RE: [Assam] Ethinic Boundaries and the Margins of the Margin -Bent D.Jørgenson

[Roy, Santanu]

Ram-da: 
Moi-u buji na-palw. As I read the sentence: 

"What is interesting here is that during every stage of this process, there are moments of conversion of dominating ethnic boundaries (upwards) and simultaneously, silencing of marginal subjectivities, i.e. to avoid any 'internal' ethnic boundaries." 

I realized it was beyond me. 

Santanu.  


-----Original Message-----
From: assam-bounces at assamnet.org on behalf of Chan Mahanta
Sent: Sun 3/12/2006 2:44 AM
To: Ram Sarangapani; ASSAMNET
Subject: Re: [Assam] Ethinic Boundaries and the Margins of the Margin -Bent D.Jørgenson
 
O' Ram,

Ram-ram! Moribolew xomoy nai, tate' tumi eikhon mohabharot porhibole' dila.

Can you give us a brief executive summary of Jorgenor-putekor  puthi?

Thanx in advance.

c-da










At 11:38 AM -0600 3/11/06, Ram Sarangapani wrote:
>Here is a Postdoc (thesis?) by Jorgenson. He has 
>also dealt with the subject of ethinic 
>boundaries in Assam. I have hi-lighted those 
>relevant parts. It makes very interesed reading. 
>He deals withquestions of  identity, ethinic 
>boundaries and "marginalization" of groups and 
>places.
>
>Would be interested in netters' comments.
>
>--Ram
>
>_____________________________
>
>ETHNIC BOUNDARIES AND THE
>
>MARGINS OF THE MARGIN:
>
>in a Postcolonial and Conflict Resolution Perspective
>
>Bent D. Jørgenson
>
><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html>http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html
>
>The clouds on the map would move, reform, 
>disappear, break-up into pieces; the pieces 
>would reassemble and new distinct areas would 
>form; and the channels between them would 
>expand, contract, and shift (Kopytoff, 1985, 
>p.12).
>
>The theme of this paper is on one of the most 
>elementary questions in the study of ethnicity 
>and nationalism, namely how to approach and 
>assess ethnic boundaries'. Should we perceive 
>them as an advantageous or a pernicious tool in 
>politics? To answer that question, we need a 
>reference point; advantageous or pernicious in 
>relation to whom? I will here use those 
>people(-s) who are so marginalized that their 
>voices are practically silenced, and the way in 
>which the political reconstruction, conversion, 
>or deconstruction of ethnic boundaries is 
>favorable or not to them; the margins of the 
>margin. Do ethnic boundaries, and particularly 
>their political usage, illuminate and create 
>preconditions for uplifting, visualization or in 
>any other way favor the margins of the margin? 
>And if yes, how does one handle the element of 
>violence which is involved in the politicization 
>and defense of such boundaries? On the contrary, 
>if we suggest that ethnic boundaries should be 
>deconstructed, how do we deal with the causes of 
>ethnic boundary construction? In order to 
>illuminate these problems, two approaches will 
>be critically discussed and applied: 
>Post-Colonialism and Conflict Resolution.
>
>In recent year these two approaches have gained 
>some influence in International Relations 
>theory. Postcolonialism addresses the problem of 
>epistemic violence and marginality. One of the 
>fundamental questions is: In what ways have the 
>dominant discourses (particularly emanating in 
>the West) marginalized, and still marginalized, 
>subjectivities based on skin-color, gender, 
>ethnicity etc. And normatively: How to combat 
>this marginalization? "The empire strikes (or 
>writes) back," is a slogan both in the local and 
>global political arena and, I believe, in ever 
>growing pockets of the academia. This 
>perspective or school of thought is present 
>almost everywhere in the world, but especially 
>in South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the 
>Caribbean.
>
>Parallel with the rising voice of marginality, 
>the salience of ethnic and internal conflicts 
>all over the world has fueled interest in 
>conflict research in general and the conflict 
>resolution in particular. Conflict Resolution 
>has been an attempt to find general methods and 
>schemes of solution, develop guidelines for 
>mediation, and/or identify universal processes 
>of conflict resolution in particular societies. 
>Bosnia and Israel, among others, have been the 
>targets for the attention of such practitioners 
>of conflict resolution.
>
>Why are these two perspectives brought together 
>into the same discussion? First, because they 
>share a normative concern for the same 
>fundamental problem, namely the reconstruction 
>and deconstruction of ethnic boundaries. 
>Concerning Postcolonialism, there is a clear 
>emphasis on the transformation or conversion of 
>ethnic boundaries from boundaries of 
>marginalization to boundaries for 'strategic 
>essentialization' (Krishna, Sankaran, 1993, 
>p.405). Conflict resolution approaches ethnic 
>boundaries as crucial 'complications' in 
>processes of conflict resolution and of course 
>of prime importance in processes of conflict 
>escalation. Despite the strong normativity in 
>both approaches, it is crucial to bear in mind 
>that the margins of the margin play a role in 
>the conflict dynamic itself, and therefore, the 
>connection; margins-conflicts-ethnic boundaries 
>have to be dealt with, not only normatively but 
>also positively.
>
>Secondly, the two perspectives are brought into 
>the same discussion as an attempt to open a 
>dialogue between two approaches to violence, 
>which have so far largely ignored each other's 
>existence<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_1_> 
>(1) In particular, how does one succeed in 
>envisaging and perhaps even uplifting or 'un 
>marginalizing' marginal subjects. By 'breaking 
>the ice' between the two approaches to 
>international studies, we might end up having 
>two perspectives illuminating each other's blind 
>spot, and eradicating some of the worst 
>pre-perceptions and prejudice in both.
