Re: [Assam] Ethinic Boundaries and the Margins of the Margin -Bent D. Jørgenson

[Ram Sarangapani]

O C'da,

 >Ram-ram! Moribolew xomoy nai, tate' tumi eikhon mohabharot porhibole'
dila.

I agree it is a mohabharot. That is why I "High lighted" only Assam centric
parts

I too am under the gun here - Alpana has been yelling (hera, hera, Xonisa
ne, ki kori asa) froom downstairs - I am sure its a "to-do list.
:):)
Neverthe less - if you get some time, only the Assam relevan parts are
understanable.
Ram



On 3/11/06, Chan Mahanta <cmahanta at charter.net> wrote:
>
>  O' Ram,
>
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> Ram-ram! Moribolew xomoy nai, tate' tumi eikhon mohabharot porhibole'
> dila.
>
>
> Can you give us a brief executive summary of Jorgenor-putekor  puthi?
>
>
> Thanx in advance.
>
>
> c-da
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> At 11:38 AM -0600 3/11/06, Ram Sarangapani wrote:
>
> *Here is a Postdoc (thesis?) by Jorgenson. He has also dealt with the
> subject of ethinic boundaries in Assam. I have hi-lighted those relevant
> parts. It makes very interesed reading. He deals withquestions of  identity,
> ethinic boundaries and "marginalization" of groups and places.*
> **
>
> Would be interested in netters' comments.
>
> --Ram
>
> _____________________________
>
> *ETHNIC BOUNDARIES AND THE*
> **
>
> *MARGINS OF THE MARGIN:*
> **
>
> *in a Postcolonial and Conflict Resolution Perspective*
> **
>
> *Bent D. Jørgenson*
> **
>
> http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html
>
> *The clouds on the map would move, reform, disappear, break-up into
> pieces; the pieces would reassemble and new distinct areas would form; and
> the channels between them would expand, contract, and shift* (Kopytoff,
> 1985, p.12).
>
> The theme of this paper is on one of the most elementary questions in the
> study of ethnicity and nationalism, namely how to approach and assess*ethnic boundaries'.
> * Should we perceive them as an advantageous or a pernicious tool in
> politics? To answer that question, we need a reference point; advantageous
> or pernicious in relation to whom? I will here use those people(-s) who are
> so marginalized that their voices are practically silenced, and the way in
> which the political reconstruction, conversion, or deconstruction of ethnic
> boundaries is favorable or not to them; the* margins of the margin.* Do
> ethnic boundaries, and particularly their political usage, illuminate and
> create preconditions for uplifting, visualization or in any other way favor
> the margins of the margin? And if yes, how does one handle the element of
> violence which is involved in the politicization and defense of such
> boundaries? On the contrary, if we suggest that ethnic boundaries should be
> deconstructed, how do we deal with the causes of ethnic boundary
> construction? In order to illuminate these problems, two approaches will be
> critically discussed and applied:* Post-Colonialism* and* Conflict
> Resolution.*
>
> In recent year these two approaches have gained some influence in
> International Relations theory. Postcolonialism addresses the problem of
> epistemic violence and marginality. One of the fundamental questions is: In
> what ways have the dominant discourses (particularly emanating in the West)
> marginalized, and still marginalized, subjectivities based on skin-color,
> gender, ethnicity etc. And normatively: How to combat this marginalization?
> "The empire strikes (or writes) back," is a slogan both in the local and
> global political arena and, I believe, in ever growing pockets of the
> academia. This perspective or school of thought is present almost everywhere
> in the world, but especially in South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the
> Caribbean.
>
> Parallel with the rising voice of marginality, the salience of ethnic and
> internal conflicts all over the world has fueled interest in conflict
> research in general and the* conflict resolution* in particular. Conflict
> Resolution has been an attempt to find general methods and schemes of
> solution, develop guidelines for mediation, and/or identify universal
> processes of conflict resolution in particular societies. Bosnia and Israel,
> among others, have been the targets for the attention of such practitioners
> of conflict resolution.
