Re: [Assam] Ethinic Boundaries and the Margins of the Margin -Bent D.Jørgenson

[Ram Sarangapani]

Santanu,
I agree - just read the hilighted parts. I had to read it a couple of times
to get the hang of it.
gotta go - before baideu comes at me with a "belana" (rollingpin)
:):)

Ram da



On 3/11/06, Roy, Santanu <sroy at mail.smu.edu> wrote:
>
> Ram-da:
> Moi-u buji na-palw. As I read the sentence:
>
> "What is interesting here is that during every stage of this process,
> there are moments of conversion of dominating ethnic boundaries (upwards)
> and simultaneously, silencing of marginal subjectivities, i.e. to avoid
> any 'internal' ethnic boundaries."
>
> I realized it was beyond me.
>
> Santanu.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: assam-bounces at assamnet.org on behalf of Chan Mahanta
> Sent: Sun 3/12/2006 2:44 AM
> To: Ram Sarangapani; ASSAMNET
> Subject: Re: [Assam] Ethinic Boundaries and the Margins of the Margin
> -Bent D.Jørgenson
>
> O' Ram,
>
> Ram-ram! Moribolew xomoy nai, tate' tumi eikhon mohabharot porhibole'
> dila.
>
> Can you give us a brief executive summary of Jorgenor-putekor  puthi?
>
> Thanx in advance.
>
> c-da
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> At 11:38 AM -0600 3/11/06, Ram Sarangapani wrote:
> >Here is a Postdoc (thesis?) by Jorgenson. He has
> >also dealt with the subject of ethinic
> >boundaries in Assam. I have hi-lighted those
> >relevant parts. It makes very interesed reading.
> >He deals withquestions of  identity, ethinic
> >boundaries and "marginalization" of groups and
> >places.
> >
> >Would be interested in netters' comments.
> >
> >--Ram
> >
> >_____________________________
> >
> >ETHNIC BOUNDARIES AND THE
> >
> >MARGINS OF THE MARGIN:
> >
> >in a Postcolonial and Conflict Resolution Perspective
> >
> >Bent D. Jørgenson
> >
> ><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html>
> http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html
> >
> >The clouds on the map would move, reform,
> >disappear, break-up into pieces; the pieces
> >would reassemble and new distinct areas would
> >form; and the channels between them would
> >expand, contract, and shift (Kopytoff, 1985,
> >p.12).
> >
> >The theme of this paper is on one of the most
> >elementary questions in the study of ethnicity
> >and nationalism, namely how to approach and
> >assess ethnic boundaries'. Should we perceive
> >them as an advantageous or a pernicious tool in
> >politics? To answer that question, we need a
> >reference point; advantageous or pernicious in
> >relation to whom? I will here use those
> >people(-s) who are so marginalized that their
> >voices are practically silenced, and the way in
> >which the political reconstruction, conversion,
> >or deconstruction of ethnic boundaries is
> >favorable or not to them; the margins of the
> >margin. Do ethnic boundaries, and particularly
> >their political usage, illuminate and create
> >preconditions for uplifting, visualization or in
> >any other way favor the margins of the margin?
> >And if yes, how does one handle the element of
> >violence which is involved in the politicization
> >and defense of such boundaries? On the contrary,
> >if we suggest that ethnic boundaries should be
> >deconstructed, how do we deal with the causes of
> >ethnic boundary construction? In order to
> >illuminate these problems, two approaches will
> >be critically discussed and applied:
> >Post-Colonialism and Conflict Resolution.
> >
> >In recent year these two approaches have gained
> >some influence in International Relations
> >theory. Postcolonialism addresses the problem of
> >epistemic violence and marginality. One of the
> >fundamental questions is: In what ways have the
> >dominant discourses (particularly emanating in
> >the West) marginalized, and still marginalized,
> >subjectivities based on skin-color, gender,
> >ethnicity etc. And normatively: How to combat
> >this marginalization? "The empire strikes (or
> >writes) back," is a slogan both in the local and
> >global political arena and, I believe, in ever
> >growing pockets of the academia. This
> >perspective or school of thought is present
> >almost everywhere in the world, but especially
> >in South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the
> >Caribbean.
> >
> >Parallel with the rising voice of marginality,
> >the salience of ethnic and internal conflicts
> >all over the world has fueled interest in
> >conflict research in general and the conflict
> >resolution in particular. Conflict Resolution
> >has been an attempt to find general methods and
> >schemes of solution, develop guidelines for
> >mediation, and/or identify universal processes
> >of conflict resolution in particular societies.
> >Bosnia and Israel, among others, have been the
> >targets for the attention of such practitioners
> >of conflict resolution.
> >
> >Why are these two perspectives brought together
> >into the same discussion? First, because they
> >share a normative concern for the same
> >fundamental problem, namely the reconstruction
> >and deconstruction of ethnic boundaries.
> >Concerning Postcolonialism, there is a clear
> >emphasis on the transformation or conversion of
> >ethnic boundaries from boundaries of
> >marginalization to boundaries for 'strategic
> >essentialization' (Krishna, Sankaran, 1993,
> >p.405). Conflict resolution approaches ethnic
> >boundaries as crucial 'complications' in
> >processes of conflict resolution and of course
> >of prime importance in processes of conflict
> >escalation. Despite the strong normativity in
> >both approaches, it is crucial to bear in mind
> >that the margins of the margin play a role in
> >the conflict dynamic itself, and therefore, the
> >connection; margins-conflicts-ethnic boundaries
> >have to be dealt with, not only normatively but
> >also positively.
> >
> >Secondly, the two perspectives are brought into
> >the same discussion as an attempt to open a
> >dialogue between two approaches to violence,
> >which have so far largely ignored each other's
> >existence<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_1_>
> >(1) In particular, how does one succeed in
> >envisaging and perhaps even uplifting or 'un
> >marginalizing' marginal subjects. By 'breaking
> >the ice' between the two approaches to
> >international studies, we might end up having
> >two perspectives illuminating each other's blind
> >spot, and eradicating some of the worst
> >pre-perceptions and prejudice in both.
