[Assam] Ethinic Boundaries and the Margins of the Margin -Bent D. Jørgenson

[Chan Mahanta]

O' Ram,

Ram-ram! Moribolew xomoy nai, tate' tumi eikhon mohabharot porhibole' dila.

Can you give us a brief executive summary of Jorgenor-putekor  puthi?

Thanx in advance.

c-da










At 11:38 AM -0600 3/11/06, Ram Sarangapani wrote:
>Here is a Postdoc (thesis?) by Jorgenson. He has 
>also dealt with the subject of ethinic 
>boundaries in Assam. I have hi-lighted those 
>relevant parts. It makes very interesed reading. 
>He deals withquestions of  identity, ethinic 
>boundaries and "marginalization" of groups and 
>places.
>
>Would be interested in netters' comments.
>
>--Ram
>
>_____________________________
>
>ETHNIC BOUNDARIES AND THE
>
>MARGINS OF THE MARGIN:
>
>in a Postcolonial and Conflict Resolution Perspective
>
>Bent D. Jørgenson
>
><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html>http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html
>
>The clouds on the map would move, reform, 
>disappear, break-up into pieces; the pieces 
>would reassemble and new distinct areas would 
>form; and the channels between them would 
>expand, contract, and shift (Kopytoff, 1985, 
>p.12).
>
>The theme of this paper is on one of the most 
>elementary questions in the study of ethnicity 
>and nationalism, namely how to approach and 
>assess ethnic boundaries'. Should we perceive 
>them as an advantageous or a pernicious tool in 
>politics? To answer that question, we need a 
>reference point; advantageous or pernicious in 
>relation to whom? I will here use those 
>people(-s) who are so marginalized that their 
>voices are practically silenced, and the way in 
>which the political reconstruction, conversion, 
>or deconstruction of ethnic boundaries is 
>favorable or not to them; the margins of the 
>margin. Do ethnic boundaries, and particularly 
>their political usage, illuminate and create 
>preconditions for uplifting, visualization or in 
>any other way favor the margins of the margin? 
>And if yes, how does one handle the element of 
>violence which is involved in the politicization 
>and defense of such boundaries? On the contrary, 
>if we suggest that ethnic boundaries should be 
>deconstructed, how do we deal with the causes of 
>ethnic boundary construction? In order to 
>illuminate these problems, two approaches will 
>be critically discussed and applied: 
>Post-Colonialism and Conflict Resolution.
>
>In recent year these two approaches have gained 
>some influence in International Relations 
>theory. Postcolonialism addresses the problem of 
>epistemic violence and marginality. One of the 
>fundamental questions is: In what ways have the 
>dominant discourses (particularly emanating in 
>the West) marginalized, and still marginalized, 
>subjectivities based on skin-color, gender, 
>ethnicity etc. And normatively: How to combat 
>this marginalization? "The empire strikes (or 
>writes) back," is a slogan both in the local and 
>global political arena and, I believe, in ever 
>growing pockets of the academia. This 
>perspective or school of thought is present 
>almost everywhere in the world, but especially 
>in South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the 
>Caribbean.
>
>Parallel with the rising voice of marginality, 
>the salience of ethnic and internal conflicts 
>all over the world has fueled interest in 
>conflict research in general and the conflict 
>resolution in particular. Conflict Resolution 
>has been an attempt to find general methods and 
>schemes of solution, develop guidelines for 
>mediation, and/or identify universal processes 
>of conflict resolution in particular societies. 
>Bosnia and Israel, among others, have been the 
>targets for the attention of such practitioners 
>of conflict resolution.
>
>Why are these two perspectives brought together 
>into the same discussion? First, because they 
>share a normative concern for the same 
>fundamental problem, namely the reconstruction 
>and deconstruction of ethnic boundaries. 
>Concerning Postcolonialism, there is a clear 
>emphasis on the transformation or conversion of 
>ethnic boundaries from boundaries of 
>marginalization to boundaries for 'strategic 
>essentialization' (Krishna, Sankaran, 1993, 
>p.405). Conflict resolution approaches ethnic 
>boundaries as crucial 'complications' in 
>processes of conflict resolution and of course 
>of prime importance in processes of conflict 
>escalation. Despite the strong normativity in 
>both approaches, it is crucial to bear in mind 
>that the margins of the margin play a role in 
>the conflict dynamic itself, and therefore, the 
>connection; margins-conflicts-ethnic boundaries 
>have to be dealt with, not only normatively but 
>also positively.
>
>Secondly, the two perspectives are brought into 
>the same discussion as an attempt to open a 
>dialogue between two approaches to violence, 
>which have so far largely ignored each other's 
>existence<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_1_> 
>(1) In particular, how does one succeed in 
>envisaging and perhaps even uplifting or 'un 
>marginalizing' marginal subjects. By 'breaking 
>the ice' between the two approaches to 
>international studies, we might end up having 
>two perspectives illuminating each other's blind 
>spot, and eradicating some of the worst 
>pre-perceptions and prejudice in both.
>
>The following are empirical examples from Assam 
>and Southern Bihar in India. My own experiences 
>with the people in these two locations have 
>generated the questions and the problems 
>formulated in this paper. In both locations, 
>problems associated with the marginalization of 
>the margins have led to severe manifest or 
>non-manifest social problems in which ethnic 
>boundaries play a key role. In Assam, the tribal 
>groups have slowly emerged as political forces 
>after independence, asserting their demands 
>towards regional and central authorities. The 
>modern history of Assam illustrates the problem 
>of locating or territorializing the marginalized 
>space when elite groups claim the status as 
>'sons of the soil.' In Southern Bihar, a 
>marginalized region in itself, ethnic boundaries 
>cut across relations of dominance, thereby 
>complicating the relation between the two 
>phenomena .