>
> Why are these two perspectives brought together into the same discussion?
> First, because they share a normative concern for the same fundamental
> problem, namely the reconstruction and deconstruction of ethnic boundaries.
> Concerning Postcolonialism, there is a clear emphasis on the transformation
> or* conversion* of ethnic boundaries from boundaries of marginalization to
> boundaries for 'strategic essentialization' (Krishna, Sankaran, 1993,
> p.405). Conflict resolution approaches ethnic boundaries as crucial
> 'complications' in processes of conflict resolution and of course of prime
> importance in processes of conflict escalation. Despite the strong
> normativity in both approaches, it is crucial to bear in mind that the
> margins of the margin play a role in the conflict dynamic itself, and
> therefore, the connection; margins-conflicts-ethnic boundaries have to be
> dealt with, not only normatively but also positively.
>
>
> Secondly, the two perspectives are brought into the same discussion as an
> attempt to open a dialogue between two approaches to violence, which have so
> far largely ignored each other's existence (1)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_1_>In particular, how does one succeed in envisaging and perhaps even uplifting
> or 'un marginalizing' marginal subjects. By 'breaking the ice' between the
> two approaches to international studies, we might end up having two
> perspectives illuminating each other's blind spot, and eradicating some of
> the worst pre-perceptions and prejudice in both.
>
> *The following are empirical examples from Assam and Southern Bihar in
> India. My own experiences with the people in these two locations have
> generated the questions and the problems formulated in this paper. In both
> locations, problems associated with the marginalization of the margins have
> led to severe manifest or non-manifest social problems in which ethnic
> boundaries play a key role. In Assam, the tribal groups have slowly emerged
> as political forces after independence, asserting their demands towards
> regional and central authorities. The modern history of Assam illustrates
> the problem of locating or territorializing the marginalized space when
> elite groups claim the status as 'sons of the soil.' In Southern Bihar, a
> marginalized region in itself, ethnic boundaries cut across relations of
> dominance, thereby complicating the relation between the two phenomena* .
>
>
>
> *Ethnic Boundaries*
>
> Ethnic boundaries, a concept borrowed from Fredrik Barth (Barth, 1982
> (1969)), are best understood as cognitive or mental boundaries situated in
> the minds of people and are the result of collective efforts of construction
> and maintenance. Ethnic boundaries dichotomize insiders from outsiders--'us'
> from 'them.' Katherine Verdery's summarizes Barth on this point:
>
> The roots of [ethnicity as an] organizational form are not in the*cultural content
> * associated with ethnic identities but rather in the fact of their*dichotomization
> * -- the presence of boundaries separating groups. This shifts the
> emphasis from seemingly 'objective' cultural traits to behavior (including
> 'cultural' behavior) that is socially effective in maintaining group
> boundaries (Verdery, 1994, in Vermeulen & Govers, 1994, p. 35).
>
> There are, in other words, neither objective ethnic boundaries nor
> objective ethnic groups or identities.(2)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_2_>
>
> Furthermore, ethnic boundaries are open to multiple individual perceptions
> and interpretations. No wonder that hard social sciences like International
> Relations, until recently, have turned a blind eye to these phenomena. Only
> the political significance within the last few decades and the subsequent
> demand for explanation and comprehension have pushed these phenomena into
> the limelight of social science.
>
> Ethnic boundaries are means to create order. They are means of social
> navigation in a social space comparable with the geographical map meant for
> navigation in our physical environment. This knowledge of a social universe
> is passed on through processes of learning from one generation to another or
> through other channels of communication, simultaneously attaching cultural
> values and features to what appears as an 'inside' and an 'outside.' Seen
> from the perspective of a certain individual, the ethnic boundary is the
> result of a cognitive* reconstruction* that separates 'us' from 'them.'
> Ethnic boundaries are thus social constructions and reconstructions mostly
> made peacefully in interaction between individuals.