> >
> >The following are empirical examples from Assam
> >and Southern Bihar in India. My own experiences
> >with the people in these two locations have
> >generated the questions and the problems
> >formulated in this paper. In both locations,
> >problems associated with the marginalization of
> >the margins have led to severe manifest or
> >non-manifest social problems in which ethnic
> >boundaries play a key role. In Assam, the tribal
> >groups have slowly emerged as political forces
> >after independence, asserting their demands
> >towards regional and central authorities. The
> >modern history of Assam illustrates the problem
> >of locating or territorializing the marginalized
> >space when elite groups claim the status as
> >'sons of the soil.' In Southern Bihar, a
> >marginalized region in itself, ethnic boundaries
> >cut across relations of dominance, thereby
> >complicating the relation between the two
> >phenomena .
> >
> >Ethnic Boundaries
> >
> >Ethnic boundaries, a concept borrowed from
> >Fredrik Barth (Barth, 1982 (1969)), are best
> >understood as cognitive or mental boundaries
> >situated in the minds of people and are the
> >result of collective efforts of construction and
> >maintenance. Ethnic boundaries dichotomize
> >insiders from outsiders--'us' from 'them.'
> >Katherine Verdery's summarizes Barth on this
> >point:
> >
> >The roots of [ethnicity as an] organizational
> >form are not in the cultural content associated
> >with ethnic identities but rather in the fact of
> >their dichotomization -- the presence of
> >boundaries separating groups. This shifts the
> >emphasis from seemingly 'objective' cultural
> >traits to behavior (including 'cultural'
> >behavior) that is socially effective in
> >maintaining group boundaries (Verdery, 1994, in
> >Vermeulen & Govers, 1994, p. 35).
> >
> >There are, in other words, neither objective
> >ethnic boundaries nor objective ethnic groups or
> >identities.<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_2_>(2)
> >
> >Furthermore, ethnic boundaries are open to
> >multiple individual perceptions and
> >interpretations. No wonder that hard social
> >sciences like International Relations, until
> >recently, have turned a blind eye to these
> >phenomena. Only the political significance
> >within the last few decades and the subsequent
> >demand for explanation and comprehension have
> >pushed these phenomena into the limelight of
> >social science.
> >
> >Ethnic boundaries are means to create order.
> >They are means of social navigation in a social
> >space comparable with the geographical map meant
> >for navigation in our physical environment. This
> >knowledge of a social universe is passed on
> >through processes of learning from one
> >generation to another or through other channels
> >of communication, simultaneously attaching
> >cultural values and features to what appears as
> >an 'inside' and an 'outside.' Seen from the
> >perspective of a certain individual, the ethnic
> >boundary is the result of a cognitive
> >reconstruction that separates 'us' from 'them.'
> >Ethnic boundaries are thus social constructions
> >and reconstructions mostly made peacefully in
> >interaction between individuals.
> >
> >This rather 'apolitical' definition of ethnic
> >boundaries is challenged, or rather
> >complemented, by a political approach that
> >reveals that ethnic boundaries, and the cultural
> >stuff which they contain, are not only
> >negotiable, but also contested. This is close to
> >the postcolonial approach in which ethnic
> >boundaries are determined by the dominant
> >discourse. The knowledge about ethnic boundaries
> >are carried on via the older generation, the
> >school, the mass media, and the state, or in
> >short, those who have the power to define the
> >ethnic boundary towards the marginal, and even
> >to define what the marginal is like, i.e. to
> >fill the image of the marginal with cultural
> >content. The postcolonial normative approach
> >would, as already mentioned, by a very
> >simplistic description advocate the conversion
> >of these marginalizing ethnic boundaries into
> >boundaries of 'strategic essentialization' and
> >as a means of resistance against
> >marginalization. On the contrary, in a conflict
> >resolution approach, ethnic boundaries would be
> >assessed as obstacles to conflict resolutions;
> >as an element of stereotyping the enemy, and
> >putting barriers of effective communication, and
> >thereby to get a false comprehension of what is
> >actually and rationally going on ( e.g-79).
> >Ethnic boundaries are therefore in need of
> >deconstruction. In the following discussion,
> >conversion and deconstruction will form the core
> >concepts, or 'lenses' through which ethnic
> >boundaries will be illuminated.
> >
> >Postcolonialism and Conflict Resolution
> >
> >Both the postcolonial and the conflict
> >resolution approaches have a strong normative
> >element, as they attempt to target the problem
> >of violence-although with emphasis on different
> >aspects of violence. In a Postcolonial
> >perspective, the prime evil appears to be the
> >epistemic violence committed by the dominant
> >discourse over the marginal. The dominant
> >Western discourse has wrested the marginalized
> >of even their ability to conceptualize
> >themselves as people with their own history,
> >future, dignity and self-respect. Conflict
> >resolution is, before anything else, a method to
> >alleviate further violence, and then open direct
> >violence. This is not to say that structural
> >violence is not a matter of concern in conflict
> >resolution. (Johan & Höivik, Tord, 1971, p.
> >73-76) However war, as the ultimate exercise of
> >direct violence, is without doubt also the
> >ultimate form of conflict to resolve and avoid.
> >
> >More specifically, the two perspectives have
> >rather different approaches to ethno-national
> >boundaries. The postcolonial normative approach
> >would, as already mentioned, by a very
> >simplistic description advocate the conversion
> >of these marginalizing ethnic boundaries into
> >boundaries of 'strategic essentialization' and
> >as a means of resistance against
> >marginalization. In a conflict resolution
> >approach, on the contrary, ethnic boundaries
> >would be assessed as obstacles to conflict
> >resolutions by stereotyping the enemy and
> >putting up barriers of effective communication,
> >thereby creating a false image of what is
> >actually and rationally going on (Burton, 1990,
> >p.78-79). Ethnic boundaries are therefore in
> >need of deconstruction. In the following
> >discussion, conversion and deconstruction will
> >form the core concepts, or 'lenses' through
> >which ethnic boundaries will be illuminated.
> >
> >Postcolonialism and conflict resolution could be
> >seen as very different approaches, and they are
> >indeed, but it should not be forgotten that both
> >have roots in a critique of the same dominant
> >discourses. Conflict resolution emerged as a
> >critique from inside the Western society,
> >challenging established institutions of conflict
> >management, e.g. juridical national and
> >international practices and
> >theories<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_3_>(3).