>
>Ethnic Boundaries
>
>Ethnic boundaries, a concept borrowed from 
>Fredrik Barth (Barth, 1982 (1969)), are best 
>understood as cognitive or mental boundaries 
>situated in the minds of people and are the 
>result of collective efforts of construction and 
>maintenance. Ethnic boundaries dichotomize 
>insiders from outsiders--'us' from 'them.' 
>Katherine Verdery's summarizes Barth on this 
>point:
>
>The roots of [ethnicity as an] organizational 
>form are not in the cultural content associated 
>with ethnic identities but rather in the fact of 
>their dichotomization -- the presence of 
>boundaries separating groups. This shifts the 
>emphasis from seemingly 'objective' cultural 
>traits to behavior (including 'cultural' 
>behavior) that is socially effective in 
>maintaining group boundaries (Verdery, 1994, in 
>Vermeulen & Govers, 1994, p. 35).
>
>There are, in other words, neither objective 
>ethnic boundaries nor objective ethnic groups or 
>identities.<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_2_>(2)
>
>Furthermore, ethnic boundaries are open to 
>multiple individual perceptions and 
>interpretations. No wonder that hard social 
>sciences like International Relations, until 
>recently, have turned a blind eye to these 
>phenomena. Only the political significance 
>within the last few decades and the subsequent 
>demand for explanation and comprehension have 
>pushed these phenomena into the limelight of 
>social science.
>
>Ethnic boundaries are means to create order. 
>They are means of social navigation in a social 
>space comparable with the geographical map meant 
>for navigation in our physical environment. This 
>knowledge of a social universe is passed on 
>through processes of learning from one 
>generation to another or through other channels 
>of communication, simultaneously attaching 
>cultural values and features to what appears as 
>an 'inside' and an 'outside.' Seen from the 
>perspective of a certain individual, the ethnic 
>boundary is the result of a cognitive 
>reconstruction that separates 'us' from 'them.' 
>Ethnic boundaries are thus social constructions 
>and reconstructions mostly made peacefully in 
>interaction between individuals.
>
>This rather 'apolitical' definition of ethnic 
>boundaries is challenged, or rather 
>complemented, by a political approach that 
>reveals that ethnic boundaries, and the cultural 
>stuff which they contain, are not only 
>negotiable, but also contested. This is close to 
>the postcolonial approach in which ethnic 
>boundaries are determined by the dominant 
>discourse. The knowledge about ethnic boundaries 
>are carried on via the older generation, the 
>school, the mass media, and the state, or in 
>short, those who have the power to define the 
>ethnic boundary towards the marginal, and even 
>to define what the marginal is like, i.e. to 
>fill the image of the marginal with cultural 
>content. The postcolonial normative approach 
>would, as already mentioned, by a very 
>simplistic description advocate the conversion 
>of these marginalizing ethnic boundaries into 
>boundaries of 'strategic essentialization' and 
>as a means of resistance against 
>marginalization. On the contrary, in a conflict 
>resolution approach, ethnic boundaries would be 
>assessed as obstacles to conflict resolutions; 
>as an element of stereotyping the enemy, and 
>putting barriers of effective communication, and 
>thereby to get a false comprehension of what is 
>actually and rationally going on ( e.g-79). 
>Ethnic boundaries are therefore in need of 
>deconstruction. In the following discussion, 
>conversion and deconstruction will form the core 
>concepts, or 'lenses' through which ethnic 
>boundaries will be illuminated.
>
>Postcolonialism and Conflict Resolution
>
>Both the postcolonial and the conflict 
>resolution approaches have a strong normative 
>element, as they attempt to target the problem 
>of violence-although with emphasis on different 
>aspects of violence. In a Postcolonial 
>perspective, the prime evil appears to be the 
>epistemic violence committed by the dominant 
>discourse over the marginal. The dominant 
>Western discourse has wrested the marginalized 
>of even their ability to conceptualize 
>themselves as people with their own history, 
>future, dignity and self-respect. Conflict 
>resolution is, before anything else, a method to 
>alleviate further violence, and then open direct 
>violence. This is not to say that structural 
>violence is not a matter of concern in conflict 
>resolution. (Johan & Höivik, Tord, 1971, p. 
>73-76) However war, as the ultimate exercise of 
>direct violence, is without doubt also the 
>ultimate form of conflict to resolve and avoid.
>
>More specifically, the two perspectives have 
>rather different approaches to ethno-national 
>boundaries. The postcolonial normative approach 
>would, as already mentioned, by a very 
>simplistic description advocate the conversion 
>of these marginalizing ethnic boundaries into 
>boundaries of 'strategic essentialization' and 
>as a means of resistance against 
>marginalization. In a conflict resolution 
>approach, on the contrary, ethnic boundaries 
>would be assessed as obstacles to conflict 
>resolutions by stereotyping the enemy and 
>putting up barriers of effective communication, 
>thereby creating a false image of what is 
>actually and rationally going on (Burton, 1990, 
>p.78-79). Ethnic boundaries are therefore in 
>need of deconstruction. In the following 
>discussion, conversion and deconstruction will 
>form the core concepts, or 'lenses' through 
>which ethnic boundaries will be illuminated.
>
>Postcolonialism and conflict resolution could be 
>seen as very different approaches, and they are 
>indeed, but it should not be forgotten that both 
>have roots in a critique of the same dominant 
>discourses. Conflict resolution emerged as a 
>critique from inside the Western society, 
>challenging established institutions of conflict 
>management, e.g. juridical national and 
>international practices and 
>theories<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_3_>(3). 
>Postcolonialism became a challenge from outside, 
>as the Oriental, the subaltern and the marginal 
>began to speak or write back to the dominant 
>West, challenging imperial and colonial 
>discourses.