>
> This rather 'apolitical' definition of ethnic boundaries is challenged, or
> rather complemented, by a political approach that reveals that ethnic
> boundaries, and the cultural stuff which they contain, are not only
> negotiable, but also contested. This is close to the postcolonial approach
> in which ethnic boundaries are determined by the dominant discourse. The
> knowledge about ethnic boundaries are carried on via the older generation,
> the school, the mass media, and the state, or in short, those who have the
> power to define the ethnic boundary towards the marginal, and even to define
> what the marginal is like, i.e. to fill the image of the marginal with
> cultural content. The postcolonial normative approach would, as already
> mentioned, by a very simplistic description advocate the* conversion* of
> these marginalizing ethnic boundaries into boundaries of 'strategic
> essentialization' and as a means of resistance against marginalization. On
> the contrary, in a conflict resolution approach, ethnic boundaries would be
> assessed as obstacles to conflict resolutions; as an element of stereotyping
> the enemy, and putting barriers of effective communication, and thereby to
> get a false comprehension of what is actually and rationally going on (
> e.g-79). Ethnic boundaries are therefore in need of* deconstruction.* In
> the following discussion, conversion and deconstruction will form the core
> concepts, or 'lenses' through which ethnic boundaries will be illuminated.
>
>
>
> *Postcolonialism and Conflict Resolution*
>
> Both the postcolonial and the conflict resolution approaches have a strong
> normative element, as they attempt to target the problem of
> violence-although with emphasis on different aspects of violence. In a
> Postcolonial perspective, the prime evil appears to be the epistemic
> violence committed by the dominant discourse over the marginal. The dominant
> Western discourse has wrested the marginalized of even their ability to
> conceptualize themselves as people with their own history, future, dignity
> and self-respect. Conflict resolution is, before anything else, a method to
> alleviate further violence, and then open direct violence. This is not to
> say that structural violence is not a matter of concern in conflict
> resolution. (Johan & Höivik, Tord, 1971, p. 73-76) However war, as the
> ultimate exercise of direct violence, is without doubt also the ultimate
> form of conflict to resolve and avoid.
>
> More specifically, the two perspectives have rather different approaches
> to ethno-national boundaries. The postcolonial normative approach would, as
> already mentioned, by a very simplistic description advocate the*conversion
> * of these marginalizing ethnic boundaries into boundaries of 'strategic
> essentialization' and as a means of resistance against marginalization. In a
> conflict resolution approach, on the contrary, ethnic boundaries would be
> assessed as obstacles to conflict resolutions by stereotyping the enemy and
> putting up barriers of effective communication, thereby creating a false
> image of what is actually and rationally going on (Burton, 1990, p.78-79).
> Ethnic boundaries are therefore in need of* deconstruction.* In the
> following discussion, conversion and deconstruction will form the core
> concepts, or 'lenses' through which ethnic boundaries will be illuminated.
>
> Postcolonialism and conflict resolution could be seen as very different
> approaches, and they are indeed, but it should not be forgotten that both
> have roots in a critique of the same dominant discourses. Conflict
> resolution emerged as a critique from inside the Western society,
> challenging established institutions of conflict management, e.g.
> juridical national and international practices and theories(3)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_3_>.
> Postcolonialism became a challenge from outside, as the Oriental, the
> subaltern and the marginal began to speak or write back to the dominant
> West, challenging imperial and colonial discourses.
>
> On some locations the political practices derived from these two
> approaches are hidden and acted out silently under the surface. However,
> nowhere is the dynamic between them more apparent than in the recent
> so-called peace process in Israel/Palestine. The conflict resolution
> practitioners have until recently had the advantaged position, bringing the
> Israeli and Palestinian elite to peace talks and institutionalizing
> cooperation between the two parties. Recently, however, postcolonialists
> have raised their voices and are about to take the lead, pushing the
> peace-process back. The conflicts is not, at least for the moment, between
> the Palestinians and the Israelis or the Muslims and the Jews. It is instead
> between those in favor of working out ways to make ethnic boundaries less
> politically explosive, and those who want to politicize the boundaries
> further. In the former case, the end of conflict is the prime goal, in the
> latter the focus is on marginalization.