> >Postcolonialism became a challenge from outside,
> >as the Oriental, the subaltern and the marginal
> >began to speak or write back to the dominant
> >West, challenging imperial and colonial
> >discourses.
> >
> >On some locations the political practices
> >derived from these two approaches are hidden and
> >acted out silently under the surface. However,
> >nowhere is the dynamic between them more
> >apparent than in the recent so-called peace
> >process in Israel/Palestine. The conflict
> >resolution practitioners have until recently had
> >the advantaged position, bringing the Israeli
> >and Palestinian elite to peace talks and
> >institutionalizing cooperation between the two
> >parties. Recently, however, postcolonialists
> >have raised their voices and are about to take
> >the lead, pushing the peace-process back. The
> >conflicts is not, at least for the moment,
> >between the Palestinians and the Israelis or the
> >Muslims and the Jews. It is instead between
> >those in favor of working out ways to make
> >ethnic boundaries less politically explosive,
> >and those who want to politicize the boundaries
> >further. In the former case, the end of conflict
> >is the prime goal, in the latter the focus is on
> >marginalization.
> >
> >Before we enter into a discussion of the two
> >approaches to ethnic boundaries, it should be
> >clear that none of them are as coherent and
> >fixed as they will appear below. It is
> >inevitable to generalize and leave out certain
> >nuances and aspects which are important for
> >those who have brought them forward or those who
> >believe that they are inseparable parts of each
> >tradition. However, the aim here is to use these
> >two approaches as rather focused 'spot lights'
> >on the problem under scrutiny, not to give a
> >just treatment of two perspectives and their
> >founding parents.
> >
> >Postcolonialism and the Conversion of Ethnic Boundaries
> >
> >In the vast literature on Postcolonialism, it is
> >described as a project, a discourse, an
> >ideology, a text/narrative, a trend or a variety
> >of these concepts in the same text (Prakash,
> >1995, Introduction). To me, none of these
> >features can be carved out of the composite
> >nature of Postcolonialism. That Postcolonialism
> >will appear as an approach in the following
> >text, does not mean that the other facets are
> >left out. In fact, the postcolonial approach is
> >the most open-ended of the two perspectives
> >probably due to the fact that it spans almost
> >every humanist and social science and it has as
> >a consequence a very broad methodological base.
> >Furthermore, and probably due to this
> >multifaceted character, Postcolonialism has
> >within it a strong sense of self criticism. To
> >fix a certain standpoint in this approach is
> >therefore, to use the conceptual framework
> >within the approach itself, to use 'epistemic
> >violence.'
> >
> >Post-Colonialism has its origin in Literature
> >and the study of the ex-colonial novel. The task
> >has been to expose the subordinate
> >representation of the colonized by the
> >colonizers. The focus on text indicates a strong
> >linkage with post-modernism and the difference
> >between the two is not always clear. However,
> >Postcolonialism, at least in the form it is
> >presented here, is political and normative while
> >post-modernism, at least in its most relativist
> >form, is not.
> >
> >[In] the core of the discourse, is a focus on
> >the relations of domination and resistance and
> >the effect they have had on identity, in,
> >through, and beyond, the colonial encounter: the
> >prefix 'post' is testament to the fact that the
> >problems that lie at the heart of the
> >colonializer-colonized relationship are seen to
> >persist beyond colonialism. The importance of
> >reinterpreting the colonial experience is
> >relevant to contemporary identity. In the
> >process of resistance, the native voice is
> >repositioned and empowered (Darby & Paolini,
> >1994, p.375).
> >
> >The post-colonial approach calls for revival and
> >politicization of the marginalized's
> >subjectivities. One of the main questions is
> >"how does one construct provisional and
> >strategically essentialized subjectivities to
> >enable a progressive politics" (Krishna, 1993,
> >p.405). The marginalized are not only supposed
> >to deconstructed dominant hegemonic discourse,
> >but to subvert boundaries from the 'bottom up'
> >and transform the cultural 'stuff' which these
> >boundaries enclose. This is problematic in terms
> >of localizing the marginalized space and when we
> >consider the problem of marginalization by the
> >marginalized. These are of course central issues
> >for further discussion below.
> >
> >In India, the postcolonial discourse has had a
> >long history which in fact dates back to figures
> >like Tagore, but the most prominent is of course
> >Mahatma Gandhi. He advocated a resistance which
> >was asserted as an Indian alternative to Western
> >colonialism. Gandhi in fact illustrates the
> >difficulties-and challenges-within
> >Postcolonialism. It is both a category of
> >political movements around the world ( e.g.
> >Gandhian movements) and an highly sophisticated
> >academic approach (e.g. Gandhiism). It is, in
> >other words, both theory and practice, which is
> >a strength, but also poses problems of getting
> >ideas, views, and norms across between
> >practitioners and theorists. More concretely,
> >the assessment of the central issues here,
> >namely violence, ethnic boundaries, and
> >marginality, differs considerably between these
> >two positions. Violent chauvinism, marginalizing
> >the margins of the margin might be 'a price
> >worth paying' for the practitioner, whereas this
> >is likely to be normatively unacceptable to the
> >theorist far from
> >realpolitik.<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_4_>(4)
> >
> >Conflict Resolution and the Deconstruction of Ethnic Boundaries
> >
> >The other strand of research will be called
> >conflict resolution. It is basically an array of
> >theories of conflicts combined with a variety of
> >techniques and methods to solve or manage
> >conflicts.
> ><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_5_>(5)
> >However, such characteristics neglect the recent
> >development within the field, where conflict
> >resolution has developed into an academic
> >discipline and a rather coherent school of
> >discussion and debate. And even though it lacks
> >a coherent theoretical base, it has emerged as a
> >discipline in colleges and universities around
> >the world. A great number of scholars are now
> >theorizing about conflicts and conflicts
> >resolution creating a body of literature which
> >now forms an embryonic approach to conflict and
> >conflict resolution ( e.g. Scimecca, J.A., p.19
> >and 33).