>
>On some locations the political practices 
>derived from these two approaches are hidden and 
>acted out silently under the surface. However, 
>nowhere is the dynamic between them more 
>apparent than in the recent so-called peace 
>process in Israel/Palestine. The conflict 
>resolution practitioners have until recently had 
>the advantaged position, bringing the Israeli 
>and Palestinian elite to peace talks and 
>institutionalizing cooperation between the two 
>parties. Recently, however, postcolonialists 
>have raised their voices and are about to take 
>the lead, pushing the peace-process back. The 
>conflicts is not, at least for the moment, 
>between the Palestinians and the Israelis or the 
>Muslims and the Jews. It is instead between 
>those in favor of working out ways to make 
>ethnic boundaries less politically explosive, 
>and those who want to politicize the boundaries 
>further. In the former case, the end of conflict 
>is the prime goal, in the latter the focus is on 
>marginalization.
>
>Before we enter into a discussion of the two 
>approaches to ethnic boundaries, it should be 
>clear that none of them are as coherent and 
>fixed as they will appear below. It is 
>inevitable to generalize and leave out certain 
>nuances and aspects which are important for 
>those who have brought them forward or those who 
>believe that they are inseparable parts of each 
>tradition. However, the aim here is to use these 
>two approaches as rather focused 'spot lights' 
>on the problem under scrutiny, not to give a 
>just treatment of two perspectives and their 
>founding parents.
>
>Postcolonialism and the Conversion of Ethnic Boundaries
>
>In the vast literature on Postcolonialism, it is 
>described as a project, a discourse, an 
>ideology, a text/narrative, a trend or a variety 
>of these concepts in the same text (Prakash, 
>1995, Introduction). To me, none of these 
>features can be carved out of the composite 
>nature of Postcolonialism. That Postcolonialism 
>will appear as an approach in the following 
>text, does not mean that the other facets are 
>left out. In fact, the postcolonial approach is 
>the most open-ended of the two perspectives 
>probably due to the fact that it spans almost 
>every humanist and social science and it has as 
>a consequence a very broad methodological base. 
>Furthermore, and probably due to this 
>multifaceted character, Postcolonialism has 
>within it a strong sense of self criticism. To 
>fix a certain standpoint in this approach is 
>therefore, to use the conceptual framework 
>within the approach itself, to use 'epistemic 
>violence.'
>
>Post-Colonialism has its origin in Literature 
>and the study of the ex-colonial novel. The task 
>has been to expose the subordinate 
>representation of the colonized by the 
>colonizers. The focus on text indicates a strong 
>linkage with post-modernism and the difference 
>between the two is not always clear. However, 
>Postcolonialism, at least in the form it is 
>presented here, is political and normative while 
>post-modernism, at least in its most relativist 
>form, is not.
>
>[In] the core of the discourse, is a focus on 
>the relations of domination and resistance and 
>the effect they have had on identity, in, 
>through, and beyond, the colonial encounter: the 
>prefix 'post' is testament to the fact that the 
>problems that lie at the heart of the 
>colonializer-colonized relationship are seen to 
>persist beyond colonialism. The importance of 
>reinterpreting the colonial experience is 
>relevant to contemporary identity. In the 
>process of resistance, the native voice is 
>repositioned and empowered (Darby & Paolini, 
>1994, p.375).
>
>The post-colonial approach calls for revival and 
>politicization of the marginalized's 
>subjectivities. One of the main questions is 
>"how does one construct provisional and 
>strategically essentialized subjectivities to 
>enable a progressive politics" (Krishna, 1993, 
>p.405). The marginalized are not only supposed 
>to deconstructed dominant hegemonic discourse, 
>but to subvert boundaries from the 'bottom up' 
>and transform the cultural 'stuff' which these 
>boundaries enclose. This is problematic in terms 
>of localizing the marginalized space and when we 
>consider the problem of marginalization by the 
>marginalized. These are of course central issues 
>for further discussion below.
>
>In India, the postcolonial discourse has had a 
>long history which in fact dates back to figures 
>like Tagore, but the most prominent is of course 
>Mahatma Gandhi. He advocated a resistance which 
>was asserted as an Indian alternative to Western 
>colonialism. Gandhi in fact illustrates the 
>difficulties-and challenges-within 
>Postcolonialism. It is both a category of 
>political movements around the world ( e.g. 
>Gandhian movements) and an highly sophisticated 
>academic approach (e.g. Gandhiism). It is, in 
>other words, both theory and practice, which is 
>a strength, but also poses problems of getting 
>ideas, views, and norms across between 
>practitioners and theorists. More concretely, 
>the assessment of the central issues here, 
>namely violence, ethnic boundaries, and 
>marginality, differs considerably between these 
>two positions. Violent chauvinism, marginalizing 
>the margins of the margin might be 'a price 
>worth paying' for the practitioner, whereas this 
>is likely to be normatively unacceptable to the 
>theorist far from 
>realpolitik.<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_4_>(4)
>
>Conflict Resolution and the Deconstruction of Ethnic Boundaries
>
>The other strand of research will be called 
>conflict resolution. It is basically an array of 
>theories of conflicts combined with a variety of 
>techniques and methods to solve or manage 
>conflicts. 
><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_5_>(5) 
>However, such characteristics neglect the recent 
>development within the field, where conflict 
>resolution has developed into an academic 
>discipline and a rather coherent school of 
>discussion and debate. And even though it lacks 
>a coherent theoretical base, it has emerged as a 
>discipline in colleges and universities around 
>the world. A great number of scholars are now 
>theorizing about conflicts and conflicts 
>resolution creating a body of literature which 
>now forms an embryonic approach to conflict and 
>conflict resolution ( e.g. Scimecca, J.A., p.19 
>and 33).