>
>The following are empirical examples from Assam 
>and Southern Bihar in India. My own experiences 
>with the people in these two locations have 
>generated the questions and the problems 
>formulated in this paper. In both locations, 
>problems associated with the marginalization of 
>the margins have led to severe manifest or 
>non-manifest social problems in which ethnic 
>boundaries play a key role. In Assam, the tribal 
>groups have slowly emerged as political forces 
>after independence, asserting their demands 
>towards regional and central authorities. The 
>modern history of Assam illustrates the problem 
>of locating or territorializing the marginalized 
>space when elite groups claim the status as 
>'sons of the soil.' In Southern Bihar, a 
>marginalized region in itself, ethnic boundaries 
>cut across relations of dominance, thereby 
>complicating the relation between the two 
>phenomena .
>
>Ethnic Boundaries
>
>Ethnic boundaries, a concept borrowed from 
>Fredrik Barth (Barth, 1982 (1969)), are best 
>understood as cognitive or mental boundaries 
>situated in the minds of people and are the 
>result of collective efforts of construction and 
>maintenance. Ethnic boundaries dichotomize 
>insiders from outsiders--'us' from 'them.' 
>Katherine Verdery's summarizes Barth on this 
>point:
>
>The roots of [ethnicity as an] organizational 
>form are not in the cultural content associated 
>with ethnic identities but rather in the fact of 
>their dichotomization -- the presence of 
>boundaries separating groups. This shifts the 
>emphasis from seemingly 'objective' cultural 
>traits to behavior (including 'cultural' 
>behavior) that is socially effective in 
>maintaining group boundaries (Verdery, 1994, in 
>Vermeulen & Govers, 1994, p. 35).
>
>There are, in other words, neither objective 
>ethnic boundaries nor objective ethnic groups or 
>identities.<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_2_>(2)
>
>Furthermore, ethnic boundaries are open to 
>multiple individual perceptions and 
>interpretations. No wonder that hard social 
>sciences like International Relations, until 
>recently, have turned a blind eye to these 
>phenomena. Only the political significance 
>within the last few decades and the subsequent 
>demand for explanation and comprehension have 
>pushed these phenomena into the limelight of 
>social science.
>
>Ethnic boundaries are means to create order. 
>They are means of social navigation in a social 
>space comparable with the geographical map meant 
>for navigation in our physical environment. This 
>knowledge of a social universe is passed on 
>through processes of learning from one 
>generation to another or through other channels 
>of communication, simultaneously attaching 
>cultural values and features to what appears as 
>an 'inside' and an 'outside.' Seen from the 
>perspective of a certain individual, the ethnic 
>boundary is the result of a cognitive 
>reconstruction that separates 'us' from 'them.' 
>Ethnic boundaries are thus social constructions 
>and reconstructions mostly made peacefully in 
>interaction between individuals.
>
>This rather 'apolitical' definition of ethnic 
>boundaries is challenged, or rather 
>complemented, by a political approach that 
>reveals that ethnic boundaries, and the cultural 
>stuff which they contain, are not only 
>negotiable, but also contested. This is close to 
>the postcolonial approach in which ethnic 
>boundaries are determined by the dominant 
>discourse. The knowledge about ethnic boundaries 
>are carried on via the older generation, the 
>school, the mass media, and the state, or in 
>short, those who have the power to define the 
>ethnic boundary towards the marginal, and even 
>to define what the marginal is like, i.e. to 
>fill the image of the marginal with cultural 
>content. The postcolonial normative approach 
>would, as already mentioned, by a very 
>simplistic description advocate the conversion 
>of these marginalizing ethnic boundaries into 
>boundaries of 'strategic essentialization' and 
>as a means of resistance against 
>marginalization. On the contrary, in a conflict 
>resolution approach, ethnic boundaries would be 
>assessed as obstacles to conflict resolutions; 
>as an element of stereotyping the enemy, and 
>putting barriers of effective communication, and 
>thereby to get a false comprehension of what is 
>actually and rationally going on ( e.g-79). 
>Ethnic boundaries are therefore in need of 
>deconstruction. In the following discussion, 
>conversion and deconstruction will form the core 
>concepts, or 'lenses' through which ethnic 
>boundaries will be illuminated.
>
>Postcolonialism and Conflict Resolution
>
>Both the postcolonial and the conflict 
>resolution approaches have a strong normative 
>element, as they attempt to target the problem 
>of violence-although with emphasis on different 
>aspects of violence. In a Postcolonial 
>perspective, the prime evil appears to be the 
>epistemic violence committed by the dominant 
>discourse over the marginal. The dominant 
>Western discourse has wrested the marginalized 
>of even their ability to conceptualize 
>themselves as people with their own history, 
>future, dignity and self-respect. Conflict 
>resolution is, before anything else, a method to 
>alleviate further violence, and then open direct 
>violence. This is not to say that structural 
>violence is not a matter of concern in conflict 
>resolution. (Johan & Höivik, Tord, 1971, p. 
>73-76) However war, as the ultimate exercise of 
>direct violence, is without doubt also the 
>ultimate form of conflict to resolve and avoid.
>
>More specifically, the two perspectives have 
>rather different approaches to ethno-national 
>boundaries. The postcolonial normative approach 
>would, as already mentioned, by a very 
>simplistic description advocate the conversion 
>of these marginalizing ethnic boundaries into 
>boundaries of 'strategic essentialization' and 
>as a means of resistance against 
>marginalization. In a conflict resolution 
>approach, on the contrary, ethnic boundaries 
>would be assessed as obstacles to conflict 
>resolutions by stereotyping the enemy and 
>putting up barriers of effective communication, 
>thereby creating a false image of what is 
>actually and rationally going on (Burton, 1990, 
>p.78-79). Ethnic boundaries are therefore in 
>need of deconstruction. In the following 
>discussion, conversion and deconstruction will 
>form the core concepts, or 'lenses' through 
>which ethnic boundaries will be illuminated.
