[Assam] Ethinic Boundaries and the Margins of the Margin -Bent D. Jørgenson

[Ram Sarangapani]

 Here is a Postdoc (thesis?) by Jorgenson. He has also dealt with the
subject of ethinic boundaries in Assam. I have hi-lighted those relevant
parts. It makes very interesed reading. He deals withquestions of  identity,
ethinic boundaries and "marginalization" of groups and places.

Would be interested in netters' comments.

--Ram

_____________________________
ETHNIC BOUNDARIES AND THE MARGINS OF THE MARGIN: in a Postcolonial and
Conflict Resolution Perspective Bent D. Jørgenson

http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html

*The clouds on the map would move, reform, disappear, break-up into pieces;
the pieces would reassemble and new distinct areas would form; and the
channels between them would expand, contract, and shift* (Kopytoff, 1985,
p.12).

The theme of this paper is on one of the most elementary questions in the
study of ethnicity and nationalism, namely how to approach and assess *ethnic
boundaries'.* Should we perceive them as an advantageous or a pernicious
tool in politics? To answer that question, we need a reference point;
advantageous or pernicious in relation to whom? I will here use those
people(-s) who are so marginalized that their voices are practically
silenced, and the way in which the political reconstruction, conversion, or
deconstruction of ethnic boundaries is favorable or not to them; the *margins
of the margin.* Do ethnic boundaries, and particularly their political
usage, illuminate and create preconditions for uplifting, visualization or
in any other way favor the margins of the margin? And if yes, how does one
handle the element of violence which is involved in the politicization and
defense of such boundaries? On the contrary, if we suggest that ethnic
boundaries should be deconstructed, how do we deal with the causes of ethnic
boundary construction? In order to illuminate these problems, two approaches
will be critically discussed and applied: *Post-Colonialism* and *Conflict
Resolution.*

In recent year these two approaches have gained some influence in
International Relations theory. Postcolonialism addresses the problem of
epistemic violence and marginality. One of the fundamental questions is: In
what ways have the dominant discourses (particularly emanating in the West)
marginalized, and still marginalized, subjectivities based on skin-color,
gender, ethnicity etc. And normatively: How to combat this marginalization?
"The empire strikes (or writes) back," is a slogan both in the local and
global political arena and, I believe, in ever growing pockets of the
academia. This perspective or school of thought is present almost everywhere
in the world, but especially in South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the
Caribbean.

Parallel with the rising voice of marginality, the salience of ethnic and
internal conflicts all over the world has fueled interest in conflict
research in general and the *conflict resolution* in particular. Conflict
Resolution has been an attempt to find general methods and schemes of
solution, develop guidelines for mediation, and/or identify universal
processes of conflict resolution in particular societies. Bosnia and Israel,
among others, have been the targets for the attention of such practitioners
of conflict resolution.

Why are these two perspectives brought together into the same discussion?
First, because they share a normative concern for the same fundamental
problem, namely the reconstruction and deconstruction of ethnic boundaries.
Concerning Postcolonialism, there is a clear emphasis on the transformation
or *conversion* of ethnic boundaries from boundaries of marginalization to
boundaries for 'strategic essentialization' (Krishna, Sankaran, 1993, p.405).
Conflict resolution approaches ethnic boundaries as crucial 'complications'
in processes of conflict resolution and of course of prime importance in
processes of conflict escalation. Despite the strong normativity in both
approaches, it is crucial to bear in mind that the margins of the margin
play a role in the conflict dynamic itself, and therefore, the connection;
margins-conflicts-ethnic boundaries have to be dealt with, not only
normatively but also positively.

Secondly, the two perspectives are brought into the same discussion as an
attempt to open a dialogue between two approaches to violence, which have so
far largely ignored each other's
existence(1)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_1_>In
particular, how does one succeed in envisaging and perhaps even
uplifting
or 'un marginalizing' marginal subjects. By 'breaking the ice' between the
two approaches to international studies, we might end up having two
perspectives illuminating each other's blind spot, and eradicating some of
the worst pre-perceptions and prejudice in both.

*The following are empirical examples from Assam and Southern Bihar in
India. My own experiences with the people in these two locations have
generated the questions and the problems formulated in this paper. In both
locations, problems associated with the marginalization of the margins have
led to severe manifest or non-manifest social problems in which ethnic
boundaries play a key role. In Assam, the tribal groups have slowly emerged
as political forces after independence, asserting their demands towards
regional and central authorities. The modern history of Assam illustrates
the problem of locating or territorializing the marginalized space when
elite groups claim the status as 'sons of the soil.' In Southern Bihar, a
marginalized region in itself, ethnic boundaries cut across relations of
dominance, thereby complicating the relation between the two phenomena*. **
** *Ethnic Boundaries*

Ethnic boundaries, a concept borrowed from Fredrik Barth (Barth, 1982
(1969)), are best understood as cognitive or mental boundaries situated in
the minds of people and are the result of collective efforts of construction
and maintenance. Ethnic boundaries dichotomize insiders from outsiders--'us'
from 'them.' Katherine Verdery's summarizes Barth on this point:

The roots of [ethnicity as an] organizational form are not in the *cultural
content* associated with ethnic identities but rather in the fact of their *
dichotomization* -- the presence of boundaries separating groups. This
shifts the emphasis from seemingly 'objective' cultural traits to behavior
(including 'cultural' behavior) that is socially effective in maintaining
group boundaries (Verdery, 1994, in Vermeulen & Govers, 1994, p. 35).