>
>Conflict resolution is a vast field with a 
>variety of methodological approaches. The common 
>normative approach, though, is that conflicts 
>should be solved in an orderly (following 
>certain methods) and peaceful way. Peaceful here 
>could mean anything from absence of direct 
>violence or threat of violence, to the creation 
>of a certain desirable and non-violent regime. 
>Conflict resolution is, first of all, advocating 
>a non-violent ideology. It basically advocates 
>the alleviation of violence and then pushes for 
>the development and allocation of conflict 
>solving methods and development of institutions 
>geared toward conflict management. For the 
>Postcolonials violence is not necessarily a 
>major problem. Frans Fanon, one of the strong 
>influences in the post-colonial discourse, has 
>put it this way: "At the level of the 
>individuals, violence is a cleansing force; it 
>forces the native from his inferiority complex 
>and from his despair and inaction; it makes him 
>fearless and restores his self-respect" (Fanon, 
>1967, p.94).
>
>In relation to conflict resolution, this is not 
>just a very different view of violence, but also 
>of its psychological function. Within conflict 
>resolution direct physical violence is seen as 
>the highest stage of conflict escalation and a 
>result of 'more unconscious and subconscious 
>forces.' 
><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_6_>(6) 
>It is not far to interpret conflicts as a social 
>relation which in fact describes a 
>transformation from rationality and reason to 
>irrationality and intuition. And a postcolonial 
>critic would probably add: from Western to 
>Non-western.
>
>If we for a moment separate the field into the 
>two influential fields of Game theory and Human 
>needs theory, it is clear that the former has 
>taken the ethnic boundaries as communication 
>barriers, which have to be broken down in order 
>to envisage the position of the opponent. Game 
>theory is insensitive to cultural differences 
>and the unequal distribution of power. Therefore 
>it tells us little about the problems outlined 
>above. 
><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_7_>(7)
>
>It is of course disputable whether conflict 
>resolution advocates the deconstruction of 
>ethnic boundaries. What about Human needs 
>theory? One of the most influential scholars in 
>this conflict resolution approach is undoubtedly 
>John Burton, who belong to the so called London 
>School within the field of conflict resolution. 
>In his monumental work, Conflict Resolution and 
>Provention, he "seeks to provide a framework for 
>consideration of theory and practice in conflict 
>resolution and provention." (Burton, 1990, p.x). 
>He makes a distinction between disputes which 
>"are an integral part of a competitive society; 
>and conflicts which are deep-rooted in human 
>needs." (Ibid., p.1). The need of identity 
>somehow presupposes the reconstruction of ethnic 
>boundaries. According to Burton, we need to have 
>an identity and that implies ethnic boundaries. 
>However, the boundary is supposed to be 
>inclusive and not exclusive and discriminatory. 
>Burton has also explained his key concept, 
>'Conflict Provention,' in a way which prevents 
>boundaries from becoming politicized barriers. 
>"The term prevention has the connotation of 
>containment. The term provention has been 
>introduced to signify taking steps to remove a 
>source of conflict, and more positively to 
>promote conditions in which collaborative and 
>valued relationships control behavior" (Ibid., 
>p. v ).
>
>That is to enhance communication between 
>conflicting parties. This is to say that people 
>are not supposed to give up their personal and 
>collective identification, but they are not 
>supposed to be utilized as a political tool; 
>ethnic boundaries are not to be subverted and 
>strategically essentialized. The relation 
>between the concepts of boundaries and needs of 
>identity is objective and apolitical (Ibid., 
>p.39f. ).
>
>If ontological needs exist it follows that the 
>traditional belief that politics is subjective 
>is false. It is this discovery, this deduction, 
>that is the core of the contemporary shift in 
>thought. Politics can no longer be justified as 
>arbitrary, determined by ideologies and 
>interests. It is possible to assess 'isms, 
>leadership and systems generally by reference to 
>these needs. We can predict the consequences of 
>politics. (Ibid., p.117.)
>
>Burton's point here is that politics in fact is 
>objective in its cause and development. We can 
>assume that conflicts and even their resolution 
>follow the same trajectory. Conflict resolution 
>has had a tendency to slip into the grand 
>theorizing about the universal causes and 
>solutions to conflicts. 
><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_8_>(8) 
>The human needs approach accentuates where 
>conflicts derives from the frustration of basic 
>human needs. According to Burton, politics is 
>not a subjective realm, but a realm open for 
>negotiation between parties with at least 
>theoretical ability to use reason and 
>calculation in assessment of human needs. There 
>are two problems with this theory.
>
>Human needs, like for instance the need for 
>identity, is not an objective force which has a 
>certain influence on politics. Human needs are 
>experienced as well as expressed through 
>cultural lenses and effected by relations of 
>power. Burton argues that conflicts deriving 
>from the frustration of the need of identity, 
>are often to be found in so called multi-ethnic 
>societies (Edward E. Azar's makes a similar 
>point. Azar, 1990). For the postcolonials, 
>marginalized human beings act in conflicts 
>because they are deprived of their subjective 
>rights which are theirs and realized by them. 
>Furthermore, how is the need for identity 
>satisfied and when is it frustrated? Is the need 
>of identity frustrated when people almost never 
>express their group belonging, because their 
>social environment is indifferent to it, and is 
>it satisfied when people for generations have 
>been marginalized by the reconstruction of 
>ethnic boundaries, ascribing an identity onto 
>them? Does the frustration of human needs in the 
>margins of the margin lead to conflicts at all, 
>and if so, can they be handled the same way as 
>'other' conflicts? We will have reason to return 
>to these last questions. The must fundamental 
>question is of course, could the need of 
>identity be satisfied by identifying with 
>humanity?