>
>Postcolonialism and conflict resolution could be 
>seen as very different approaches, and they are 
>indeed, but it should not be forgotten that both 
>have roots in a critique of the same dominant 
>discourses. Conflict resolution emerged as a 
>critique from inside the Western society, 
>challenging established institutions of conflict 
>management, e.g. juridical national and 
>international practices and 
>theories<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_3_>(3). 
>Postcolonialism became a challenge from outside, 
>as the Oriental, the subaltern and the marginal 
>began to speak or write back to the dominant 
>West, challenging imperial and colonial 
>discourses.
>
>On some locations the political practices 
>derived from these two approaches are hidden and 
>acted out silently under the surface. However, 
>nowhere is the dynamic between them more 
>apparent than in the recent so-called peace 
>process in Israel/Palestine. The conflict 
>resolution practitioners have until recently had 
>the advantaged position, bringing the Israeli 
>and Palestinian elite to peace talks and 
>institutionalizing cooperation between the two 
>parties. Recently, however, postcolonialists 
>have raised their voices and are about to take 
>the lead, pushing the peace-process back. The 
>conflicts is not, at least for the moment, 
>between the Palestinians and the Israelis or the 
>Muslims and the Jews. It is instead between 
>those in favor of working out ways to make 
>ethnic boundaries less politically explosive, 
>and those who want to politicize the boundaries 
>further. In the former case, the end of conflict 
>is the prime goal, in the latter the focus is on 
>marginalization.
>
>Before we enter into a discussion of the two 
>approaches to ethnic boundaries, it should be 
>clear that none of them are as coherent and 
>fixed as they will appear below. It is 
>inevitable to generalize and leave out certain 
>nuances and aspects which are important for 
>those who have brought them forward or those who 
>believe that they are inseparable parts of each 
>tradition. However, the aim here is to use these 
>two approaches as rather focused 'spot lights' 
>on the problem under scrutiny, not to give a 
>just treatment of two perspectives and their 
>founding parents.
>
>Postcolonialism and the Conversion of Ethnic Boundaries
>
>In the vast literature on Postcolonialism, it is 
>described as a project, a discourse, an 
>ideology, a text/narrative, a trend or a variety 
>of these concepts in the same text (Prakash, 
>1995, Introduction). To me, none of these 
>features can be carved out of the composite 
>nature of Postcolonialism. That Postcolonialism 
>will appear as an approach in the following 
>text, does not mean that the other facets are 
>left out. In fact, the postcolonial approach is 
>the most open-ended of the two perspectives 
>probably due to the fact that it spans almost 
>every humanist and social science and it has as 
>a consequence a very broad methodological base. 
>Furthermore, and probably due to this 
>multifaceted character, Postcolonialism has 
>within it a strong sense of self criticism. To 
>fix a certain standpoint in this approach is 
>therefore, to use the conceptual framework 
>within the approach itself, to use 'epistemic 
>violence.'
>
>Post-Colonialism has its origin in Literature 
>and the study of the ex-colonial novel. The task 
>has been to expose the subordinate 
>representation of the colonized by the 
>colonizers. The focus on text indicates a strong 
>linkage with post-modernism and the difference 
>between the two is not always clear. However, 
>Postcolonialism, at least in the form it is 
>presented here, is political and normative while 
>post-modernism, at least in its most relativist 
>form, is not.
>
>[In] the core of the discourse, is a focus on 
>the relations of domination and resistance and 
>the effect they have had on identity, in, 
>through, and beyond, the colonial encounter: the 
>prefix 'post' is testament to the fact that the 
>problems that lie at the heart of the 
>colonializer-colonized relationship are seen to 
>persist beyond colonialism. The importance of 
>reinterpreting the colonial experience is 
>relevant to contemporary identity. In the 
>process of resistance, the native voice is 
>repositioned and empowered (Darby & Paolini, 
>1994, p.375).
>
>The post-colonial approach calls for revival and 
>politicization of the marginalized's 
>subjectivities. One of the main questions is 
>"how does one construct provisional and 
>strategically essentialized subjectivities to 
>enable a progressive politics" (Krishna, 1993, 
>p.405). The marginalized are not only supposed 
>to deconstructed dominant hegemonic discourse, 
>but to subvert boundaries from the 'bottom up' 
>and transform the cultural 'stuff' which these 
>boundaries enclose. This is problematic in terms 
>of localizing the marginalized space and when we 
>consider the problem of marginalization by the 
>marginalized. These are of course central issues 
>for further discussion below.
>
>In India, the postcolonial discourse has had a 
>long history which in fact dates back to figures 
>like Tagore, but the most prominent is of course 
>Mahatma Gandhi. He advocated a resistance which 
>was asserted as an Indian alternative to Western 
>colonialism. Gandhi in fact illustrates the 
>difficulties-and challenges-within 
>Postcolonialism. It is both a category of 
>political movements around the world ( e.g. 
>Gandhian movements) and an highly sophisticated 
>academic approach (e.g. Gandhiism). It is, in 
>other words, both theory and practice, which is 
>a strength, but also poses problems of getting 
>ideas, views, and norms across between 
>practitioners and theorists. More concretely, 
>the assessment of the central issues here, 
>namely violence, ethnic boundaries, and 
>marginality, differs considerably between these 
>two positions. Violent chauvinism, marginalizing 
>the margins of the margin might be 'a price 
>worth paying' for the practitioner, whereas this 
>is likely to be normatively unacceptable to the 
>theorist far from 
>realpolitik.<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_4_>(4)
>
>Conflict Resolution and the Deconstruction of Ethnic Boundaries
>
>The other strand of research will be called 
>conflict resolution. It is basically an array of 
>theories of conflicts combined with a variety of 
>techniques and methods to solve or manage 
>conflicts. 