> >
> >Conflict resolution is a vast field with a
> >variety of methodological approaches. The common
> >normative approach, though, is that conflicts
> >should be solved in an orderly (following
> >certain methods) and peaceful way. Peaceful here
> >could mean anything from absence of direct
> >violence or threat of violence, to the creation
> >of a certain desirable and non-violent regime.
> >Conflict resolution is, first of all, advocating
> >a non-violent ideology. It basically advocates
> >the alleviation of violence and then pushes for
> >the development and allocation of conflict
> >solving methods and development of institutions
> >geared toward conflict management. For the
> >Postcolonials violence is not necessarily a
> >major problem. Frans Fanon, one of the strong
> >influences in the post-colonial discourse, has
> >put it this way: "At the level of the
> >individuals, violence is a cleansing force; it
> >forces the native from his inferiority complex
> >and from his despair and inaction; it makes him
> >fearless and restores his self-respect" (Fanon,
> >1967, p.94).
> >
> >In relation to conflict resolution, this is not
> >just a very different view of violence, but also
> >of its psychological function. Within conflict
> >resolution direct physical violence is seen as
> >the highest stage of conflict escalation and a
> >result of 'more unconscious and subconscious
> >forces.'
> ><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_6_>(6)
> >It is not far to interpret conflicts as a social
> >relation which in fact describes a
> >transformation from rationality and reason to
> >irrationality and intuition. And a postcolonial
> >critic would probably add: from Western to
> >Non-western.
> >
> >If we for a moment separate the field into the
> >two influential fields of Game theory and Human
> >needs theory, it is clear that the former has
> >taken the ethnic boundaries as communication
> >barriers, which have to be broken down in order
> >to envisage the position of the opponent. Game
> >theory is insensitive to cultural differences
> >and the unequal distribution of power. Therefore
> >it tells us little about the problems outlined
> >above.
> ><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_7_>(7)
> >
> >It is of course disputable whether conflict
> >resolution advocates the deconstruction of
> >ethnic boundaries. What about Human needs
> >theory? One of the most influential scholars in
> >this conflict resolution approach is undoubtedly
> >John Burton, who belong to the so called London
> >School within the field of conflict resolution.
> >In his monumental work, Conflict Resolution and
> >Provention, he "seeks to provide a framework for
> >consideration of theory and practice in conflict
> >resolution and provention." (Burton, 1990, p.x).
> >He makes a distinction between disputes which
> >"are an integral part of a competitive society;
> >and conflicts which are deep-rooted in human
> >needs." (Ibid., p.1). The need of identity
> >somehow presupposes the reconstruction of ethnic
> >boundaries. According to Burton, we need to have
> >an identity and that implies ethnic boundaries.
> >However, the boundary is supposed to be
> >inclusive and not exclusive and discriminatory.
> >Burton has also explained his key concept,
> >'Conflict Provention,' in a way which prevents
> >boundaries from becoming politicized barriers.
> >"The term prevention has the connotation of
> >containment. The term provention has been
> >introduced to signify taking steps to remove a
> >source of conflict, and more positively to
> >promote conditions in which collaborative and
> >valued relationships control behavior" (Ibid.,
> >p. v ).
> >
> >That is to enhance communication between
> >conflicting parties. This is to say that people
> >are not supposed to give up their personal and
> >collective identification, but they are not
> >supposed to be utilized as a political tool;
> >ethnic boundaries are not to be subverted and
> >strategically essentialized. The relation
> >between the concepts of boundaries and needs of
> >identity is objective and apolitical (Ibid.,
> >p.39f. ).
> >
> >If ontological needs exist it follows that the
> >traditional belief that politics is subjective
> >is false. It is this discovery, this deduction,
> >that is the core of the contemporary shift in
> >thought. Politics can no longer be justified as
> >arbitrary, determined by ideologies and
> >interests. It is possible to assess 'isms,
> >leadership and systems generally by reference to
> >these needs. We can predict the consequences of
> >politics. (Ibid., p.117.)
> >
> >Burton's point here is that politics in fact is
> >objective in its cause and development. We can
> >assume that conflicts and even their resolution
> >follow the same trajectory. Conflict resolution
> >has had a tendency to slip into the grand
> >theorizing about the universal causes and
> >solutions to conflicts.
> ><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_8_>(8)
> >The human needs approach accentuates where
> >conflicts derives from the frustration of basic
> >human needs. According to Burton, politics is
> >not a subjective realm, but a realm open for
> >negotiation between parties with at least
> >theoretical ability to use reason and
> >calculation in assessment of human needs. There
> >are two problems with this theory.
> >
> >Human needs, like for instance the need for
> >identity, is not an objective force which has a
> >certain influence on politics. Human needs are
> >experienced as well as expressed through
> >cultural lenses and effected by relations of
> >power. Burton argues that conflicts deriving
> >from the frustration of the need of identity,
> >are often to be found in so called multi-ethnic
> >societies (Edward E. Azar's makes a similar
> >point. Azar, 1990). For the postcolonials,
> >marginalized human beings act in conflicts
> >because they are deprived of their subjective
> >rights which are theirs and realized by them.
> >Furthermore, how is the need for identity
> >satisfied and when is it frustrated? Is the need
> >of identity frustrated when people almost never
> >express their group belonging, because their
> >social environment is indifferent to it, and is
> >it satisfied when people for generations have
> >been marginalized by the reconstruction of
> >ethnic boundaries, ascribing an identity onto
> >them? Does the frustration of human needs in the
> >margins of the margin lead to conflicts at all,
> >and if so, can they be handled the same way as
> >'other' conflicts? We will have reason to return
> >to these last questions. The must fundamental
> >question is of course, could the need of
> >identity be satisfied by identifying with
> >humanity?
