[Air-L] Multistakeholder Imposition of Internet Sanctions

[Joly MacFie]

There is discussion on this on the IETF HRPC (Human Rights Protocol
Considerations) list

https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/hrpc/O9OyvXaJQYYObKNFZ5OMwFeLJqg/

On Thu, Mar 10, 2022 at 5:18 AM Joly MacFie <joly at punkcast.com> wrote:

>
> Via Bill Woodcock of PCH on NANOG, a founding statement + technical paper
> on '*Multistakeholder Imposition of Internet Sanctions*' signed by a
> bunch of people, including former ISOC trustee John Levine.
>
>
> https://www.pch.net/resources/Papers/Multistakeholder-Imposition-of-Internet-Sanctions.pdf
>
> EXCERPT
>
>  *We believe it is now incumbent upon the Internet community to
> deliberate and make decisions in the face of humanitarian crises. We may
> not responsibly dismiss such crises without consideration, nor with
> consideration only for the self-interest of our community’s own direct
> constituents; instead, maturity of governance requires that self interests
> be weighed in the balance with broader moral and societal considerations.
> This document is the beginning of a global Internet governance conversation
> about the appropriate scope of sanctions, the feasibility of sanctions
> within the realm of our collective responsibility, and our moral imperative
> to minimize detrimental consequences. *
>
> *Principles for Internet Infrastructure Governance Sanctions *
>
> *We, the undersigned, agree to the following principles: *
>
> *● Disconnecting the population of a country from the Internet is a
> disproportionate and inappropriate sanction, since it hampers their access
> to the very information that might lead them to withdraw support for acts
> of war and leaves them with access to only the information their own
> government chooses to furnish. *
>
> *● The effectiveness of sanctions should be evaluated relative to
> predefined goals. Ineffective sanctions waste effort and willpower and
> convey neither unity nor conviction. *
>
> *● Sanctions should be focused and precise. They should minimize the
> chance of unintended consequences or collateral damage. Disproportionate or
> over-broad sanctions risk fundamentally alienating populations. *
>
> *● Military and propaganda agencies and their information infrastructure
> are potential targets of sanctions. *
>
> *● The Internet, due to its transnational nature and consensus-driven
> multistakeholder system of governance, currently does not easily lend
> itself to the imposition of sanctions in national conflicts. *
>
> *● It is inappropriate and counterproductive for governments to attempt to
> compel Internet governance mechanisms to impose sanctions outside of the
> community’s multistakeholder decision-making process. *
>
> *● There are nonetheless appropriate, effective, and specific sanctions
> the Internet governance community may wish to consider in its deliberative
> processes. *
>
>
> *Recommendations *
>
> *We believe it is the responsibility of the global Internet governance
> community to weigh the costs and risks of sanctions against the moral
> imperatives that call us to action in defense of society, and we must
> address this governance problem now and in the future. We believe the time
> is right for the formation of a new, minimal, multistakeholder mechanism,
> similar in scale to NSP-Sec or Outages, which after due process and
> consensus would publish sanctioned IP addresses and domain names in the
> form of public data feeds in standard forms (BGP and RPZ), to be consumed
> by any organization that chooses to subscribe to the principles and their
> outcome. *
>
> *This process should use clearly documented procedures to assess
> violations of international norms in an open, multistakeholder, and
> consensus-driven process, taking into account the principles of
> non-overreach and effectiveness in making its determinations. This system
> mirrors existing systems used by network operators to block spam, malware,
> and DDoS attacks, so it requires no new technology and minimal work to
> implement. *
>
> *We call upon our colleagues to participate in a multistakeholder
> deliberation using the mechanism outlined above, to decide whether the IP
> addresses and domain names of the Russian military and its propaganda
> organs should be sanctioned, and to lay the groundwork for timely decisions
> of similar gravity and urgency in the future.   *
>
> Bill writes:
>
>
>
>
>
> *Now we can focus on operationalization.  Mailing list, web site, etc. are
> in the process of being set up.The goal is to have a minimal, lightweight
> mechanism with BGP and RPZ feeds that networks can voluntarily subscribe
> to.  99% of the time, they’d be empty.  Occasionally, when the Internet
> community believes that a military or propaganda agency is problematic
> enough to be worth sanctioning, IPs and domains would be added to the feed.
> The mechanism is exactly the same as is currently used for blackholing
> abuse IPs and domains, so doesn’t take anything new on the subscribing
> network’s side, just one more feed.We’re anticipating that debate over what
> goes into the list will only happen very occasionally, and the discussion
> list will be quiet the rest of the time.  A lot like NSP-Sec and Outages.
> And there’ll probably be a lot of overlap with those groups.  All are
> welcome, look for an announcement in a few more days.*
>
> --
> --------------------------------------
> Joly MacFie  +12185659365
> --------------------------------------
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>
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> Joly MacFie  +12185659365
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>


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Joly MacFie  +12185659365
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