There are, in other words, neither objective ethnic boundaries nor objective
ethnic groups or
identities.(2)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_2_>

Furthermore, ethnic boundaries are open to multiple individual perceptions
and interpretations. No wonder that hard social sciences like International
Relations, until recently, have turned a blind eye to these phenomena. Only
the political significance within the last few decades and the subsequent
demand for explanation and comprehension have pushed these phenomena into
the limelight of social science.

Ethnic boundaries are means to create order. They are means of social
navigation in a social space comparable with the geographical map meant for
navigation in our physical environment. This knowledge of a social universe
is passed on through processes of learning from one generation to another or
through other channels of communication, simultaneously attaching cultural
values and features to what appears as an 'inside' and an 'outside.' Seen
from the perspective of a certain individual, the ethnic boundary is the
result of a cognitive *reconstruction* that separates 'us' from 'them.'
Ethnic boundaries are thus social constructions and reconstructions mostly
made peacefully in interaction between individuals.

This rather 'apolitical' definition of ethnic boundaries is challenged, or
rather complemented, by a political approach that reveals that ethnic
boundaries, and the cultural stuff which they contain, are not only
negotiable, but also contested. This is close to the postcolonial approach
in which ethnic boundaries are determined by the dominant discourse. The
knowledge about ethnic boundaries are carried on via the older generation,
the school, the mass media, and the state, or in short, those who have the
power to define the ethnic boundary towards the marginal, and even to define
what the marginal is like, i.e. to fill the image of the marginal with
cultural content. The postcolonial normative approach would, as already
mentioned, by a very simplistic description advocate the *conversion* of
these marginalizing ethnic boundaries into boundaries of 'strategic
essentialization' and as a means of resistance against marginalization. On
the contrary, in a conflict resolution approach, ethnic boundaries would be
assessed as obstacles to conflict resolutions; as an element of stereotyping
the enemy, and putting barriers of effective communication, and thereby to
get a false comprehension of what is actually and rationally going on (
e.g-79). Ethnic boundaries are therefore in need of *deconstruction.* In the
following discussion, conversion and deconstruction will form the core
concepts, or 'lenses' through which ethnic boundaries will be illuminated. *
*  ** *Postcolonialism and Conflict Resolution*

Both the postcolonial and the conflict resolution approaches have a strong
normative element, as they attempt to target the problem of
violence-although with emphasis on different aspects of violence. In a
Postcolonial perspective, the prime evil appears to be the epistemic
violence committed by the dominant discourse over the marginal. The dominant
Western discourse has wrested the marginalized of even their ability to
conceptualize themselves as people with their own history, future, dignity
and self-respect. Conflict resolution is, before anything else, a method to
alleviate further violence, and then open direct violence. This is not to
say that structural violence is not a matter of concern in conflict
resolution. (Johan & Höivik, Tord, 1971, p. 73-76) However war, as the
ultimate exercise of direct violence, is without doubt also the ultimate
form of conflict to resolve and avoid.

More specifically, the two perspectives have rather different approaches to
ethno-national boundaries. The postcolonial normative approach would, as
already mentioned, by a very simplistic description advocate the *conversion
* of these marginalizing ethnic boundaries into boundaries of 'strategic
essentialization' and as a means of resistance against marginalization. In a
conflict resolution approach, on the contrary, ethnic boundaries would be
assessed as obstacles to conflict resolutions by stereotyping the enemy and
putting up barriers of effective communication, thereby creating a false
image of what is actually and rationally going on (Burton, 1990, p.78-79).
Ethnic boundaries are therefore in need of *deconstruction.* In the
following discussion, conversion and deconstruction will form the core
concepts, or 'lenses' through which ethnic boundaries will be illuminated.

Postcolonialism and conflict resolution could be seen as very different
approaches, and they are indeed, but it should not be forgotten that both
have roots in a critique of the same dominant discourses. Conflict
resolution emerged as a critique from inside the Western society,
challenging established institutions of conflict management, e.g. juridical
national and international practices and
theories(3)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_3_>.
Postcolonialism became a challenge from outside, as the Oriental, the
subaltern and the marginal began to speak or write back to the dominant
West, challenging imperial and colonial discourses.

On some locations the political practices derived from these two approaches
are hidden and acted out silently under the surface. However, nowhere is the
dynamic between them more apparent than in the recent so-called peace
process in Israel/Palestine. The conflict resolution practitioners have
until recently had the advantaged position, bringing the Israeli and
Palestinian elite to peace talks and institutionalizing cooperation between
the two parties. Recently, however, postcolonialists have raised their
voices and are about to take the lead, pushing the peace-process back. The
conflicts is not, at least for the moment, between the Palestinians and the
Israelis or the Muslims and the Jews. It is instead between those in favor
of working out ways to make ethnic boundaries less politically explosive,
and those who want to politicize the boundaries further. In the former case,
the end of conflict is the prime goal, in the latter the focus is on
marginalization.