> >
> >Ethnic Boundaries and Marginality
> >
> >The theoretical connection between ethnic
> >boundaries and marginality can be developed in
> >two steps. First, the connection between ethnic
> >boundaries and marginality has to do with the
> >exercise of power and culture. Culture indicates
> >not only what is right or wrong but also who has
> >the right to decide in these matters. Those who
> >are deprived of the right, at least in relation
> >to the dominant, we can call marginal. A great
> >deal of the post-colonial literature deals with
> >the colonial power to define a discourse in
> >which the subjugated people were fixed into
> >categories of races, castes, religions or
> >tribes, creating a tidy map to conquer and
> >control. Timothy Mitchell argues in a citation
> >in Philip Darby and A.J. Paolini's essay:
> >
> >modern colonialism was constructed upon a vastly
> >increased power of representation, a power that
> >made possible an unprecedented fixing and
> >policing of boundaries; an unprecedented power
> >of portraying what lay 'outside.' Power is
> >determined not so much by obvious recourse
> >disparities, but by the ability of the colonial
> >order to establish an absolute boundary between
> >the West and the non-West, the modern and the
> >past, order and disorder, self and other (Darby
> >& Paolini, 1994, p.375).
> >
> >Power is the ability to construct a social
> >boundary in this post-colonial view. Secondly,
> >we can imagine that a boundary has a marginal
> >zone, a place which is neither inside, nor
> >outside. It is a socially constructed human 'no
> >mans land' in which 'we' have located people
> >(real or imagined) who are neither 'we' nor
> >'them', they are rather a subjugated
> >subjectivity, which is a negation of 'we'. Why?
> >Because they are needed as a permanent
> >instrument of locating 'we' in relation to
> >'them', and tell us who 'we' are (culture), what
> >are 'our' rights (politics), and what belongs to
> >'us' (economics) and so forth. Often, this space
> >'in-between' is the margins of the margin. The
> >tribal population in India has in many places
> >had that function during centuries. Living
> >either among the dominant caste Hindu's or at
> >the fringes of their settlements, they
> >constitute the marginal which is in many places
> >effectively silenced.
> >
> >The interesting thing to note is that there is
> >no definite beginnings or ends to the marginal,
> >and similarly there is no definite marginalized
> >space which is totally without power. The margin
> >is, in other words, a diffuse entity which can
> >contain almost everything which is not commonly
> >held as dominant in a specific setting and at a
> >certain point in time. Or again in other words,
> >the localization of the margin depends on the
> >location of the observer. Being in the margin
> >there is always space which is more marginalized
> >and silenced, and, equally important, more
> >dominant space.
> >
> >The pitfalls in the conversion and
> >reconstruction of ethnic boundaries are many and
> >sometimes even violently disastrous in relation
> >to the margins of the margin. The construction
> >of ethnic boundaries could be perceived as an
> >act of violence in the sense that they are
> >forced on individuals for whom these divisions
> >are incongruent with their personal perception
> >of social boundaries and thereby marginalized
> >these individuals; i.e. they are marginalized by
> >the marginalized.
> >
> >Problems of Conversion and Deconstruction
> >
> >The two realms of problems concerning conversion
> >and deconstruction of ethnic boundaries which
> >will be sketched out below, basically points to
> >the problems of normativity in the postcolonial
> >and conflict resolution approaches. But even
> >more basically, they point to the connection
> >between the soft sciences and political action;
> >between theory and practice. Can we transform
> >theoretical ideas, results and conclusion into
> >political action and, at the same time, be
> >observant from various political standpoints,
> >especially toward those whom are so marginal
> >that they are practically silenced?
> >
> >Where is the Margins of the Margin in Assam?
> >
> >How can we possibly locate a marginal space? In
> >the global society, the potentials for group
> >formations and hence the conversion of ethnic
> >boundaries are many, and these possibilities are
> >often described as ethnic segmentation or
> >stratification (ethnic levels), or in the
> >post-colonial debate, as a power hierarchy. With
> >such metaphors in mind, the postcolonial concern
> >is to chose the right level in order to make the
> >dominant discourse visible, subvert it, and
> >eventually fight it. With this strategy, we
> >might end up repressing the other marginalized
> >groups or the marginalized of the marginalized
> >groups. In that case, the strategy is no longer
> >conversion of ethnic boundaries, but rather
> >shift of positions from marginal to dominant.
> >However, this distinction is not very easy to
> >make for two reasons.
> >
> >First, it is not easy to locate a marginalized
> >space. A marginalized space always contains even
> >more severely marginalized spaces, which might
> >however seem too 'small' or 'weak' for political
> >mobilization. Consequently these subgroups are
> >not only neglected, but also forced into a
> >political project which they might not want to
> >be part of, or at least against their interests.
> >Localization is, in other words, important.
> >Secondly, this space changes location,
> >disappears, and appears depending on a variety
> >of factors. We can not be sure that either the
> >ethnic boundaries or the rationale behind their
> >construction and reconstruction will persist,
> >although one important part in boundary making
> >is to make them appear as eternal.
> >
> >There are several examples to illustrate these
> >problems of location and shift of positions. In
> >the state of Assam in Northeast India, the
> >Assamese elite started in the middle of the 19th
> >century, to create an Assamese identity in
> >contrast first of all to the dominant Bengali
> >identity. By the advent of colonization in the
> >1820s, the Assamese nobility was removed from
> >the apex of power, deprived of their former
> >privileges, and Bengali was declared the
> >official language of the province. The Bengali
> >minority moving into the region was apparently
> >successful in constructing a boundary towards
> >the Assamese majority. Slowly a mixture of old
> >and new Assamese leaders succeeded in subverting
> >this ethnic boundary, and by independence, they
> >gained political control of a territory which
> >covered most of present day Northeast India.
> >However, after independence five new states have
> >been carved out of the Assam state, and this
> >process doesn't seem to have reached a final end.
> >
> >Soon after independence, ethnic groups began to
> >emerge as distinct communities with a political
> >will different from that of the Assamese
> >majority. The Naga elite demanded independence
> >or autonomy immediately after 1947. After a long
> >violent struggle in the mountains of Northeast
> >Lastly, the Bodo elite of lowland Assam are
> >demanding an autonomous state carved out of the
> >Assam, but within the Indian Union.