><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_5_>(5) 
>However, such characteristics neglect the recent 
>development within the field, where conflict 
>resolution has developed into an academic 
>discipline and a rather coherent school of 
>discussion and debate. And even though it lacks 
>a coherent theoretical base, it has emerged as a 
>discipline in colleges and universities around 
>the world. A great number of scholars are now 
>theorizing about conflicts and conflicts 
>resolution creating a body of literature which 
>now forms an embryonic approach to conflict and 
>conflict resolution ( e.g. Scimecca, J.A., p.19 
>and 33).
>
>Conflict resolution is a vast field with a 
>variety of methodological approaches. The common 
>normative approach, though, is that conflicts 
>should be solved in an orderly (following 
>certain methods) and peaceful way. Peaceful here 
>could mean anything from absence of direct 
>violence or threat of violence, to the creation 
>of a certain desirable and non-violent regime. 
>Conflict resolution is, first of all, advocating 
>a non-violent ideology. It basically advocates 
>the alleviation of violence and then pushes for 
>the development and allocation of conflict 
>solving methods and development of institutions 
>geared toward conflict management. For the 
>Postcolonials violence is not necessarily a 
>major problem. Frans Fanon, one of the strong 
>influences in the post-colonial discourse, has 
>put it this way: "At the level of the 
>individuals, violence is a cleansing force; it 
>forces the native from his inferiority complex 
>and from his despair and inaction; it makes him 
>fearless and restores his self-respect" (Fanon, 
>1967, p.94).
>
>In relation to conflict resolution, this is not 
>just a very different view of violence, but also 
>of its psychological function. Within conflict 
>resolution direct physical violence is seen as 
>the highest stage of conflict escalation and a 
>result of 'more unconscious and subconscious 
>forces.' 
><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_6_>(6) 
>It is not far to interpret conflicts as a social 
>relation which in fact describes a 
>transformation from rationality and reason to 
>irrationality and intuition. And a postcolonial 
>critic would probably add: from Western to 
>Non-western.
>
>If we for a moment separate the field into the 
>two influential fields of Game theory and Human 
>needs theory, it is clear that the former has 
>taken the ethnic boundaries as communication 
>barriers, which have to be broken down in order 
>to envisage the position of the opponent. Game 
>theory is insensitive to cultural differences 
>and the unequal distribution of power. Therefore 
>it tells us little about the problems outlined 
>above. 
><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_7_>(7)
>
>It is of course disputable whether conflict 
>resolution advocates the deconstruction of 
>ethnic boundaries. What about Human needs 
>theory? One of the most influential scholars in 
>this conflict resolution approach is undoubtedly 
>John Burton, who belong to the so called London 
>School within the field of conflict resolution. 
>In his monumental work, Conflict Resolution and 
>Provention, he "seeks to provide a framework for 
>consideration of theory and practice in conflict 
>resolution and provention." (Burton, 1990, p.x). 
>He makes a distinction between disputes which 
>"are an integral part of a competitive society; 
>and conflicts which are deep-rooted in human 
>needs." (Ibid., p.1). The need of identity 
>somehow presupposes the reconstruction of ethnic 
>boundaries. According to Burton, we need to have 
>an identity and that implies ethnic boundaries. 
>However, the boundary is supposed to be 
>inclusive and not exclusive and discriminatory. 
>Burton has also explained his key concept, 
>'Conflict Provention,' in a way which prevents 
>boundaries from becoming politicized barriers. 
>"The term prevention has the connotation of 
>containment. The term provention has been 
>introduced to signify taking steps to remove a 
>source of conflict, and more positively to 
>promote conditions in which collaborative and 
>valued relationships control behavior" (Ibid., 
>p. v ).
>
>That is to enhance communication between 
>conflicting parties. This is to say that people 
>are not supposed to give up their personal and 
>collective identification, but they are not 
>supposed to be utilized as a political tool; 
>ethnic boundaries are not to be subverted and 
>strategically essentialized. The relation 
>between the concepts of boundaries and needs of 
>identity is objective and apolitical (Ibid., 
>p.39f. ).
>
>If ontological needs exist it follows that the 
>traditional belief that politics is subjective 
>is false. It is this discovery, this deduction, 
>that is the core of the contemporary shift in 
>thought. Politics can no longer be justified as 
>arbitrary, determined by ideologies and 
>interests. It is possible to assess 'isms, 
>leadership and systems generally by reference to 
>these needs. We can predict the consequences of 
>politics. (Ibid., p.117.)
>
>Burton's point here is that politics in fact is 
>objective in its cause and development. We can 
>assume that conflicts and even their resolution 
>follow the same trajectory. Conflict resolution 
>has had a tendency to slip into the grand 
>theorizing about the universal causes and 
>solutions to conflicts. 
><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_8_>(8) 
>The human needs approach accentuates where 
>conflicts derives from the frustration of basic 
>human needs. According to Burton, politics is 
>not a subjective realm, but a realm open for 
>negotiation between parties with at least 
>theoretical ability to use reason and 
>calculation in assessment of human needs. There 
>are two problems with this theory.
>
>Human needs, like for instance the need for 
>identity, is not an objective force which has a 
>certain influence on politics. Human needs are 
>experienced as well as expressed through 
>cultural lenses and effected by relations of 
>power. Burton argues that conflicts deriving 
>from the frustration of the need of identity, 
>are often to be found in so called multi-ethnic 
>societies (Edward E. Azar's makes a similar 
>point. Azar, 1990). For the postcolonials, 
>marginalized human beings act in conflicts 
>because they are deprived of their subjective 
>rights which are theirs and realized by them. 
>Furthermore, how is the need for identity 
>satisfied and when is it frustrated? Is the need 
>of identity frustrated when people almost never 
>express their group belonging, because their 
>social environment is indifferent to it, and is 
>it satisfied when people for generations have 
>been marginalized by the reconstruction of 
>ethnic boundaries, ascribing an identity onto 
>them? Does the frustration of human needs in the 
>margins of the margin lead to conflicts at all, 
>and if so, can they be handled the same way as 
>'other' conflicts? We will have reason to return 
>to these last questions. The must fundamental 
>question is of course, could the need of 
>identity be satisfied by identifying with 
>humanity?