>
>Ethnic Boundaries and Marginality
>
>The theoretical connection between ethnic 
>boundaries and marginality can be developed in 
>two steps. First, the connection between ethnic 
>boundaries and marginality has to do with the 
>exercise of power and culture. Culture indicates 
>not only what is right or wrong but also who has 
>the right to decide in these matters. Those who 
>are deprived of the right, at least in relation 
>to the dominant, we can call marginal. A great 
>deal of the post-colonial literature deals with 
>the colonial power to define a discourse in 
>which the subjugated people were fixed into 
>categories of races, castes, religions or 
>tribes, creating a tidy map to conquer and 
>control. Timothy Mitchell argues in a citation 
>in Philip Darby and A.J. Paolini's essay:
>
>modern colonialism was constructed upon a vastly 
>increased power of representation, a power that 
>made possible an unprecedented fixing and 
>policing of boundaries; an unprecedented power 
>of portraying what lay 'outside.' Power is 
>determined not so much by obvious recourse 
>disparities, but by the ability of the colonial 
>order to establish an absolute boundary between 
>the West and the non-West, the modern and the 
>past, order and disorder, self and other (Darby 
>& Paolini, 1994, p.375).
>
>Power is the ability to construct a social 
>boundary in this post-colonial view. Secondly, 
>we can imagine that a boundary has a marginal 
>zone, a place which is neither inside, nor 
>outside. It is a socially constructed human 'no 
>mans land' in which 'we' have located people 
>(real or imagined) who are neither 'we' nor 
>'them', they are rather a subjugated 
>subjectivity, which is a negation of 'we'. Why? 
>Because they are needed as a permanent 
>instrument of locating 'we' in relation to 
>'them', and tell us who 'we' are (culture), what 
>are 'our' rights (politics), and what belongs to 
>'us' (economics) and so forth. Often, this space 
>'in-between' is the margins of the margin. The 
>tribal population in India has in many places 
>had that function during centuries. Living 
>either among the dominant caste Hindu's or at 
>the fringes of their settlements, they 
>constitute the marginal which is in many places 
>effectively silenced.
>
>The interesting thing to note is that there is 
>no definite beginnings or ends to the marginal, 
>and similarly there is no definite marginalized 
>space which is totally without power. The margin 
>is, in other words, a diffuse entity which can 
>contain almost everything which is not commonly 
>held as dominant in a specific setting and at a 
>certain point in time. Or again in other words, 
>the localization of the margin depends on the 
>location of the observer. Being in the margin 
>there is always space which is more marginalized 
>and silenced, and, equally important, more 
>dominant space.
>
>The pitfalls in the conversion and 
>reconstruction of ethnic boundaries are many and 
>sometimes even violently disastrous in relation 
>to the margins of the margin. The construction 
>of ethnic boundaries could be perceived as an 
>act of violence in the sense that they are 
>forced on individuals for whom these divisions 
>are incongruent with their personal perception 
>of social boundaries and thereby marginalized 
>these individuals; i.e. they are marginalized by 
>the marginalized.
>
>Problems of Conversion and Deconstruction
>
>The two realms of problems concerning conversion 
>and deconstruction of ethnic boundaries which 
>will be sketched out below, basically points to 
>the problems of normativity in the postcolonial 
>and conflict resolution approaches. But even 
>more basically, they point to the connection 
>between the soft sciences and political action; 
>between theory and practice. Can we transform 
>theoretical ideas, results and conclusion into 
>political action and, at the same time, be 
>observant from various political standpoints, 
>especially toward those whom are so marginal 
>that they are practically silenced?
>
>Where is the Margins of the Margin in Assam?
>
>How can we possibly locate a marginal space? In 
>the global society, the potentials for group 
>formations and hence the conversion of ethnic 
>boundaries are many, and these possibilities are 
>often described as ethnic segmentation or 
>stratification (ethnic levels), or in the 
>post-colonial debate, as a power hierarchy. With 
>such metaphors in mind, the postcolonial concern 
>is to chose the right level in order to make the 
>dominant discourse visible, subvert it, and 
>eventually fight it. With this strategy, we 
>might end up repressing the other marginalized 
>groups or the marginalized of the marginalized 
>groups. In that case, the strategy is no longer 
>conversion of ethnic boundaries, but rather 
>shift of positions from marginal to dominant. 
>However, this distinction is not very easy to 
>make for two reasons.
>
>First, it is not easy to locate a marginalized 
>space. A marginalized space always contains even 
>more severely marginalized spaces, which might 
>however seem too 'small' or 'weak' for political 
>mobilization. Consequently these subgroups are 
>not only neglected, but also forced into a 
>political project which they might not want to 
>be part of, or at least against their interests. 
>Localization is, in other words, important. 
>Secondly, this space changes location, 
>disappears, and appears depending on a variety 
>of factors. We can not be sure that either the 
>ethnic boundaries or the rationale behind their 
>construction and reconstruction will persist, 
>although one important part in boundary making 
>is to make them appear as eternal.
>
>There are several examples to illustrate these 
>problems of location and shift of positions. In 
>the state of Assam in Northeast India, the 
>Assamese elite started in the middle of the 19th 
>century, to create an Assamese identity in 
>contrast first of all to the dominant Bengali 
>identity. By the advent of colonization in the 
>1820s, the Assamese nobility was removed from 
>the apex of power, deprived of their former 
>privileges, and Bengali was declared the 
>official language of the province. The Bengali 
>minority moving into the region was apparently 
>successful in constructing a boundary towards 
>the Assamese majority. Slowly a mixture of old 
>and new Assamese leaders succeeded in subverting 
>this ethnic boundary, and by independence, they 
>gained political control of a territory which 
>covered most of present day Northeast India. 
>However, after independence five new states have 
>been carved out of the Assam state, and this 
>process doesn't seem to have reached a final end.
>
>Soon after independence, ethnic groups began to 
>emerge as distinct communities with a political 
>will different from that of the Assamese 
>majority. The Naga elite demanded independence 
>or autonomy immediately after 1947. After a long 
>violent struggle in the mountains of Northeast 
>Lastly, the Bodo elite of lowland Assam are 
>demanding an autonomous state carved out of the 
>Assam, but within the Indian Union.