> >
> >This row of events could be seen as the
> >minorities' slow awakening and proliferation of
> >their ethnic boundary toward an ever louder
> >Assamese identity. It is indisputable that the
> >Assamese leadership has shifted positions,
> >forcing Assamese language and customs on other
> >groups. This is the major impetus for the
> >conversion of the ethnic boundary between the
> >Assamese and the tribals. Second, the 'tribal'
> >awakening' has to do with the rise in education
> >and economic power of certain segments of the
> >tribal population all over Northeast India,
> >especially after independence. Tribal elites
> >have emerged and use their power to assert their
> >subjectivity and claim the same rights to
> >control a certain territory as other 'major
> >groups' within the Indian Union. In that
> >development, we of course imagine that the
> >marginalized space is moving downwards. Today we
> >will find, that certain tribes, and segments of
> >the tribals have no voice at all. They have been
> >practically silenced in the struggle for
> >autonomy by relatively dominant groups.
> >
> >What is interesting here is that during every
> >stage of this process, there are moments of
> >conversion of dominating ethnic boundaries
> >(upwards) and simultaneously, silencing of
> >marginal subjectivities, i.e. to avoid any
> >'internal' ethnic boundaries. During the
> >independence struggle, all ethnic boundaries
> >were with one exception, successfully repressed.
> >During the so called Assam Movement from 1979 to
> >1983, the differences between groups in Assam
> >were again repressed in the struggle of the
> >'sons of the soil' against the 'foreigners,'
> >mainly Bengali immigrants. In that movement,
> >which was extremely violent, most of the
> >casualties were found among the lowland tribal
> >population,
> ><http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_9_>(9)
> >which today are demanding an autonomous
> >Bodo-land.
> >
> >An important aspect to lift to the fore here is
> >that ethnic boundaries almost never fit with the
> >'boundaries of marginality.' The class aspect
> >should be brought in here. What is appearing in
> >the Assamese context is a new Bengali
> >marginalized group facing the anger of an
> >Assamese majority against an historically
> >dominant Bengali upper and middle class. These
> >Bengalis are poor peasants fleeing the densely
> >populated Bangladesh and are now trying their
> >luck in Assam as in other places in India. How
> >should this marginal Bengali group subvert the
> >ethnic boundary which keeps them mired in
> >marginality? Furthermore, the conversion and
> >reconstruction of ethnic boundaries depends on
> >the power to convert and reconstruct, and that
> >appears to be in the hands of the elites. But
> >sufficient power never enters the margins of the
> >margin, where groups are marginalized by the
> >marginalized in the process of subverting the
> >ethnic boundaries of domination.
> >
> >The fate of the Bengalis in Assam is shared with
> >a great deal of Brahmins in Northern India. Now
> >the numerous so-called 'backward castes' are, by
> >democratic means, taking to power, and using it
> >violently against their former high caste
> >oppressors. Upper castes like Brahmins are
> >however, a socio-economically very diversified
> >group from rich to deeply poor. The latter are
> >the victims of the newly born postcolonial
> >politics now as they face the conversion of the
> >caste boundary which has kept the lower castes
> >in marginality for centuries.
> >
> >Who is marginalizing whom and for what purpose
> >is a question to which I will return soon. At
> >this stage, it should be clear that ethnic
> >boundaries are a political means, some would say
> >a weapon, whose use of stereotyping and
> >homogenization lead to violent effects, both
> >direct and epistemically, on the margins of the
> >margin.
> >
> >Do the Margins of the Margin have a Voice in Southern Bihar?
> >
> >The major handicap for the margins of the margin
> >is not merely economic deprivation, but the fact
> >that they have no voice to put forward their
> >demands. 'The subaltern cannot speak.' (Spivak,
> >1994, p.104 ). This fact is a serious challenge
> >to the conflict resolution approach, as it
> >presupposes that there are parties involved in a
> >conflict. To practice conflict resolution or
> >management presupposes the existence of parties
> >who can negotiate, and enter processes of
> >conflict resolution (See e.g. Wallensteen,
> >Peter, 1994, p. 5, 59). I have not heard (!) but
> >I could imagine, that there are subjectivities
> >in Bosnia and Israel Palestine which are not
> >present or represented at the negotiation tables
> >and are also neglected in the many NGO's which
> >have some political influence in this conflict.
> >Similarly in India, there are subjectivities
> >which are generated by neither party nor in the
> >political institutions of the conflict.
> >
> >In Southern Bihar, we find a population of mixed
> >tribes and caste-Hindus. It is a poor area, with
> >all the severity of poverty, and with all social
> >indicators pointing low. People have since the
> >colonial era learned to mistrust authorities in
> >many other places including what is commonly
> >known as the 'tribal belt' in Central India.
> >Although the phenomenon of the margins of the
> >margin is as evident here as in Northeast India,
> >there is a common perception that whatever comes
> >'from above' is of evil. This perception is held
> >by many from school teachers to forest and
> >police officials. Furthermore there is little in
> >the present developments which have changed that
> >image of power and its institutions.
> >
> >When I visited a village in the Ranchi district
> >in Southern Bihar in 1994 and again in 1995, I
> >learned that the villagers had had the
> >opportunity to elect one of their own to the
> >village council, the Panchayat, which is an
> >elected body presiding over 4-5 villages. This
> >election took place in 1984 and should have been
> >held again in 1989. But different political
> >interests on the state level had postponed the
> >election for years. The official reason was not
> >known to the villagers, but their own
> >perceptions were clear, namely that the people
> >with power were not interested in hearing their
> >voice. However, their elected Mukia, or headman
> >in the Panchayat, might have been able to voice
> >their demands and rights. Unfortunately, he and
> >his family had long ago lost the contact with
> >the villagers. He had settled in the town of
> >Ranchi, and was now leading a life totally
> >different from that of his former fellows. He
> >had crossed over from, not the ethnic boundary,
> >but a backward community to which he belonged
> >into the political establishment. Politicians,
> >despite ethnic and ideological differences, have
> >a lot in common in terms of culture and
> >interests.
> >
> >Could the margins of the margin raise their
> >voice and appear as a subject or a party in the
> >public media, and thereby start that conflict
> >through which they should express their
> >frustrated needs? That would require basic
> >reading and writing skills which the villagers
> >in Southern Bihar do not possess. The following
> >short story, told to me on a train ride from
> >Calcutta to McCluskieganj in Southern Bihar in
> >1995, illustrates this point. I was told by a
> >school teacher that he had not been teaching in
> >his one-man school in a remote tribal area for
> >six month. He had not even been there. His own
> >explanation was that it was too far away from
> >his home. The school master was turning his
> >blind eye to this apparent case of fraught, as
> >long as he received ten percent of the teacher's
> >salary. Now I asked about the fate of the
> >children as they apparently were deprived of
> >their education. With a slight surprise in his
> >face, the teacher answered: "The children? They
> >are tribals! They cannot learn much anyway."