Before we enter into a discussion of the two approaches to ethnic
boundaries, it should be clear that none of them are as coherent and fixed
as they will appear below. It is inevitable to generalize and leave out
certain nuances and aspects which are important for those who have brought
them forward or those who believe that they are inseparable parts of each
tradition. However, the aim here is to use these two approaches as rather
focused 'spot lights' on the problem under scrutiny, not to give a just
treatment of two perspectives and their founding parents. **  **
*Postcolonialism
and the Conversion of Ethnic Boundaries*

In the vast literature on Postcolonialism, it is described as a project, a
discourse, an ideology, a text/narrative, a trend or a variety of these
concepts in the same text (Prakash, 1995, Introduction). To me, none of
these features can be carved out of the composite nature of Postcolonialism.
That Postcolonialism will appear as an approach in the following text, does
not mean that the other facets are left out. In fact, the postcolonial
approach is the most open-ended of the two perspectives probably due to the
fact that it spans almost every humanist and social science and it has as a
consequence a very broad methodological base. Furthermore, and probably due
to this multifaceted character, Postcolonialism has within it a strong sense
of self criticism. To fix a certain standpoint in this approach is
therefore, to use the conceptual framework within the approach itself, to
use 'epistemic violence.'

Post-Colonialism has its origin in Literature and the study of the
ex-colonial novel. The task has been to expose the subordinate
representation of the colonized by the colonizers. The focus on text
indicates a strong linkage with post-modernism and the difference between
the two is not always clear. However, Postcolonialism, at least in the form
it is presented here, is political and normative while post-modernism, at
least in its most relativist form, is not.

[In] the core of the discourse, is a focus on the relations of domination
and resistance and the effect they have had on identity, in, through, and
beyond, the colonial encounter: the prefix 'post' is testament to the fact
that the problems that lie at the heart of the colonializer-colonized
relationship are seen to persist beyond colonialism. The importance of
reinterpreting the colonial experience is relevant to contemporary identity.
In the process of resistance, the native voice is repositioned and empowered
(Darby & Paolini, 1994, p.375).

The post-colonial approach calls for revival and politicization of the
marginalized's subjectivities. One of the main questions is "how does one
construct provisional and strategically essentialized subjectivities to
enable a progressive politics" (Krishna, 1993, p.405). The marginalized are
not only supposed to deconstructed dominant hegemonic discourse, but to
subvert boundaries from the 'bottom up' and transform the cultural 'stuff'
which these boundaries enclose. This is problematic in terms of localizing
the marginalized space and when we consider the problem of marginalization
by the marginalized. These are of course central issues for further
discussion below.

In India, the postcolonial discourse has had a long history which in fact
dates back to figures like Tagore, but the most prominent is of course
Mahatma Gandhi. He advocated a resistance which was asserted as an Indian
alternative to Western colonialism. Gandhi in fact illustrates the
difficulties-and challenges-within Postcolonialism. It is both a category of
political movements around the world (e.g. Gandhian movements) and an highly
sophisticated academic approach (e.g. Gandhiism). It is, in other words,
both theory and practice, which is a strength, but also poses problems of
getting ideas, views, and norms across between practitioners and theorists.
More concretely, the assessment of the central issues here, namely violence,
ethnic boundaries, and marginality, differs considerably between these two
positions. Violent chauvinism, marginalizing the margins of the margin might
be 'a price worth paying' for the practitioner, whereas this is likely to be
normatively unacceptable to the theorist far from
*realpolitik*.(4)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_4_>
**  ** *Conflict Resolution and the Deconstruction of Ethnic Boundaries*

The other strand of research will be called *conflict resolution*. It is
basically an array of theories of conflicts combined with a variety of
techniques and methods to solve or manage
conflicts.(5)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_5_>However,
such characteristics neglect the recent development within the
field, where conflict resolution has developed into an academic discipline
and a rather coherent school of discussion and debate. And even though it
lacks a coherent theoretical base, it has emerged as a discipline in
colleges and universities around the world. A great number of scholars are
now theorizing about conflicts and conflicts resolution creating a body of
literature which now forms an embryonic approach to conflict and conflict
resolution (e.g. Scimecca, J.A., p.19 and 33).

Conflict resolution is a vast field with a variety of methodological
approaches. The common normative approach, though, is that conflicts should
be solved in an orderly (following certain methods) and peaceful way.
Peaceful here could mean anything from absence of direct violence or threat
of violence, to the creation of a certain desirable and non-violent regime.
Conflict resolution is, first of all, advocating a non-violent ideology. It
basically advocates the alleviation of violence and then pushes for the
development and allocation of conflict solving methods and development of
institutions geared toward conflict management. For the Postcolonials
violence is not necessarily a major problem. Frans Fanon, one of the strong
influences in the post-colonial discourse, has put it this way: "At the
level of the individuals, violence is a cleansing force; it forces the
native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it
makes him fearless and restores his self-respect" (Fanon, 1967, p.94).

In relation to conflict resolution, this is not just a very different view
of violence, but also of its psychological function. Within conflict
resolution direct physical violence is seen as the highest stage of conflict
escalation and a result of 'more unconscious and subconscious
forces.'(6)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_6_>It is
not far to interpret conflicts as a social relation which in fact
describes a transformation from rationality and reason to irrationality and
intuition. And a postcolonial critic would probably add: from Western to
Non-western.