>
>Ethnic Boundaries and Marginality
>
>The theoretical connection between ethnic 
>boundaries and marginality can be developed in 
>two steps. First, the connection between ethnic 
>boundaries and marginality has to do with the 
>exercise of power and culture. Culture indicates 
>not only what is right or wrong but also who has 
>the right to decide in these matters. Those who 
>are deprived of the right, at least in relation 
>to the dominant, we can call marginal. A great 
>deal of the post-colonial literature deals with 
>the colonial power to define a discourse in 
>which the subjugated people were fixed into 
>categories of races, castes, religions or 
>tribes, creating a tidy map to conquer and 
>control. Timothy Mitchell argues in a citation 
>in Philip Darby and A.J. Paolini's essay:
>
>modern colonialism was constructed upon a vastly 
>increased power of representation, a power that 
>made possible an unprecedented fixing and 
>policing of boundaries; an unprecedented power 
>of portraying what lay 'outside.' Power is 
>determined not so much by obvious recourse 
>disparities, but by the ability of the colonial 
>order to establish an absolute boundary between 
>the West and the non-West, the modern and the 
>past, order and disorder, self and other (Darby 
>& Paolini, 1994, p.375).
>
>Power is the ability to construct a social 
>boundary in this post-colonial view. Secondly, 
>we can imagine that a boundary has a marginal 
>zone, a place which is neither inside, nor 
>outside. It is a socially constructed human 'no 
>mans land' in which 'we' have located people 
>(real or imagined) who are neither 'we' nor 
>'them', they are rather a subjugated 
>subjectivity, which is a negation of 'we'. Why? 
>Because they are needed as a permanent 
>instrument of locating 'we' in relation to 
>'them', and tell us who 'we' are (culture), what 
>are 'our' rights (politics), and what belongs to 
>'us' (economics) and so forth. Often, this space 
>'in-between' is the margins of the margin. The 
>tribal population in India has in many places 
>had that function during centuries. Living 
>either among the dominant caste Hindu's or at 
>the fringes of their settlements, they 
>constitute the marginal which is in many places 
>effectively silenced.
>
>The interesting thing to note is that there is 
>no definite beginnings or ends to the marginal, 
>and similarly there is no definite marginalized 
>space which is totally without power. The margin 
>is, in other words, a diffuse entity which can 
>contain almost everything which is not commonly 
>held as dominant in a specific setting and at a 
>certain point in time. Or again in other words, 
>the localization of the margin depends on the 
>location of the observer. Being in the margin 
>there is always space which is more marginalized 
>and silenced, and, equally important, more 
>dominant space.
>
>The pitfalls in the conversion and 
>reconstruction of ethnic boundaries are many and 
>sometimes even violently disastrous in relation 
>to the margins of the margin. The construction 
>of ethnic boundaries could be perceived as an 
>act of violence in the sense that they are 
>forced on individuals for whom these divisions 
>are incongruent with their personal perception 
>of social boundaries and thereby marginalized 
>these individuals; i.e. they are marginalized by 
>the marginalized.
>
>Problems of Conversion and Deconstruction
>
>The two realms of problems concerning conversion 
>and deconstruction of ethnic boundaries which 
>will be sketched out below, basically points to 
>the problems of normativity in the postcolonial 
>and conflict resolution approaches. But even 
>more basically, they point to the connection 
>between the soft sciences and political action; 
>between theory and practice. Can we transform 
>theoretical ideas, results and conclusion into 
>political action and, at the same time, be 
>observant from various political standpoints, 
>especially toward those whom are so marginal 
>that they are practically silenced?
>
>Where is the Margins of the Margin in Assam?
>
>How can we possibly locate a marginal space? In 
>the global society, the potentials for group 
>formations and hence the conversion of ethnic 
>boundaries are many, and these possibilities are 
>often described as ethnic segmentation or 
>stratification (ethnic levels), or in the 
>post-colonial debate, as a power hierarchy. With 
>such metaphors in mind, the postcolonial concern 
>is to chose the right level in order to make the 
>dominant discourse visible, subvert it, and 
>eventually fight it. With this strategy, we 
>might end up repressing the other marginalized 
>groups or the marginalized of the marginalized 
>groups. In that case, the strategy is no longer 
>conversion of ethnic boundaries, but rather 
>shift of positions from marginal to dominant. 
>However, this distinction is not very easy to 
>make for two reasons.
>
>First, it is not easy to locate a marginalized 
>space. A marginalized space always contains even 
>more severely marginalized spaces, which might 
>however seem too 'small' or 'weak' for political 
>mobilization. Consequently these subgroups are 
>not only neglected, but also forced into a 
>political project which they might not want to 
>be part of, or at least against their interests. 
>Localization is, in other words, important. 
>Secondly, this space changes location, 
>disappears, and appears depending on a variety 
>of factors. We can not be sure that either the 
>ethnic boundaries or the rationale behind their 
>construction and reconstruction will persist, 
>although one important part in boundary making 
>is to make them appear as eternal.
>
>There are several examples to illustrate these 
>problems of location and shift of positions. In 
>the state of Assam in Northeast India, the 
>Assamese elite started in the middle of the 19th 
>century, to create an Assamese identity in 
>contrast first of all to the dominant Bengali 
>identity. By the advent of colonization in the 
>1820s, the Assamese nobility was removed from 
>the apex of power, deprived of their former 
>privileges, and Bengali was declared the 
>official language of the province. The Bengali 
>minority moving into the region was apparently 
>successful in constructing a boundary towards 
>the Assamese majority. Slowly a mixture of old 
>and new Assamese leaders succeeded in subverting 
>this ethnic boundary, and by independence, they 
>gained political control of a territory which 
>covered most of present day Northeast India. 