> >
> >There are of course other political forces which
> >offer themselves as representatives to the
> >margins of the margin in Southern Bihar. During
> >my visit in 1995, the Naxalite guerrillas had
> >settled in the area. They are a Maoist group who
> >are fighting a war against the Indian government
> >and larger landholders located primarily in
> >Central and Eastern India. As a guerrilla group
> >they are totally dependent on the support of the
> >villagers wherever they settle. When I arrived
> >in 1995, the situation was tense and people were
> >scared. The newspaper told about the violent
> >conflict between the Naxalites and the
> >government/police. Descriptions of the detailed
> >battles between the two parties were followed by
> >the government and police officials view on the
> >matter. None of the newspapers contained a
> >single word expressed by the villagers from any
> >part of the area. That the villagers were a
> >party, and the losing party, was not mentioned
> >anywhere, not even between the lines.
> >
> >The fact was that in the village I described
> >above, most of the young men had fled, to avoid
> >recruitment by the guerrilla forces or, in the
> >alternative, to be accused by the police for
> >being guerrilla soldiers. A nearby village was
> >totally deserted.
> >
> >Means of conflict resolution in the present
> >conflict in Southern Bihar would perhaps include
> >the government, the locally elected politicians,
> >the guerrillas, the trade Unions and so on, but
> >the margins of the margin would certainly be
> >left out. And even if they were invited vors due
> >to a deep and perfectly rational mistrust of
> >authority. To put it a bit harshly; there is no
> >conflict at all in Southern Bihar, simply
> >because there are no representatives of the
> >marginalized, among whom we might expect to find
> >those with frustrated human needs.
> >
> >The question arises of course: Could they
> >subvert the boundaries which keep them in their
> >marginal position? Unfortunately, their identity
> >as Yadav (a so called backward caste), Munda,
> >and Orao, is already subverted by 'their own'
> >elites in their struggle against the high
> >castes. These elites are now controlling
> >political bodies. The present Chief Minister of
> >Bihar is a Yadav and his political power rests
> >on his caste identity. He and the new 'backward
> >caste elite' have succeeded in subverting the
> >ethnic boundary which once held them in
> >backwardness, and now use this very boundary
> >both as a means to mobilize sufficient political
> >support and to marginalized 'his own caste'
> >(sic.). Again we have a case of shifting
> >positions.
> >
> >Conclusion
> >
> >It is impossible to assess ethnic boundaries per
> >se, in terms of advantages for the margins of
> >the margin. The postcolonial attempt to subvert
> >them into political means of resistance does not
> >eradicate the phenomenon of marginality.
> >Politicized ethnic boundaries have the tendency
> >of dichotomization and hence the use of
> >violence--epistemic or direct--towards whatever
> >is different 'inside' or 'outside'. Sankaran
> >Krishna has put it this way:
> >
> >I would like to begin by pointing out the irony
> >that it is precisely the greatest victims of the
> >West's essentialist conceits (the ex-colonials
> >and neocolonials, Blacks, women, and so forth)
> >that are articulating a need for new strategic
> >essentialisms (Krishna, S., 1993, p.405).
> >
> >The line between conversion and shifting
> >positions of domination is not easy to draw in
> >concrete
> >situations.<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_10_>(10)
> >There is a risk that the postcolonial strategic
> >essentialism is just a replication of dominance
> >on a different level and in a different context,
> >and that marginality is, as already indicated,
> >an inescapable part of the construction of
> >ethnic boundaries. Ethnic boundaries may be, to
> >put it perhaps too harshly, a mere means of
> >dominance and violence. As Foucault warns:
> >
> >one can perfectly well conceive of revolution
> >which leave essentially untouched the power
> >relations which form the basis for the
> >functioning of the state As soon as one
> >endeavors to detach power with its techniques
> >and procedures from the form of law within which
> >it has been theoretically confined up until now,
> >one is driven to ask this basic question: isn't
> >power simply a form of warlike domination?
> >(Foucault, 1980, p.123, my emphasis).
> >
> >Resistance in the form of strategic
> >essentialization, and hence the conversion of
> >ethnic boundaries could be seen as a replication
> >of the techniques and procedures of power.
> >Ethnic boundaries are then an inseparable part
> >of the essence of the dominant, which in the
> >contemporary inter-state system, rests on the
> >idea of the nation-state as it is outlined in
> >the introduction. Power, according to the
> >imperative of the modern inter-state system
> >derives from the ability to produce congruity
> >between ethnic/national boundaries and political
> >border. To make these two entities, i.e. the
> >territory and the nation, coincide, is not only
> >a violent, but also an impossible task which
> >underscores the irony of the modern
> >state.<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_11_>(11)
> >The case of Assam has given some indications of
> >this irony, which also question the conversion
> >of ethnic boundaries as a long term political
> >strategy. In a longer perspective we might
> >prefer to develop more sustainable social forms
> >of interaction. This is actually one of the main
> >concerns in the conflict resolution perspective.
> >
> >There are also pitfalls in the conflict
> >resolution approach--pitfalls which the Bihari
> >example, in part, demonstrated. One such pitfall
> >is the common task of deconstructing the
> >boundaries by identifying parties to represent
> >sides of the conflict and bring them into
> >processes of negotiation and conflict
> >resolution. In Bihar, the problem would be to
> >identify the parties and especially the margins
> >of the margin. Not even the democratic
> >institutions are, in their present form,
> >sufficient as means through which conflicts can
> >be handled and solved. Presently, such
> >institutions rest on the relations of power, and
> >the ability of one party to silence another.
> >
> >To realize that parties in a conflict do not
> >necessarily earn the voluntary support of the
> >group they claim to represent is a major
> >challenge to the conflict resolution approach.