If we for a moment separate the field into the two influential fields of
Game theory and Human needs theory, it is clear that the former has taken
the ethnic boundaries as communication barriers, which have to be broken
down in order to envisage the position of the opponent. Game theory is
insensitive to cultural differences and the unequal distribution of power.
Therefore it tells us little about the problems outlined
above.(7)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_7_>

It is of course disputable whether conflict resolution advocates the
deconstruction of ethnic boundaries. What about Human needs theory? One of
the most influential scholars in this conflict resolution approach is
undoubtedly John Burton, who belong to the so called London School within
the field of conflict resolution. In his monumental work, *Conflict
Resolution and Provention,* he "seeks to provide a framework for
consideration of theory and practice in conflict resolution and provention."
(Burton, 1990, p.x). He makes a distinction between disputes which "are an
integral part of a competitive society; and conflicts which are deep-rooted
in human needs." (Ibid., p.1). The need of identity somehow presupposes the
reconstruction of ethnic boundaries. According to Burton, we *need* to have
an identity and that implies ethnic boundaries. However, the boundary is
supposed to be inclusive and not exclusive and discriminatory. Burton has
also explained his key concept, 'Conflict *Pro*vention,' in a way which
prevents boundaries from becoming politicized barriers. "The term *pre*vention
has the connotation of containment. The term *pro*vention has been
introduced to signify taking steps to remove a source of conflict, and more
positively to promote conditions in which collaborative and valued
relationships control behavior" (Ibid., p.*v* ).

That is to enhance communication between conflicting parties. This is to say
that people are not supposed to give up their personal and collective
identification, but they are not supposed to be utilized as a political
tool; ethnic boundaries are not to be subverted and strategically
essentialized. The relation between the concepts of boundaries and needs of
identity is objective and apolitical (Ibid., p.39f. ).

If ontological needs exist it follows that the traditional belief that
politics is subjective is false. It is this discovery, this deduction, that
is the core of the contemporary shift in thought. Politics can no longer be
justified as arbitrary, determined by ideologies and interests. It is
possible to assess 'isms, leadership and systems generally by reference to
these needs. We can predict the consequences of politics. (Ibid., p.117.)

Burton's point here is that politics *in fact* is objective in its cause and
development. We can assume that conflicts and even their resolution follow
the same trajectory. Conflict resolution has had a tendency to slip into the
grand theorizing about the universal causes and solutions to
conflicts.(8)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_8_>The
human needs approach accentuates where conflicts derives from the
frustration of basic human needs. According to Burton, politics is not a
subjective realm, but a realm open for negotiation between parties with at
least theoretical ability to use reason and calculation in assessment of
human needs. There are two problems with this theory.

Human needs, like for instance the need for identity, is not an objective
force which has a certain influence on politics. Human needs are experienced
as well as expressed through cultural lenses and effected by relations of
power. Burton argues that conflicts deriving from the frustration of the
need of identity, are often to be found in so called multi-ethnic societies
(Edward E. Azar's makes a similar point. Azar, 1990). For the postcolonials,
marginalized human beings act in conflicts because they are deprived of
their subjective rights which are theirs and realized by them. Furthermore,
how is the need for identity satisfied and when is it frustrated? Is the
need of identity frustrated when people almost never express their group
belonging, because their social environment is indifferent to it, and is it
satisfied when people for generations have been marginalized by the
reconstruction of ethnic boundaries, *ascribing* an identity onto them? Does
the frustration of human needs in the margins of the margin lead to
conflicts at all, and if so, can they be handled the same way as 'other'
conflicts? We will have reason to return to these last questions. The must
fundamental question is of course, could the need of identity be satisfied
by identifying with humanity? **  ** *Ethnic Boundaries and Marginality*

The theoretical connection between ethnic boundaries and marginality can be
developed in two steps. First, the connection between ethnic boundaries and
marginality has to do with the exercise of power and culture. Culture
indicates not only what is right or wrong but also who has the right to
decide in these matters. Those who are deprived of the right, at least in
relation to the dominant, we can call marginal. A great deal of the
post-colonial literature deals with the colonial power to define a discourse
in which the subjugated people were fixed into categories of races, castes,
religions or tribes, creating a tidy map to conquer and control. Timothy
Mitchell argues in a citation in Philip Darby and A.J. Paolini's essay:

modern colonialism was constructed upon a vastly increased power of
representation, a power that made possible an unprecedented fixing and
policing of boundaries; an unprecedented power of portraying what lay
'outside.' Power is determined not so much by obvious recourse disparities,
but by the ability of the colonial order to establish an absolute boundary
between the West and the non-West, the modern and the past, order and
disorder, self and other (Darby & Paolini, 1994, p.375).

Power is the ability to construct a social boundary in this post-colonial
view. Secondly, we can imagine that a boundary has a marginal zone, a place
which is neither inside, nor outside. It is a socially constructed human 'no
mans land' in which 'we' have located people (real or imagined) who are
neither 'we' nor 'them', they are rather a subjugated subjectivity, which is
a negation of 'we'. Why? Because they are needed as a permanent instrument
of locating 'we' in relation to 'them', and tell us who 'we' are (culture),
what are 'our' rights (politics), and what belongs to 'us' (economics) and
so forth. Often, this space 'in-between' *is* the margins of the margin. The
tribal population in India has in many places had that function during
centuries. Living either *among* the dominant caste Hindu's or at the *
fringes* of their settlements, they constitute the marginal which is in many
places effectively silenced.