>However, after independence five new states have 
>been carved out of the Assam state, and this 
>process doesn't seem to have reached a final end.
>
>Soon after independence, ethnic groups began to 
>emerge as distinct communities with a political 
>will different from that of the Assamese 
>majority. The Naga elite demanded independence 
>or autonomy immediately after 1947. After a long 
>violent struggle in the mountains of Northeast 
>Lastly, the Bodo elite of lowland Assam are 
>demanding an autonomous state carved out of the 
>Assam, but within the Indian Union.
>
>This row of events could be seen as the 
>minorities' slow awakening and proliferation of 
>their ethnic boundary toward an ever louder 
>Assamese identity. It is indisputable that the 
>Assamese leadership has shifted positions, 
>forcing Assamese language and customs on other 
>groups. This is the major impetus for the 
>conversion of the ethnic boundary between the 
>Assamese and the tribals. Second, the 'tribal' 
>awakening' has to do with the rise in education 
>and economic power of certain segments of the 
>tribal population all over Northeast India, 
>especially after independence. Tribal elites 
>have emerged and use their power to assert their 
>subjectivity and claim the same rights to 
>control a certain territory as other 'major 
>groups' within the Indian Union. In that 
>development, we of course imagine that the 
>marginalized space is moving downwards. Today we 
>will find, that certain tribes, and segments of 
>the tribals have no voice at all. They have been 
>practically silenced in the struggle for 
>autonomy by relatively dominant groups.
>
>What is interesting here is that during every 
>stage of this process, there are moments of 
>conversion of dominating ethnic boundaries 
>(upwards) and simultaneously, silencing of 
>marginal subjectivities, i.e. to avoid any 
>'internal' ethnic boundaries. During the 
>independence struggle, all ethnic boundaries 
>were with one exception, successfully repressed. 
>During the so called Assam Movement from 1979 to 
>1983, the differences between groups in Assam 
>were again repressed in the struggle of the 
>'sons of the soil' against the 'foreigners,' 
>mainly Bengali immigrants. In that movement, 
>which was extremely violent, most of the 
>casualties were found among the lowland tribal 
>population, 
><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_9_>(9) 
>which today are demanding an autonomous 
>Bodo-land.
>
>An important aspect to lift to the fore here is 
>that ethnic boundaries almost never fit with the 
>'boundaries of marginality.' The class aspect 
>should be brought in here. What is appearing in 
>the Assamese context is a new Bengali 
>marginalized group facing the anger of an 
>Assamese majority against an historically 
>dominant Bengali upper and middle class. These 
>Bengalis are poor peasants fleeing the densely 
>populated Bangladesh and are now trying their 
>luck in Assam as in other places in India. How 
>should this marginal Bengali group subvert the 
>ethnic boundary which keeps them mired in 
>marginality? Furthermore, the conversion and 
>reconstruction of ethnic boundaries depends on 
>the power to convert and reconstruct, and that 
>appears to be in the hands of the elites. But 
>sufficient power never enters the margins of the 
>margin, where groups are marginalized by the 
>marginalized in the process of subverting the 
>ethnic boundaries of domination.
>
>The fate of the Bengalis in Assam is shared with 
>a great deal of Brahmins in Northern India. Now 
>the numerous so-called 'backward castes' are, by 
>democratic means, taking to power, and using it 
>violently against their former high caste 
>oppressors. Upper castes like Brahmins are 
>however, a socio-economically very diversified 
>group from rich to deeply poor. The latter are 
>the victims of the newly born postcolonial 
>politics now as they face the conversion of the 
>caste boundary which has kept the lower castes 
>in marginality for centuries.
>
>Who is marginalizing whom and for what purpose 
>is a question to which I will return soon. At 
>this stage, it should be clear that ethnic 
>boundaries are a political means, some would say 
>a weapon, whose use of stereotyping and 
>homogenization lead to violent effects, both 
>direct and epistemically, on the margins of the 
>margin.
>
>Do the Margins of the Margin have a Voice in Southern Bihar?
>
>The major handicap for the margins of the margin 
>is not merely economic deprivation, but the fact 
>that they have no voice to put forward their 
>demands. 'The subaltern cannot speak.' (Spivak, 
>1994, p.104 ). This fact is a serious challenge 
>to the conflict resolution approach, as it 
>presupposes that there are parties involved in a 
>conflict. To practice conflict resolution or 
>management presupposes the existence of parties 
>who can negotiate, and enter processes of 
>conflict resolution (See e.g. Wallensteen, 
>Peter, 1994, p. 5, 59). I have not heard (!) but 
>I could imagine, that there are subjectivities 
>in Bosnia and Israel Palestine which are not 
>present or represented at the negotiation tables 
>and are also neglected in the many NGO's which 
>have some political influence in this conflict. 
>Similarly in India, there are subjectivities 
>which are generated by neither party nor in the 
>political institutions of the conflict.
>
>In Southern Bihar, we find a population of mixed 
>tribes and caste-Hindus. It is a poor area, with 
>all the severity of poverty, and with all social 
>indicators pointing low. People have since the 
>colonial era learned to mistrust authorities in 
>many other places including what is commonly 
>known as the 'tribal belt' in Central India. 
>Although the phenomenon of the margins of the 
>margin is as evident here as in Northeast India, 
>there is a common perception that whatever comes 
>'from above' is of evil. This perception is held 
>by many from school teachers to forest and 
>police officials. Furthermore there is little in 
>the present developments which have changed that 
>image of power and its institutions.
