[Assam] Constitutional Autonomy: Caution.

[kamal deka]

Santanu is quite right.I would like to add the following.
First thing we must realise  that India's Constitution is not a false
federation.
The legislative powers of the Union and the state legislatures have been
embodied in two separate lists, while there is also a third list enumerating
the matters which give concurrent powers of legislation to both the states
and the Centre. Currently, the Union List contains 97 items, the State List
has 66 and the Concurrent List includes 47 with the provision that if a
state law is repugnant to the law of Parliament, the latter shall prevail.
The residuary power of legislation on items other than these 210 vests with
the Union -- like in Canada.
Because the above scheme is weighted in favour of the Union, some have
variously characterised our Constitution as quasi-federal, unitary with
federal features and centralised federation. The fact is that though the
Centre in India is strong, the states are not agents of the Centre; they
exist under the Constitution and not at the sufferance of the Centre; they
enjoy a large amount of autonomy in normal times; their powers are derived
from the Constitution and not from the Central laws; and the federal portion
of the Constitution can be amended not unilaterally by the Centre alone but
only with the co-operation of the states.
On Sun, Mar 22, 2009 at 7:26 PM, Dilip and Dil Deka <dilipdeka at yahoo.com>wrote:

> Santanu,
> Thanks for sharing your thoughts.
> I agree with you and it is very true - for state autonomy to work in India,
> massive restructuring of the Indian constitution will be needed. When some
> people are thinking of discussing Autonomy with the central government, they
> need to goose the lawmakers into thinking what Autonomy will entail. It is
> easy to scream Autonomy but, as the saying goes, the devil is in the
> details.
> In my estimate, to amend the constitution for real autonomy it will take a
> decade. The folks in Delhi will not grant autonomy to any state unless the
> details are worked out to the most influential states' acquiescence.
> Don't you think Protalk ULFA, if they are serious in their intention,
> should be knocking on many doors in Delhi and in the state capitals?
> Dilipda
>
>
>
>
> ________________________________
> From: "Roy, Santanu" <sroy at mail.smu.edu>
> To: "assam at assamnet.org" <assam at assamnet.org>
> Sent: Sunday, March 22, 2009 10:43:17 AM
> Subject: [Assam] Constitutional Autonomy: Caution.
>
> This is a note of caution. Addressed to those who have voiced their demand
> for Assam's  political "autonomy" in terms of  certain changes in the Indian
> constitution - in particular, transfer of items from the federal or central
> domain to the state list & other safeguards.
>
> I suggest that this may not lead to a whole lot of difference in the
> balance of economic and political power between the centre and the state.
> And therefore, the effective autonomy that will be exercised by the state
> may well continue to be very limited.
>
> Over the last six decades, there has been rapid increase in the actual
> power exercised by Delhi over the states (particularly ones that are
> economically backward) and the division of actual power today is far more
> lopsided than what would appear to someone reading the Indian constitution.
>
> There are several reasons behind this.
>
> First, a very large share of total public sector expenditure in India is
> actually financed through internal debt (short and long term government
> borrowing, treasury bills etc), external borrowing (sovereign debt), deficit
> financing  (accommodated by a Reserve Bank of India that is wholly
> subservient to the Finance Ministry in Delhi) - that simply cannot be
> devolved to a state without much greater wholesale reform (establishing an
> autonomous RBI independent of central government's control, allowing states
> to borrow directly coordinated by an independent economic body etc).
>
> Second, the central government's tax revenue sources  (income tax, excise
> and customs) are much more elastic i.e., respond very rapidly to economic
> expansion than the state tax revenue sources.
>
> Third, given the high degree of regional inequality in India, the process
> of transfer of resources from the fast growing to the poorer regions is, by
> definition, subject to the discretion of Delhi (or its appointed officials
> such as the Finance Commissions).
>
> Due to the above three factors, the financial dependency of Assam's state
> government on the central government will continue to be very high unless,
> of course, the state is allowed to print its own money, have its own central
> bank and levy & collect all income tax, excise etc and tax international
> trade flows (this would be impossible even for flows related to Assam).
>
> Fourth, the process of economic planning in India has generated a
> gargantuan monster in Delhi (that is extra-constitutional); it controls all
> development expenditures and projects. (There is of course no economic
> planning in this free market era; simply bureaucratic or executive control
> remains.) If you do not grovel and satisfy these faceless safari suit white
> shirts, you cannot undertake any major development project. And because of
> the above three factors, it is difficult to undertake such projects
> independently at the state level.
>
> Fifth, as we have seen continuously in the case of Kashmir, even having
> your own constitution does not in any way hinder the central government from
> changing legitimately elected state governments whenever it suits them (Mrs
> Gandhi, for example, was adept at this and more or less created the present
> violent instability there) by involing concerns about internal security. So,
> unless one takes away all emergency powers of the centre (which I can bet
> they will never agree to as they see it as the essence of Indian
> sovereignty) - the power to intervene to preserve the integrity of India,
> internal security and prevent mass disturbance - the power to rush armed
> forces after that, there may not be much left to the autonomy.
>
> Sixth, even if one takes away all of the emergency powers of the centre
> under the constitution, a very high degree of national control over the
> state comes through the national political groups including political
> parties (but also other political organizations). The reason why state
> political actors may (mostly, if not always) play to the tune of their
> national higher-ups is partly because of personal ambition (state political
> power is only a stepping stone to a potential national profile - a giant
> lottery to be won and aspired for)  and partly because of the financial
> clout of the national versions and the need for money to win elections (even
> an MLA might spend crores today). Note that even the regional parties are
> part of the pan-Indian political game thanks to the era of coalitions.
>
> This is perhaps too pessimistic. But I cannot escape the feeling that the
> Indian economy and the Indian state as it is constituted today, leaves
> insufficient room for real decentralization of economic and political power.
> Perhaps, the pessimism is unfounded. Once the devolution of power begins -
> albeit, in a limited fashion, it will act as a catalyst for other changes
> and eventually lead to true decentralization. But that would require others
> to act. Assam alone cannot do it.
>
> And yes, we cannot be worse off.
>
> Santanu.
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