The interesting thing to note is that there is no definite beginnings or
ends to the marginal, and similarly there is no definite marginalized space
which is totally without power. The margin is, in other words, a diffuse
entity which can contain almost everything which is not commonly held as
dominant in a specific setting and at a certain point in time. Or again in
other words, the localization of the margin depends on the location of the
observer. Being in the margin there is always space which is more
marginalized and silenced, and, equally important, more dominant space.

The pitfalls in the conversion and reconstruction of ethnic boundaries are
many and sometimes even violently disastrous in relation to the margins of
the margin. The construction of ethnic boundaries could be perceived as an
act of violence in the sense that they are forced on individuals for whom
these divisions are incongruent with their personal perception of social
boundaries and thereby marginalized these individuals; i.e. they are
marginalized by the marginalized. **  ** *Problems of Conversion and
Deconstruction*

The two realms of problems concerning conversion and deconstruction of
ethnic boundaries which will be sketched out below, basically points to the
problems of normativity in the postcolonial and conflict resolution
approaches. But even more basically, they point to the connection between
the soft sciences and political action; between theory and practice. Can we
transform theoretical ideas, results and conclusion into political action
and, at the same time, be observant from various political standpoints,
especially toward those whom are so marginal that they are practically
silenced? **  ** *Where is the Margins of the Margin in Assam?*

*How can we possibly locate a marginal space? In the global society, the
potentials for group formations and hence the conversion of ethnic
boundaries are many, and these possibilities are often described as ethnic
segmentation or stratification (ethnic levels), or in the post-colonial
debate, as a power hierarchy. With such metaphors in mind, the postcolonial
concern is to chose the right level in order to make the dominant discourse
visible, subvert it, and eventually fight it. With this strategy, we might
end up repressing the other marginalized groups or the marginalized of the
marginalized groups. In that case, the strategy is no longer conversion of
ethnic boundaries, but rather shift of positions from marginal to dominant.
However, this distinction is not very easy to make for two reasons. *

*First, it is not easy to locate a marginalized space. A marginalized space
always contains even more severely marginalized spaces, which might however
seem too 'small' or 'weak' for political mobilization. Consequently these
subgroups are not only neglected, but also forced into a political project
which they might not want to be part of, or at least against their
interests. Localization is, in other words, important. Secondly, this space
changes location, disappears, and appears depending on a variety of factors.
We can not be sure that either the ethnic boundaries or the rationale behind
their construction and reconstruction will persist, although one important
part in boundary making is to make them appear as eternal. *

*There are several examples to illustrate these problems of location and shift
of positions. In the state of Assam in Northeast India, the Assamese elite
started in the middle of the 19th century, to create an Assamese identity in
contrast first of all to the dominant Bengali identity. By the advent of
colonization in the 1820s, the Assamese nobility was removed from the apex
of power, deprived of their former privileges, and Bengali was declared the
official language of the province. The Bengali minority moving into the
region was apparently successful in constructing a boundary towards the
Assamese majority. Slowly a mixture of old and new Assamese leaders
succeeded in subverting this ethnic boundary, and by independence, they
gained political control of a territory which covered most of present day
Northeast India. However, after independence five new states have been
carved out of the Assam state, and this process doesn't seem to have reached
a final end. *

*Soon after independence, ethnic groups began to emerge as distinct
communities with a political will different from that of the Assamese
majority. The Naga elite demanded independence or autonomy immediately after
1947. After a long violent struggle in the mountains of Northeast Lastly,
the Bodo elite of lowland Assam are demanding an autonomous state carved out
of the Assam, but within the Indian Union. *

*This row of events could be seen as the minorities' slow awakening and
proliferation of their ethnic boundary toward an ever louder Assamese
identity. It is indisputable that the Assamese leadership has shifted
positions, forcing Assamese language and customs on other groups. This is
the major impetus for the conversion of the ethnic boundary between the
Assamese and the tribals. Second, the 'tribal' awakening' has to do with the
rise in education and economic power of certain segments of the tribal
population all over Northeast India, especially after independence. Tribal
elites have emerged and use their power to assert their subjectivity and
claim the same rights to control a certain territory as other 'major groups'
within the Indian Union. In that development, we of course imagine that the
marginalized space is moving downwards. Today we will find, that certain
tribes, and segments of the tribals have no voice at all. They have been
practically silenced in the struggle for autonomy by relatively dominant
groups. *

*What is interesting here is that during every stage of this process, there
are moments of conversion of dominating ethnic boundaries (upwards)
and simultaneously,
silencing of marginal subjectivities, i.e. to avoid any 'internal' ethnic
boundaries. During the independence struggle, all ethnic boundaries were
with one exception, successfully repressed. During the so called Assam
Movement from 1979 to 1983, the differences between groups in Assam were
again repressed in the struggle of the 'sons of the soil' against the
'foreigners,' mainly Bengali immigrants. In that movement, which was
extremely violent, most of the casualties were found among the lowland
tribal population,(9)
<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_9_>which today are
demanding an autonomous Bodo-land.
*

*An important aspect to lift to the fore here is that ethnic boundaries
almost never fit with the 'boundaries of marginality.' The class aspect
should be brought in here. What is appearing in the Assamese context is a
new Bengali marginalized group facing the anger of an Assamese majority
against an historically dominant Bengali upper and middle class. These
Bengalis are poor peasants fleeing the densely populated Bangladesh and are
now trying their luck in Assam as in other places in India. How should this
marginal Bengali group subvert the ethnic boundary which keeps them mired in
marginality? Furthermore, the conversion and reconstruction of ethnic
boundaries depends on the power to convert and reconstruct, and that appears
to be in the hands of the elites. But sufficient power never enters the
margins of the margin, where groups are marginalized by the marginalized in
the process of subverting the ethnic boundaries of domination. *