>
>This row of events could be seen as the 
>minorities' slow awakening and proliferation of 
>their ethnic boundary toward an ever louder 
>Assamese identity. It is indisputable that the 
>Assamese leadership has shifted positions, 
>forcing Assamese language and customs on other 
>groups. This is the major impetus for the 
>conversion of the ethnic boundary between the 
>Assamese and the tribals. Second, the 'tribal' 
>awakening' has to do with the rise in education 
>and economic power of certain segments of the 
>tribal population all over Northeast India, 
>especially after independence. Tribal elites 
>have emerged and use their power to assert their 
>subjectivity and claim the same rights to 
>control a certain territory as other 'major 
>groups' within the Indian Union. In that 
>development, we of course imagine that the 
>marginalized space is moving downwards. Today we 
>will find, that certain tribes, and segments of 
>the tribals have no voice at all. They have been 
>practically silenced in the struggle for 
>autonomy by relatively dominant groups.
>
>What is interesting here is that during every 
>stage of this process, there are moments of 
>conversion of dominating ethnic boundaries 
>(upwards) and simultaneously, silencing of 
>marginal subjectivities, i.e. to avoid any 
>'internal' ethnic boundaries. During the 
>independence struggle, all ethnic boundaries 
>were with one exception, successfully repressed. 
>During the so called Assam Movement from 1979 to 
>1983, the differences between groups in Assam 
>were again repressed in the struggle of the 
>'sons of the soil' against the 'foreigners,' 
>mainly Bengali immigrants. In that movement, 
>which was extremely violent, most of the 
>casualties were found among the lowland tribal 
>population, 
><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_9_>(9) 
>which today are demanding an autonomous 
>Bodo-land.
>
>An important aspect to lift to the fore here is 
>that ethnic boundaries almost never fit with the 
>'boundaries of marginality.' The class aspect 
>should be brought in here. What is appearing in 
>the Assamese context is a new Bengali 
>marginalized group facing the anger of an 
>Assamese majority against an historically 
>dominant Bengali upper and middle class. These 
>Bengalis are poor peasants fleeing the densely 
>populated Bangladesh and are now trying their 
>luck in Assam as in other places in India. How 
>should this marginal Bengali group subvert the 
>ethnic boundary which keeps them mired in 
>marginality? Furthermore, the conversion and 
>reconstruction of ethnic boundaries depends on 
>the power to convert and reconstruct, and that 
>appears to be in the hands of the elites. But 
>sufficient power never enters the margins of the 
>margin, where groups are marginalized by the 
>marginalized in the process of subverting the 
>ethnic boundaries of domination.
>
>The fate of the Bengalis in Assam is shared with 
>a great deal of Brahmins in Northern India. Now 
>the numerous so-called 'backward castes' are, by 
>democratic means, taking to power, and using it 
>violently against their former high caste 
>oppressors. Upper castes like Brahmins are 
>however, a socio-economically very diversified 
>group from rich to deeply poor. The latter are 
>the victims of the newly born postcolonial 
>politics now as they face the conversion of the 
>caste boundary which has kept the lower castes 
>in marginality for centuries.
>
>Who is marginalizing whom and for what purpose 
>is a question to which I will return soon. At 
>this stage, it should be clear that ethnic 
>boundaries are a political means, some would say 
>a weapon, whose use of stereotyping and 
>homogenization lead to violent effects, both 
>direct and epistemically, on the margins of the 
>margin.
>
>Do the Margins of the Margin have a Voice in Southern Bihar?
>
>The major handicap for the margins of the margin 
>is not merely economic deprivation, but the fact 
>that they have no voice to put forward their 
>demands. 'The subaltern cannot speak.' (Spivak, 
>1994, p.104 ). This fact is a serious challenge 
>to the conflict resolution approach, as it 
>presupposes that there are parties involved in a 
>conflict. To practice conflict resolution or 
>management presupposes the existence of parties 
>who can negotiate, and enter processes of 
>conflict resolution (See e.g. Wallensteen, 
>Peter, 1994, p. 5, 59). I have not heard (!) but 
>I could imagine, that there are subjectivities 
>in Bosnia and Israel Palestine which are not 
>present or represented at the negotiation tables 
>and are also neglected in the many NGO's which 
>have some political influence in this conflict. 
>Similarly in India, there are subjectivities 
>which are generated by neither party nor in the 
>political institutions of the conflict.
>
>In Southern Bihar, we find a population of mixed 
>tribes and caste-Hindus. It is a poor area, with 
>all the severity of poverty, and with all social 
>indicators pointing low. People have since the 
>colonial era learned to mistrust authorities in 
>many other places including what is commonly 
>known as the 'tribal belt' in Central India. 
>Although the phenomenon of the margins of the 
>margin is as evident here as in Northeast India, 
>there is a common perception that whatever comes 
>'from above' is of evil. This perception is held 
>by many from school teachers to forest and 
>police officials. Furthermore there is little in 
>the present developments which have changed that 
>image of power and its institutions.
>
>When I visited a village in the Ranchi district 
>in Southern Bihar in 1994 and again in 1995, I 
>learned that the villagers had had the 
>opportunity to elect one of their own to the 
>village council, the Panchayat, which is an 
>elected body presiding over 4-5 villages. This 
>election took place in 1984 and should have been 
>held again in 1989. But different political 
>interests on the state level had postponed the 
>election for years. The official reason was not 
>known to the villagers, but their own 
>perceptions were clear, namely that the people 
>with power were not interested in hearing their 
>voice. However, their elected Mukia, or headman 
>in the Panchayat, might have been able to voice 
>their demands and rights. Unfortunately, he and 
>his family had long ago lost the contact with 
>the villagers. He had settled in the town of 
>Ranchi, and was now leading a life totally 
>different from that of his former fellows. He 
>had crossed over from, not the ethnic boundary, 
>but a backward community to which he belonged 
>into the political establishment. Politicians, 
>despite ethnic and ideological differences, have 
>a lot in common in terms of culture and 
>interests.
