and fighting Pakistani
>>>security forces, according to one former intelligence official. Militants
>>>who took part in the Red Mosque siege in Islamabad in July were closely
>>>affiliated with Mr. Azhar's group. This fall, his group fielded fighters in
>>>the Swat Valley, the famous tourist spot, where the militants presented a
>>>challenge of new proportions to the government, seizing several districts
>>>and mounting battles against Pakistani forces that left scores dead.
>>>
>>>One militant from a banned sectarian group who joined Mr. Azhar's group,
>>>Qari Zafar, now trains insurgents in South Waziristan on how to rig roadside
>>>bombs and vests for suicide bombings, according to the former intelligence
>>>official.
>>>
>>>Cooperation against the Taliban fighting in Afghanistan has improved since
>>>2006, and three senior Taliban figures have been caught, according to
>>>Western officials and sources close to the ISI. Yet doubts remain about the
>>>Pakistani government's intentions.
>>>
>>>Senior provincial ISI officials continue to meet with high-level members of
>>>the Taliban in the border provinces, according to one Western diplomat. "It
>>>is not illogical to surmise that cooperation is on the agenda, and not just
>>>debriefing," the diplomat said.
>>>
>>>"There are groups they know they have lost control of," the Western diplomat
>>>added. But the government moved only against those groups that have attacked
>>>the Pakistani state, the diplomat said, adding, "It seems very difficult for
>>>them to write them off."
>>>
>>>The Agency Now
>>>
>>>Western officials say that before Mr. Musharraf resigned as army chief in
>>>December, he appointed a loyalist to run the ISI and appears determined to
>>>retain power over the agency even as a civilian president.
>>>
>>>"For as long as he can, Musharraf will keep trying to control these
>>>organizations," a Western diplomat said. "I don't think we should expect
>>>this man to become an elder statesman as we know it."
>>>
>>>That puts Mr. Musharraf's successor as army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez
>>>Kayani, who headed the ISI from 2004 to 2007, in a potentially pivotal
>>>position. General Kayani, a pro-American moderate, is loyal to Mr. Musharraf
>>>to a point, according to retired officers. But he will abandon him if he
>>>thinks Mr. Musharraf's actions are significantly undermining the standing of
>>>the Pakistani army.
>>>
>>>Mr. Musharraf will maintain control over the agency as long as his interests
>>>coincide with General Kayani's, they said, while the new civilian prime
>>>minister who emerges from February's elections is likely to have far less
>>>authority over the agency. Opposition political parties already accuse the
>>>agency of meddling in next month's election. The Western diplomat called the
>>>ISI "the army's dirty bag of tricks."
>>>
>>>Since Ms. Bhutto's assassination, members of her party have accused
>>  >government officials, including former ISI agents, of having a hidden hand
>>>in the attack or of knowing about a plot and failing to inform Ms. Bhutto.
>>>
>>>American experts played down the chances of a government conspiracy against
>>>Ms. Bhutto. They also said it was unlikely that low-level or retired
>>>officers working alone or with militants carried out the attack.
>>>
>>>But nearly half of Pakistanis said in a recent poll that they suspected that
>>>government agencies or pro-government politicians had assassinated Ms.
>>>Bhutto. Such suspicion stems from decades of interference in elections and
>>  >politics by the ISI, according to analysts, as well as a high level of
>>>domestic surveillance, intimidation and threats to journalists, academics
>>>and human rights activists, which former intelligence officials also
>>>acknowledged.
>>>
>>>Pakistani and American experts say that distrust speaks to the urgent need
>>>to reform a hugely powerful intelligence agency that Pakistan's military
>>>rulers have used for decades to suppress political opponents, manipulate
>>>elections and support militant groups.
>>>
>>>"Pakistan would certainly be better off if the ISI were never used for
>>>domestic political purposes," said Mr. Grenier, the former C.I.A. Islamabad
>>>station chief. "That goes without saying."
>>>
>>>Pakistani analysts and Western diplomats argue that the country will remain
>>>unstable as long as the ISI remains so powerful and so unaccountable. The
>>>ISI has grown more powerful in each period of military rule, they said.
>>>
>>>Civilian leaders, including Mrs. Bhutto, could not resist using it to secure
>>>their political aims, but neither could they control it. And the army
>>>continues to rely on the ISI for its own foreign policy aims, particularly
>>>battling India in Kashmir and seeking influence in Afghanistan.
>>>
>>>"The question is, how do you change that?" asked one Western diplomat.
>>>"Their tentacles are everywhere."
>>>
>>>
>>>     Copyright 2008<http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/help/copyright.html>
>>>The
>>>     New York Times Company <http://www.nytco.com/>
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