*The fate of the Bengalis in Assam is shared with a great deal of Brahmins
in Northern India. Now the numerous so-called 'backward castes' are, by
democratic means, taking to power, and using it violently against their
former high caste oppressors. Upper castes like Brahmins are however, a
socio-economically very diversified group from rich to deeply poor. The
latter are the victims of the newly born postcolonial politics now as they
face the conversion of the caste boundary which has kept the lower castes in
marginality for centuries. *

*Who is marginalizing whom and for what purpose is a question to which I
will return soon. At this stage, it should be clear that ethnic boundaries
are a political means, some would say a weapon, whose use of stereotyping
and homogenization lead to violent effects, both direct and epistemically,
on the margins of the margin. * **  ** *Do the Margins of the Margin have a
Voice in Southern Bihar?*

The major handicap for the margins of the margin is not merely economic
deprivation, but the fact that they have no voice to put forward their
demands. 'The subaltern cannot speak.' (Spivak, 1994, p.104). This fact is a
serious challenge to the conflict resolution approach, as it presupposes
that there are parties involved in a conflict. To practice conflict
resolution or management presupposes the existence of parties who can
negotiate, and enter processes of conflict resolution (See e.g. Wallensteen,
Peter, 1994, p. 5, 59). I have not heard (!) but I could imagine, that there
are subjectivities in Bosnia and Israel Palestine which are not present or
represented at the negotiation tables and are also neglected in the many
NGO's which have some political influence in this conflict. Similarly in
India, there are subjectivities which are generated by neither party nor in
the political institutions of the conflict.

In Southern Bihar, we find a population of mixed tribes and caste-Hindus. It
is a poor area, with all the severity of poverty, and with all social
indicators pointing low. People have since the colonial era learned to
mistrust authorities in many other places including what is commonly known
as the 'tribal belt' in Central India. Although the phenomenon of the
margins of the margin is as evident here as in Northeast India, there is a
common perception that whatever comes 'from above' is of evil. This
perception is held by many from school teachers to forest and police
officials. Furthermore there is little in the present developments which
have changed that image of power and its institutions.

When I visited a village in the Ranchi district in Southern Bihar in 1994
and again in 1995, I learned that the villagers had had the opportunity to
elect one of their own to the village council, the Panchayat, which is an
elected body presiding over 4-5 villages. This election took place in 1984
and should have been held again in 1989. But different political interests
on the state level had postponed the election for years. The official reason
was not known to the villagers, but their own perceptions were clear, namely
that the people with power were not interested in hearing their voice.
However, their elected Mukia, or headman in the Panchayat, might have been
able to voice their demands and rights. Unfortunately, he and his family had
long ago lost the contact with the villagers. He had settled in the town of
Ranchi, and was now leading a life totally different from that of his former
fellows. He had crossed over from, not the ethnic boundary, but a backward
community to which he belonged into the political establishment.
Politicians, despite ethnic and ideological differences, have a lot in
common in terms of culture and interests.

Could the margins of the margin raise their voice and appear as a subject or
a party in the public media, and thereby start that conflict through which
they should express their frustrated needs? That would require basic reading
and writing skills which the villagers in Southern Bihar do not possess. The
following short story, told to me on a train ride from Calcutta to
McCluskieganj in Southern Bihar in 1995, illustrates this point. I was told
by a school teacher that he had not been teaching in his one-man school in a
remote tribal area for six month. He had not even been there. His own
explanation was that it was too far away from his home. The school master
was turning his blind eye to this apparent case of fraught, as long as he
received ten percent of the teacher's salary. Now I asked about the fate of
the children as they apparently were deprived of their education. With a
slight surprise in his face, the teacher answered: "The children? They are
tribals! They cannot learn much anyway."

There are of course other political forces which offer themselves as
representatives to the margins of the margin in Southern Bihar. During my
visit in 1995, the Naxalite guerrillas had settled in the area. They are a
Maoist group who are fighting a war against the Indian government and larger
landholders located primarily in Central and Eastern India. As a guerrilla
group they are totally dependent on the support of the villagers wherever
they settle. When I arrived in 1995, the situation was tense and people were
scared. The newspaper told about the violent conflict between the Naxalites
and the government/police. Descriptions of the detailed battles between the
two parties were followed by the government and police officials view on the
matter. None of the newspapers contained a single word expressed by the
villagers from any part of the area. That the villagers were a party, and
the losing party, was not mentioned anywhere, not even between the lines.

The fact was that in the village I described above, most of the young men
had fled, to avoid recruitment by the guerrilla forces or, in the
alternative, to be accused by the police for being guerrilla soldiers. A
nearby village was totally deserted.

Means of conflict resolution in the present conflict in Southern Bihar would
perhaps include the government, the locally elected politicians, the
guerrillas, the trade Unions and so on, but the margins of the margin would
certainly be left out. And even if they were invited vors due to a deep and
perfectly rational mistrust of authority. To put it a bit harshly; there is
no conflict at all in Southern Bihar, simply because there are no
representatives of the marginalized, among whom we might expect to find
those with frustrated human needs.