>
>When I visited a village in the Ranchi district 
>in Southern Bihar in 1994 and again in 1995, I 
>learned that the villagers had had the 
>opportunity to elect one of their own to the 
>village council, the Panchayat, which is an 
>elected body presiding over 4-5 villages. This 
>election took place in 1984 and should have been 
>held again in 1989. But different political 
>interests on the state level had postponed the 
>election for years. The official reason was not 
>known to the villagers, but their own 
>perceptions were clear, namely that the people 
>with power were not interested in hearing their 
>voice. However, their elected Mukia, or headman 
>in the Panchayat, might have been able to voice 
>their demands and rights. Unfortunately, he and 
>his family had long ago lost the contact with 
>the villagers. He had settled in the town of 
>Ranchi, and was now leading a life totally 
>different from that of his former fellows. He 
>had crossed over from, not the ethnic boundary, 
>but a backward community to which he belonged 
>into the political establishment. Politicians, 
>despite ethnic and ideological differences, have 
>a lot in common in terms of culture and 
>interests.
>
>Could the margins of the margin raise their 
>voice and appear as a subject or a party in the 
>public media, and thereby start that conflict 
>through which they should express their 
>frustrated needs? That would require basic 
>reading and writing skills which the villagers 
>in Southern Bihar do not possess. The following 
>short story, told to me on a train ride from 
>Calcutta to McCluskieganj in Southern Bihar in 
>1995, illustrates this point. I was told by a 
>school teacher that he had not been teaching in 
>his one-man school in a remote tribal area for 
>six month. He had not even been there. His own 
>explanation was that it was too far away from 
>his home. The school master was turning his 
>blind eye to this apparent case of fraught, as 
>long as he received ten percent of the teacher's 
>salary. Now I asked about the fate of the 
>children as they apparently were deprived of 
>their education. With a slight surprise in his 
>face, the teacher answered: "The children? They 
>are tribals! They cannot learn much anyway."
>
>There are of course other political forces which 
>offer themselves as representatives to the 
>margins of the margin in Southern Bihar. During 
>my visit in 1995, the Naxalite guerrillas had 
>settled in the area. They are a Maoist group who 
>are fighting a war against the Indian government 
>and larger landholders located primarily in 
>Central and Eastern India. As a guerrilla group 
>they are totally dependent on the support of the 
>villagers wherever they settle. When I arrived 
>in 1995, the situation was tense and people were 
>scared. The newspaper told about the violent 
>conflict between the Naxalites and the 
>government/police. Descriptions of the detailed 
>battles between the two parties were followed by 
>the government and police officials view on the 
>matter. None of the newspapers contained a 
>single word expressed by the villagers from any 
>part of the area. That the villagers were a 
>party, and the losing party, was not mentioned 
>anywhere, not even between the lines.
>
>The fact was that in the village I described 
>above, most of the young men had fled, to avoid 
>recruitment by the guerrilla forces or, in the 
>alternative, to be accused by the police for 
>being guerrilla soldiers. A nearby village was 
>totally deserted.
>
>Means of conflict resolution in the present 
>conflict in Southern Bihar would perhaps include 
>the government, the locally elected politicians, 
>the guerrillas, the trade Unions and so on, but 
>the margins of the margin would certainly be 
>left out. And even if they were invited vors due 
>to a deep and perfectly rational mistrust of 
>authority. To put it a bit harshly; there is no 
>conflict at all in Southern Bihar, simply 
>because there are no representatives of the 
>marginalized, among whom we might expect to find 
>those with frustrated human needs.
>
>The question arises of course: Could they 
>subvert the boundaries which keep them in their 
>marginal position? Unfortunately, their identity 
>as Yadav (a so called backward caste), Munda, 
>and Orao, is already subverted by 'their own' 
>elites in their struggle against the high 
>castes. These elites are now controlling 
>political bodies. The present Chief Minister of 
>Bihar is a Yadav and his political power rests 
>on his caste identity. He and the new 'backward 
>caste elite' have succeeded in subverting the 
>ethnic boundary which once held them in 
>backwardness, and now use this very boundary 
>both as a means to mobilize sufficient political 
>support and to marginalized 'his own caste' 
>(sic.). Again we have a case of shifting 
>positions.
>
>Conclusion
>
>It is impossible to assess ethnic boundaries per 
>se, in terms of advantages for the margins of 
>the margin. The postcolonial attempt to subvert 
>them into political means of resistance does not 
>eradicate the phenomenon of marginality. 
>Politicized ethnic boundaries have the tendency 
>of dichotomization and hence the use of 
>violence--epistemic or direct--towards whatever 
>is different 'inside' or 'outside'. Sankaran 
>Krishna has put it this way:
>
>I would like to begin by pointing out the irony 
>that it is precisely the greatest victims of the 
>West's essentialist conceits (the ex-colonials 
>and neocolonials, Blacks, women, and so forth) 
>that are articulating a need for new strategic 
>essentialisms (Krishna, S., 1993, p.405).
>
>The line between conversion and shifting 
>positions of domination is not easy to draw in 
>concrete 
>situations.<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_10_>(10) 
>There is a risk that the postcolonial strategic 
>essentialism is just a replication of dominance 
>on a different level and in a different context, 
>and that marginality is, as already indicated, 
>an inescapable part of the construction of 
>ethnic boundaries. Ethnic boundaries may be, to 
>put it perhaps too harshly, a mere means of 
>dominance and violence. As Foucault warns:
>
>one can perfectly well conceive of revolution 
>which leave essentially untouched the power 
>relations which form the basis for the 
>functioning of the state As soon as one 
>endeavors to detach power with its techniques 
>and procedures from the form of law within which 
>it has been theoretically confined up until now, 
>one is driven to ask this basic question: isn't 
>power simply a form of warlike domination? 
>(Foucault, 1980, p.123, my emphasis).
>
>Resistance in the form of strategic 
>essentialization, and hence the conversion of 
>ethnic boundaries could be seen as a replication 
>of the techniques and procedures of power. 