>
>Could the margins of the margin raise their 
>voice and appear as a subject or a party in the 
>public media, and thereby start that conflict 
>through which they should express their 
>frustrated needs? That would require basic 
>reading and writing skills which the villagers 
>in Southern Bihar do not possess. The following 
>short story, told to me on a train ride from 
>Calcutta to McCluskieganj in Southern Bihar in 
>1995, illustrates this point. I was told by a 
>school teacher that he had not been teaching in 
>his one-man school in a remote tribal area for 
>six month. He had not even been there. His own 
>explanation was that it was too far away from 
>his home. The school master was turning his 
>blind eye to this apparent case of fraught, as 
>long as he received ten percent of the teacher's 
>salary. Now I asked about the fate of the 
>children as they apparently were deprived of 
>their education. With a slight surprise in his 
>face, the teacher answered: "The children? They 
>are tribals! They cannot learn much anyway."
>
>There are of course other political forces which 
>offer themselves as representatives to the 
>margins of the margin in Southern Bihar. During 
>my visit in 1995, the Naxalite guerrillas had 
>settled in the area. They are a Maoist group who 
>are fighting a war against the Indian government 
>and larger landholders located primarily in 
>Central and Eastern India. As a guerrilla group 
>they are totally dependent on the support of the 
>villagers wherever they settle. When I arrived 
>in 1995, the situation was tense and people were 
>scared. The newspaper told about the violent 
>conflict between the Naxalites and the 
>government/police. Descriptions of the detailed 
>battles between the two parties were followed by 
>the government and police officials view on the 
>matter. None of the newspapers contained a 
>single word expressed by the villagers from any 
>part of the area. That the villagers were a 
>party, and the losing party, was not mentioned 
>anywhere, not even between the lines.
>
>The fact was that in the village I described 
>above, most of the young men had fled, to avoid 
>recruitment by the guerrilla forces or, in the 
>alternative, to be accused by the police for 
>being guerrilla soldiers. A nearby village was 
>totally deserted.
>
>Means of conflict resolution in the present 
>conflict in Southern Bihar would perhaps include 
>the government, the locally elected politicians, 
>the guerrillas, the trade Unions and so on, but 
>the margins of the margin would certainly be 
>left out. And even if they were invited vors due 
>to a deep and perfectly rational mistrust of 
>authority. To put it a bit harshly; there is no 
>conflict at all in Southern Bihar, simply 
>because there are no representatives of the 
>marginalized, among whom we might expect to find 
>those with frustrated human needs.
>
>The question arises of course: Could they 
>subvert the boundaries which keep them in their 
>marginal position? Unfortunately, their identity 
>as Yadav (a so called backward caste), Munda, 
>and Orao, is already subverted by 'their own' 
>elites in their struggle against the high 
>castes. These elites are now controlling 
>political bodies. The present Chief Minister of 
>Bihar is a Yadav and his political power rests 
>on his caste identity. He and the new 'backward 
>caste elite' have succeeded in subverting the 
>ethnic boundary which once held them in 
>backwardness, and now use this very boundary 
>both as a means to mobilize sufficient political 
>support and to marginalized 'his own caste' 
>(sic.). Again we have a case of shifting 
>positions.
>
>Conclusion
>
>It is impossible to assess ethnic boundaries per 
>se, in terms of advantages for the margins of 
>the margin. The postcolonial attempt to subvert 
>them into political means of resistance does not 
>eradicate the phenomenon of marginality. 
>Politicized ethnic boundaries have the tendency 
>of dichotomization and hence the use of 
>violence--epistemic or direct--towards whatever 
>is different 'inside' or 'outside'. Sankaran 
>Krishna has put it this way:
>
>I would like to begin by pointing out the irony 
>that it is precisely the greatest victims of the 
>West's essentialist conceits (the ex-colonials 
>and neocolonials, Blacks, women, and so forth) 
>that are articulating a need for new strategic 
>essentialisms (Krishna, S., 1993, p.405).
>
>The line between conversion and shifting 
>positions of domination is not easy to draw in 
>concrete 
>situations.<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_10_>(10) 
>There is a risk that the postcolonial strategic 
>essentialism is just a replication of dominance 
>on a different level and in a different context, 
>and that marginality is, as already indicated, 
>an inescapable part of the construction of 
>ethnic boundaries. Ethnic boundaries may be, to 
>put it perhaps too harshly, a mere means of 
>dominance and violence. As Foucault warns:
>
>one can perfectly well conceive of revolution 
>which leave essentially untouched the power 
>relations which form the basis for the 
>functioning of the state As soon as one 
>endeavors to detach power with its techniques 
>and procedures from the form of law within which 
>it has been theoretically confined up until now, 
>one is driven to ask this basic question: isn't 
>power simply a form of warlike domination? 
>(Foucault, 1980, p.123, my emphasis).
>
>Resistance in the form of strategic 
>essentialization, and hence the conversion of 
>ethnic boundaries could be seen as a replication 
>of the techniques and procedures of power. 
>Ethnic boundaries are then an inseparable part 
>of the essence of the dominant, which in the 
>contemporary inter-state system, rests on the 
>idea of the nation-state as it is outlined in 
>the introduction. Power, according to the 
>imperative of the modern inter-state system 
>derives from the ability to produce congruity 
>between ethnic/national boundaries and political 
>border. To make these two entities, i.e. the 
>territory and the nation, coincide, is not only 
>a violent, but also an impossible task which 
>underscores the irony of the modern 
>state.<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_11_>(11) 
>The case of Assam has given some indications of 
>this irony, which also question the conversion 
>of ethnic boundaries as a long term political 
>strategy. In a longer perspective we might 
>prefer to develop more sustainable social forms 
>of interaction. This is actually one of the main 
>concerns in the conflict resolution perspective.