The question arises of course: Could they subvert the boundaries which keep
them in their marginal position? Unfortunately, their identity as Yadav (a
so called backward caste), Munda, and Orao, is already subverted by 'their
own' elites in their struggle against the high castes. These elites are now
controlling political bodies. The present Chief Minister of Bihar is a Yadav
and his political power rests on his caste identity. He and the new
'backward caste elite' have succeeded in subverting the ethnic boundary
which once held them in backwardness, and now use this very boundary both as
a means to mobilize sufficient political support *and* to marginalized 'his
own caste' (sic.). Again we have a case of shifting positions. **  ** *
Conclusion*

It is impossible to assess ethnic boundaries *per se*, in terms of
advantages for the margins of the margin. The postcolonial attempt to
subvert them into political means of resistance does not eradicate the
phenomenon of marginality. Politicized ethnic boundaries have the tendency
of dichotomization and hence the use of violence--epistemic or
direct--towards whatever is different 'inside' or 'outside'. Sankaran
Krishna has put it this way:

I would like to begin by pointing out the irony that it is precisely the
greatest victims of the West's essentialist conceits (the ex-colonials and
neocolonials, Blacks, women, and so forth) that are articulating a need for
new strategic essentialisms (Krishna, S., 1993, p.405).

The line between conversion and shifting positions of domination is not easy
to draw in concrete
situations.(10)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_10_>There
is a risk that the postcolonial strategic essentialism is just a
replication of dominance on a different level and in a different context,
and that marginality is, as already indicated, an inescapable part of the
construction of ethnic boundaries. Ethnic boundaries may be, to put it
perhaps too harshly, a mere means of dominance and violence. As Foucault
warns:

one can perfectly well conceive of revolution which leave essentially
untouched the power relations which form the basis for the functioning of
the state As soon as one endeavors to *detach power with its techniques and
procedures* from the form of law within which it has been theoretically
confined up until now, one is driven to ask this basic question: *isn't
power simply a form of warlike domination?* (Foucault, 1980, p.123, my
emphasis).

Resistance in the form of strategic essentialization, and hence the
conversion of ethnic boundaries could be seen as a replication of the
*techniques
and procedures* of power. Ethnic boundaries are then an inseparable part of
the essence of the dominant, which in the contemporary inter-state system,
rests on the idea of the nation-state as it is outlined in the introduction.
Power, according to the imperative of the modern inter-state system derives
from the ability to produce congruity between ethnic/national boundaries and
political border. To make these two entities, i.e. the territory and the
nation, coincide, is not only a violent, but also an impossible task which
underscores the irony of the modern
state.(11)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_11_>The case
of Assam has given some indications of this irony, which also
question the conversion of ethnic boundaries as a long term political
strategy. In a longer perspective we might prefer to develop more
sustainable social forms of interaction. This is actually one of the main
concerns in the conflict resolution perspective.

There are also pitfalls in the conflict resolution approach--pitfalls which
the Bihari example, in part, demonstrated. One such pitfall is the common
task of deconstructing the boundaries by identifying parties to represent
sides of the conflict and bring them into processes of negotiation and
conflict resolution. In Bihar, the problem would be to identify the parties
and especially the margins of the margin. Not even the democratic
institutions are, in their present form, sufficient as means through which
conflicts can be handled and solved. Presently, such institutions rest on
the relations of power, and the ability of one party to silence another.

To realize that parties in a conflict do not necessarily earn the voluntary
support of the group they claim to represent is a major challenge to the
conflict resolution approach. The Northeastern problem of 'state'- building
would probably have developed differently if the Indian government had been
aware of the impossible principle of one tribe-one-state. A more fruitful
strategy, might have been to transcend the ethnic boundaries and demands put
forward by different parties. Such an endeavor could have envisaged the
margins of the margin before they got suppressed and silenced effectively by
'strategic essentialism.' In Bihar, the social tensions are to a large
extent swept under the carpet for the moment because the margins of the
margin are not heard. For Conflict resolution practitioners, one of the main
challenges ahead is to comprehend the meaning and effect of marginality in
conflicts as well as in processes of conflict resolution.

However, at least some of the intentions in the conflict resolution approach
should be considered in relation to the margins of the margin. First of all,
the primary goal is to avoid direct violence. This does not prevent
political struggles, but it marks a clear standpoint -- that human life
should not be sacrificed for the sake of a better society for the living.
Secondly, the conflict resolution approach implies the will to find channels
of communication; building bridges. This is important especially if methods
are developed to raise the voice of the margins of the margin. The challenge
is probably not to *give* a voice to a silenced party, but to create
conditions and institutions through which the margins of the margin can
speak. The obstacle so far has been universalism and insensitivity to
culture, particularity, and power. Power has not only a direct impact on
conflicts between the state and minorities, but on the very ability to speak
and thereby to become visible in conflict resolution processes and political
institutions. The two perspectives under scrutiny here, have in other words,
a lot to contribute with to a more coherent perspective on political ethnic
boundaries, violence, and marginality. **  ** *Notes*

1. For an an exception see Avruch, et al (eds.),1991.

2. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen has pointed out, the most serious, and perhaps
common, pitfall in the study of ethnicity and nationalism is that of
reification. (Eriksen, 1993). The fluidity of ethnic boundaries is described
by Igor Kopytoff in the initial quote above.