>Ethnic boundaries are then an inseparable part 
>of the essence of the dominant, which in the 
>contemporary inter-state system, rests on the 
>idea of the nation-state as it is outlined in 
>the introduction. Power, according to the 
>imperative of the modern inter-state system 
>derives from the ability to produce congruity 
>between ethnic/national boundaries and political 
>border. To make these two entities, i.e. the 
>territory and the nation, coincide, is not only 
>a violent, but also an impossible task which 
>underscores the irony of the modern 
>state.<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_11_>(11) 
>The case of Assam has given some indications of 
>this irony, which also question the conversion 
>of ethnic boundaries as a long term political 
>strategy. In a longer perspective we might 
>prefer to develop more sustainable social forms 
>of interaction. This is actually one of the main 
>concerns in the conflict resolution perspective.
>
>There are also pitfalls in the conflict 
>resolution approach--pitfalls which the Bihari 
>example, in part, demonstrated. One such pitfall 
>is the common task of deconstructing the 
>boundaries by identifying parties to represent 
>sides of the conflict and bring them into 
>processes of negotiation and conflict 
>resolution. In Bihar, the problem would be to 
>identify the parties and especially the margins 
>of the margin. Not even the democratic 
>institutions are, in their present form, 
>sufficient as means through which conflicts can 
>be handled and solved. Presently, such 
>institutions rest on the relations of power, and 
>the ability of one party to silence another.
>
>To realize that parties in a conflict do not 
>necessarily earn the voluntary support of the 
>group they claim to represent is a major 
>challenge to the conflict resolution approach. 
>The Northeastern problem of 'state'- building 
>would probably have developed differently if the 
>Indian government had been aware of the 
>impossible principle of one tribe-one-state. A 
>more fruitful strategy, might have been to 
>transcend the ethnic boundaries and demands put 
>forward by different parties. Such an endeavor 
>could have envisaged the margins of the margin 
>before they got suppressed and silenced 
>effectively by 'strategic essentialism.' In 
>Bihar, the social tensions are to a large extent 
>swept under the carpet for the moment because 
>the margins of the margin are not heard. For 
>Conflict resolution practitioners, one of the 
>main challenges ahead is to comprehend the 
>meaning and effect of marginality in conflicts 
>as well as in processes of conflict resolution.
>
>However, at least some of the intentions in the 
>conflict resolution approach should be 
>considered in relation to the margins of the 
>margin. First of all, the primary goal is to 
>avoid direct violence. This does not prevent 
>political struggles, but it marks a clear 
>standpoint -- that human life should not be 
>sacrificed for the sake of a better society for 
>the living. Secondly, the conflict resolution 
>approach implies the will to find channels of 
>communication; building bridges. This is 
>important especially if methods are developed to 
>raise the voice of the margins of the margin. 
>The challenge is probably not to give a voice to 
>a silenced party, but to create conditions and 
>institutions through which the margins of the 
>margin can speak. The obstacle so far has been 
>universalism and insensitivity to culture, 
>particularity, and power. Power has not only a 
>direct impact on conflicts between the state and 
>minorities, but on the very ability to speak and 
>thereby to become visible in conflict resolution 
>processes and political institutions. The two 
>perspectives under scrutiny here, have in other 
>words, a lot to contribute with to a more 
>coherent perspective on political ethnic 
>boundaries, violence, and marginality.
>
>Notes
>
>1. For an an exception see Avruch, et al (eds.),1991.
>
>2. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen has pointed out, 
>the most serious, and perhaps common, pitfall in 
>the study of ethnicity and nationalism is that 
>of reification. (Eriksen, 1993). The fluidity of 
>ethnic boundaries is described by Igor Kopytoff 
>in the initial quote above.
>
>3. As Joseph A Scimecca writes: " conflict 
>resolution was born in a time of questioning 
>whether traditional legal authority served the 
>needs of people or supported a status quo that 
>reinforced social and political inequality. [It 
>was] a challenge to traditional authority, 
>questioning of top-down, centralized decision 
>making. the "power paradigm" was challenged via 
>the notion that human beings seek to fulfil 
>their basic human needs rather than always 
>seeking power and material interests", 
>(Scimecca, 1991, p.20).
>
>4. Gandhi's and the Congress' handling of the 
>so-called indigo-riots in 1917 and other similar 
>social conflicts in Bihar clearly indicates that 
>the lower castes were submerged under the 
>principal conflict between the Congress and the 
>British Empire. This is not to say that lower 
>castes were not a crucial political weapon, but 
>this weapon was firmly laid in the hands of the 
>dominant castes. See (Frankel, 1989).
>
>5. The conflict resolution literature range from 
>texts on the human nature and the undiscovered 
>conflict resolution potentials in human beings 
>to concrete guidelines for intervention. (See 
>e.g. Parry, 1991). At the other end of the 
>spectra (Azar, 1990). There are also examples of 
>invention of a new rational 'grammar' with the 
>aim to render communication transparent in 
>conflict situations and in everyday life (see 
>e.g. Rosenberg, 1983).
>
>6. Glasl has, among other, developed a stage 
>model of conflict escalation and resolution 
>(Glasl, 1982).
>
>7. Ashis Nandy rightly observes "that the 
>oppressed, when faced with problems of survival, 
>had no obligation to follow any model or rules 
>of the game." (Nandy, 1987, p.121).
>
>8. For a broader discussion of the rationale 
>perspective in conflict resolution see also 
>Wallensteen, 1994, p.14. Also Azar, 1990, p. 
>42-48.
>
>9. 5-7000 people were killed in two weeks time. (Gupta, 1984, p.2).
>
>10. Even though G. Spivak has emphasized the 
>heterogeneity and syncretic nature of the 
>colonized and the colonizers, she does not 
>disclaim the basic standpoint, that 
>colonizer-colonized is the basic cleavage 
>(wherever it emerges) and that this dynamic has 
>to be found and the politicization encouraged. 
>In that sense Spivak only points to a problem in 
>the process of essentializing, but does not 
>disclaim it. (Spivak, G., 1994).
>
>11. The best discussion which I have come across 
>so far is an article by Sankaran Krishna, 
>(Krishna, 1994, pp.507-521).
>
>References
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>
>
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