>
>There are also pitfalls in the conflict 
>resolution approach--pitfalls which the Bihari 
>example, in part, demonstrated. One such pitfall 
>is the common task of deconstructing the 
>boundaries by identifying parties to represent 
>sides of the conflict and bring them into 
>processes of negotiation and conflict 
>resolution. In Bihar, the problem would be to 
>identify the parties and especially the margins 
>of the margin. Not even the democratic 
>institutions are, in their present form, 
>sufficient as means through which conflicts can 
>be handled and solved. Presently, such 
>institutions rest on the relations of power, and 
>the ability of one party to silence another.
>
>To realize that parties in a conflict do not 
>necessarily earn the voluntary support of the 
>group they claim to represent is a major 
>challenge to the conflict resolution approach. 
>The Northeastern problem of 'state'- building 
>would probably have developed differently if the 
>Indian government had been aware of the 
>impossible principle of one tribe-one-state. A 
>more fruitful strategy, might have been to 
>transcend the ethnic boundaries and demands put 
>forward by different parties. Such an endeavor 
>could have envisaged the margins of the margin 
>before they got suppressed and silenced 
>effectively by 'strategic essentialism.' In 
>Bihar, the social tensions are to a large extent 
>swept under the carpet for the moment because 
>the margins of the margin are not heard. For 
>Conflict resolution practitioners, one of the 
>main challenges ahead is to comprehend the 
>meaning and effect of marginality in conflicts 
>as well as in processes of conflict resolution.
>
>However, at least some of the intentions in the 
>conflict resolution approach should be 
>considered in relation to the margins of the 
>margin. First of all, the primary goal is to 
>avoid direct violence. This does not prevent 
>political struggles, but it marks a clear 
>standpoint -- that human life should not be 
>sacrificed for the sake of a better society for 
>the living. Secondly, the conflict resolution 
>approach implies the will to find channels of 
>communication; building bridges. This is 
>important especially if methods are developed to 
>raise the voice of the margins of the margin. 
>The challenge is probably not to give a voice to 
>a silenced party, but to create conditions and 
>institutions through which the margins of the 
>margin can speak. The obstacle so far has been 
>universalism and insensitivity to culture, 
>particularity, and power. Power has not only a 
>direct impact on conflicts between the state and 
>minorities, but on the very ability to speak and 
>thereby to become visible in conflict resolution 
>processes and political institutions. The two 
>perspectives under scrutiny here, have in other 
>words, a lot to contribute with to a more 
>coherent perspective on political ethnic 
>boundaries, violence, and marginality.
>
>Notes
>
>1. For an an exception see Avruch, et al (eds.),1991.
>
>2. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen has pointed out, 
>the most serious, and perhaps common, pitfall in 
>the study of ethnicity and nationalism is that 
>of reification. (Eriksen, 1993). The fluidity of 
>ethnic boundaries is described by Igor Kopytoff 
>in the initial quote above.
>
>3. As Joseph A Scimecca writes: " conflict 
>resolution was born in a time of questioning 
>whether traditional legal authority served the 
>needs of people or supported a status quo that 
>reinforced social and political inequality. [It 
>was] a challenge to traditional authority, 
>questioning of top-down, centralized decision 
>making. the "power paradigm" was challenged via 
>the notion that human beings seek to fulfil 
>their basic human needs rather than always 
>seeking power and material interests", 
>(Scimecca, 1991, p.20).
>
>4. Gandhi's and the Congress' handling of the 
>so-called indigo-riots in 1917 and other similar 
>social conflicts in Bihar clearly indicates that 
>the lower castes were submerged under the 
>principal conflict between the Congress and the 
>British Empire. This is not to say that lower 
>castes were not a crucial political weapon, but 
>this weapon was firmly laid in the hands of the 
>dominant castes. See (Frankel, 1989).
>
>5. The conflict resolution literature range from 
>texts on the human nature and the undiscovered 
>conflict resolution potentials in human beings 
>to concrete guidelines for intervention. (See 
>e.g. Parry, 1991). At the other end of the 
>spectra (Azar, 1990). There are also examples of 
>invention of a new rational 'grammar' with the 
>aim to render communication transparent in 
>conflict situations and in everyday life (see 
>e.g. Rosenberg, 1983).
>
>6. Glasl has, among other, developed a stage 
>model of conflict escalation and resolution 
>(Glasl, 1982).
>
>7. Ashis Nandy rightly observes "that the 
>oppressed, when faced with problems of survival, 
>had no obligation to follow any model or rules 
>of the game." (Nandy, 1987, p.121).
>
>8. For a broader discussion of the rationale 
>perspective in conflict resolution see also 
>Wallensteen, 1994, p.14. Also Azar, 1990, p. 
>42-48.
>
>9. 5-7000 people were killed in two weeks time. (Gupta, 1984, p.2).
>
>10. Even though G. Spivak has emphasized the 
>heterogeneity and syncretic nature of the 
>colonized and the colonizers, she does not 
>disclaim the basic standpoint, that 
>colonizer-colonized is the basic cleavage 
>(wherever it emerges) and that this dynamic has 
>to be found and the politicization encouraged. 
>In that sense Spivak only points to a problem in 
>the process of essentializing, but does not 
>disclaim it. (Spivak, G., 1994).
>
>11. The best discussion which I have come across 
>so far is an article by Sankaran Krishna, 
>(Krishna, 1994, pp.507-521).
>
>References
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>
>
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