3. As Joseph A Scimecca writes: " conflict resolution was born in a time of
questioning whether traditional legal authority served the needs of people
or supported a status quo that reinforced social and political inequality.
[It was] a challenge to traditional authority, questioning of top-down,
centralized decision making. the "power paradigm" was challenged via the
notion that human beings seek to fulfil their basic human needs rather than
always seeking power and material interests", (Scimecca, 1991, p.20).

4. Gandhi's and the Congress' handling of the so-called indigo-riots in 1917
and other similar social conflicts in Bihar clearly indicates that the lower
castes were submerged under the principal conflict between the Congress and
the British Empire. This is not to say that lower castes were not a crucial
political weapon, but this weapon was firmly laid in the hands of the
dominant castes. See (Frankel, 1989).

5. The conflict resolution literature range from texts on the human nature
and the undiscovered conflict resolution potentials in human beings to
concrete guidelines for intervention. (See e.g. Parry, 1991). At the other
end of the spectra (Azar, 1990). There are also examples of invention of a
new rational 'grammar' with the aim to render communication transparent in
conflict situations and in everyday life (see e.g. Rosenberg, 1983).

6. Glasl has, among other, developed a stage model of conflict escalation
and resolution (Glasl, 1982).

7. Ashis Nandy rightly observes "that the oppressed, when faced with
problems of survival, had no obligation to follow any model or rules of the
game." (Nandy, 1987, p.121).

8. For a broader discussion of the rationale perspective in conflict
resolution see also Wallensteen, 1994, p.14. Also Azar, 1990, p. 42-48.

9. 5-7000 people were killed in two weeks time. (Gupta, 1984, p.2).

10. Even though G. Spivak has emphasized the heterogeneity and syncretic
nature of the colonized and the colonizers, she does not disclaim the basic
standpoint, that *colonizer*-*colonized* is the basic cleavage (wherever it
emerges) and that this dynamic has to be found and the politicization
encouraged. In that sense Spivak only points to a problem in the process of
essentializing, but does not disclaim it. (Spivak, G., 1994).

11. The best discussion which I have come across so far is an article by
Sankaran Krishna, (Krishna, 1994, pp.507-521). **  ** *References*

Avruch, K., P. Black and J. Scimecca (Eds). 1991. *Conflict Resolution.
Cross-Cultural Perspectives,* New York: Greenwood Press.

Barth, F. (Ed.) 1982. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization
of Cultural Difference.* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Breckenridge, C. & Van der Veer (Eds.) 1994.*Orientalism and the
Postcolonial Predicament. Perspectives on South Asia.* Delhi: Oxford
University Press.

Burton, J. 1990. *Conflict Resolution and Provention.* New York: Macmillan
Press.

Darby, P. & A. Paolini. 1994. "Bridging International Relations and
Postcolonialism." *Alternatives,* Vol. 19, pp. 371-97.

Eriksen, T. 1993. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological
Perspectives.*London: Pluto Press.

Fanon, F. 1967. *The Wretched of the Earth.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Foucault, M. 1980. *Power/Knowledge. Selected interviews and other writings
1972-1977.* Trans. and ed. by Colin Gordon. Hertfordshire: The Harvester
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Frankel, F. 1989. "Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of the
Brahmanical Social Order." In F. Frankel & M.S.A. Rao (Eds.), *Dominance and
State Power in Modern India. Decline of a Social Order, *Vol 1, Delhi:
Oxford University Press., pp.46-132

Galtung, J. & T. Höivik 1971. "Structural and Direct Violence." *Journal of
Peace Research*, Oslo, PRIO, pp. 73-76

Gupta, S. 1984. *A Valley Divided,* New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Ltd.

Kopytoff, I. (ed.) 1985. *The African Frontier. The Reproduction of
Traditional African Societies. *Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
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Krishna, S. 1993. "The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on
Critical. International Relations Theory." *Alternatives,* Vol 18, pp.
385-417

---------. 1996. "Cartographic Anxiety: Mapping the Body Politics in India."
In Shapiro & Alker (Eds.), pp. 193-214.

Nandy, A. 1987. "Cultural Frames for Social Transformation: A Credo." *
Alternatives*, Vol. 12, pp. 113-123.

Prakash, G. (ed.) 1995. *After Colonialism. Imperial Histories, and
Postcolonial Displacement.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Scimecca, J. 1991. "Conflict Resolution in the United States: The Emergence
of a Profession?" In Avruch, Black & Scimecca (eds.), pp.19-39.

Shapiro, M. & H. Alker (eds.) 1996. *Challenging Boundaries.* University of
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Spivak, G. 1994. "Can the Subaltern Speak?" In P.Williams & L. Chrisman, pp.
66-111.

Verdery, K. 1994. "Ethnicity, Nationalism, and State-making. Ethnic Groups
and Boundaries: Past and Future."' In Vermeulen, Hans, Govers, Cora (ed.), *The
Anthropology of Ethnicity. Beyond 'Ethnic Groups and
Boundaries.'*Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, pp. 33 - 58.

Wallensteen, P. 1994. *Från krig till fred,* (From War to Peace). Uppsala:
Almqvist & Wiksell Förlag AB.

Weber, T. 1991. *Conflict Resolution and Ghandian Ethics. *New Delhi: Gandhi
Peace. Foundation

Williams, P. & L. Chrisman. 1994. *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial
Theory.* New York: Columbia University Press.
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