> >The Northeastern problem of 'state'- building
> >would probably have developed differently if the
> >Indian government had been aware of the
> >impossible principle of one tribe-one-state. A
> >more fruitful strategy, might have been to
> >transcend the ethnic boundaries and demands put
> >forward by different parties. Such an endeavor
> >could have envisaged the margins of the margin
> >before they got suppressed and silenced
> >effectively by 'strategic essentialism.' In
> >Bihar, the social tensions are to a large extent
> >swept under the carpet for the moment because
> >the margins of the margin are not heard. For
> >Conflict resolution practitioners, one of the
> >main challenges ahead is to comprehend the
> >meaning and effect of marginality in conflicts
> >as well as in processes of conflict resolution.
> >
> >However, at least some of the intentions in the
> >conflict resolution approach should be
> >considered in relation to the margins of the
> >margin. First of all, the primary goal is to
> >avoid direct violence. This does not prevent
> >political struggles, but it marks a clear
> >standpoint -- that human life should not be
> >sacrificed for the sake of a better society for
> >the living. Secondly, the conflict resolution
> >approach implies the will to find channels of
> >communication; building bridges. This is
> >important especially if methods are developed to
> >raise the voice of the margins of the margin.
> >The challenge is probably not to give a voice to
> >a silenced party, but to create conditions and
> >institutions through which the margins of the
> >margin can speak. The obstacle so far has been
> >universalism and insensitivity to culture,
> >particularity, and power. Power has not only a
> >direct impact on conflicts between the state and
> >minorities, but on the very ability to speak and
> >thereby to become visible in conflict resolution
> >processes and political institutions. The two
> >perspectives under scrutiny here, have in other
> >words, a lot to contribute with to a more
> >coherent perspective on political ethnic
> >boundaries, violence, and marginality.
> >
> >Notes
> >
> >1. For an an exception see Avruch, et al (eds.),1991.
> >
> >2. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen has pointed out,
> >the most serious, and perhaps common, pitfall in
> >the study of ethnicity and nationalism is that
> >of reification. (Eriksen, 1993). The fluidity of
> >ethnic boundaries is described by Igor Kopytoff
> >in the initial quote above.
> >
> >3. As Joseph A Scimecca writes: " conflict
> >resolution was born in a time of questioning
> >whether traditional legal authority served the
> >needs of people or supported a status quo that
> >reinforced social and political inequality. [It
> >was] a challenge to traditional authority,
> >questioning of top-down, centralized decision
> >making. the "power paradigm" was challenged via
> >the notion that human beings seek to fulfil
> >their basic human needs rather than always
> >seeking power and material interests",
> >(Scimecca, 1991, p.20).
> >
> >4. Gandhi's and the Congress' handling of the
> >so-called indigo-riots in 1917 and other similar
> >social conflicts in Bihar clearly indicates that
> >the lower castes were submerged under the
> >principal conflict between the Congress and the
> >British Empire. This is not to say that lower
> >castes were not a crucial political weapon, but
> >this weapon was firmly laid in the hands of the
> >dominant castes. See (Frankel, 1989).
> >
> >5. The conflict resolution literature range from
> >texts on the human nature and the undiscovered
> >conflict resolution potentials in human beings
> >to concrete guidelines for intervention. (See
> >e.g. Parry, 1991). At the other end of the
> >spectra (Azar, 1990). There are also examples of
> >invention of a new rational 'grammar' with the
> >aim to render communication transparent in
> >conflict situations and in everyday life (see
> >e.g. Rosenberg, 1983).
> >
> >6. Glasl has, among other, developed a stage
> >model of conflict escalation and resolution
> >(Glasl, 1982).
> >
> >7. Ashis Nandy rightly observes "that the
> >oppressed, when faced with problems of survival,
> >had no obligation to follow any model or rules
> >of the game." (Nandy, 1987, p.121).
> >
> >8. For a broader discussion of the rationale
> >perspective in conflict resolution see also
> >Wallensteen, 1994, p.14. Also Azar, 1990, p.
> >42-48.
> >
> >9. 5-7000 people were killed in two weeks time. (Gupta, 1984, p.2).
> >
> >10. Even though G. Spivak has emphasized the
> >heterogeneity and syncretic nature of the
> >colonized and the colonizers, she does not
> >disclaim the basic standpoint, that
> >colonizer-colonized is the basic cleavage
> >(wherever it emerges) and that this dynamic has
> >to be found and the politicization encouraged.
> >In that sense Spivak only points to a problem in
> >the process of essentializing, but does not
> >disclaim it. (Spivak, G., 1994).
> >
> >11. The best discussion which I have come across
> >so far is an article by Sankaran Krishna,
> >(Krishna, 1994, pp.507-521).
> >
> >References
> >
> >Avruch, K., P. Black and J. Scimecca (Eds).
> >1991. Conflict Resolution. Cross-Cultural
> >Perspectives, New York: Greenwood Press.
> >
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> >Boundaries. The Social Organization of Cultural
> >Difference. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
> >
> >Breckenridge, C. & Van der Veer (Eds.)
> >1994.Orientalism and the Postcolonial
> >Predicament. Perspectives on South Asia. Delhi:
> >Oxford University Press.
> >
> >Burton, J. 1990. Conflict Resolution and
> >Provention. New York: Macmillan Press.
> >
> >Darby, P. & A. Paolini. 1994. "Bridging
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> >Alternatives, Vol. 19, pp. 371-97.
> >
> >Eriksen, T. 1993. Ethnicity and Nationalism:
> >Anthropological Perspectives. London: Pluto
> >Press.
> >
> >Fanon, F. 1967. The Wretched of the Earth. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
> >
> >Foucault, M. 1980. Power/Knowledge. Selected
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> >and ed. by Colin Gordon. Hertfordshire: The
> >Harvester Press Ltd.
> >
> >Frankel, F. 1989. "Caste, Land and Dominance in
> >Bihar: Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social
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> >
> >Galtung, J. & T. Höivik 1971. "Structural and
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> >
> >Gupta, S. 1984. A Valley Divided, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Ltd.
> >
> >Kopytoff, I. (ed.) 1985. The African Frontier.
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> >_______________________________________________
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