>
> Before we enter into a discussion of the two approaches to ethnic
> boundaries, it should be clear that none of them are as coherent and fixed
> as they will appear below. It is inevitable to generalize and leave out
> certain nuances and aspects which are important for those who have brought
> them forward or those who believe that they are inseparable parts of each
> tradition. However, the aim here is to use these two approaches as rather
> focused 'spot lights' on the problem under scrutiny, not to give a just
> treatment of two perspectives and their founding parents.
>
>
>
> *Postcolonialism and the Conversion of Ethnic Boundaries*
>
> In the vast literature on Postcolonialism, it is described as a project, a
> discourse, an ideology, a text/narrative, a trend or a variety of these
> concepts in the same text (Prakash, 1995, Introduction). To me, none of
> these features can be carved out of the composite nature of Postcolonialism.
> That Postcolonialism will appear as an approach in the following text, does
> not mean that the other facets are left out. In fact, the postcolonial
> approach is the most open-ended of the two perspectives probably due to the
> fact that it spans almost every humanist and social science and it has as a
> consequence a very broad methodological base. Furthermore, and probably due
> to this multifaceted character, Postcolonialism has within it a strong sense
> of self criticism. To fix a certain standpoint in this approach is
> therefore, to use the conceptual framework within the approach itself, to
> use 'epistemic violence.'
>
>
> Post-Colonialism has its origin in Literature and the study of the
> ex-colonial novel. The task has been to expose the subordinate
> representation of the colonized by the colonizers. The focus on text
> indicates a strong linkage with post-modernism and the difference between
> the two is not always clear. However, Postcolonialism, at least in the form
> it is presented here, is political and normative while post-modernism, at
> least in its most relativist form, is not.
>
> [In] the core of the discourse, is a focus on the relations of domination
> and resistance and the effect they have had on identity, in, through, and
> beyond, the colonial encounter: the prefix 'post' is testament to the fact
> that the problems that lie at the heart of the colonializer-colonized
> relationship are seen to persist beyond colonialism. The importance of
> reinterpreting the colonial experience is relevant to contemporary identity.
> In the process of resistance, the native voice is repositioned and empowered
> (Darby & Paolini, 1994, p.375).
>
> The post-colonial approach calls for revival and politicization of the
> marginalized's subjectivities. One of the main questions is "how does one
> construct provisional and strategically essentialized subjectivities to
> enable a progressive politics" (Krishna, 1993, p.405). The marginalized
> are not only supposed to deconstructed dominant hegemonic discourse, but to
> subvert boundaries from the 'bottom up' and transform the cultural 'stuff'
> which these boundaries enclose. This is problematic in terms of localizing
> the marginalized space and when we consider the problem of marginalization
> by the marginalized. These are of course central issues for further
> discussion below.
>
> In India, the postcolonial discourse has had a long history which in fact
> dates back to figures like Tagore, but the most prominent is of course
> Mahatma Gandhi. He advocated a resistance which was asserted as an Indian
> alternative to Western colonialism. Gandhi in fact illustrates the
> difficulties-and challenges-within Postcolonialism. It is both a category of
> political movements around the world ( e.g. Gandhian movements) and an
> highly sophisticated academic approach (e.g. Gandhiism). It is, in other
> words, both theory and practice, which is a strength, but also poses
> problems of getting ideas, views, and norms across between practitioners and
> theorists. More concretely, the assessment of the central issues here,
> namely violence, ethnic boundaries, and marginality, differs considerably
> between these two positions. Violent chauvinism, marginalizing the margins
> of the margin might be 'a price worth paying' for the practitioner, whereas
> this is likely to be normatively unacceptable to the theorist far from*realpolitik
> *.(4) <http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_4_>
>
>
>
> *Conflict Resolution and the Deconstruction of Ethnic Boundaries*
>
> The other strand of research will be called* conflict resolution*. It is
> basically an array of theories of conflicts combined with a variety of
> techniques and methods to solve or manage conflicts. (5)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_5_>However, such characteristics neglect the recent development within the
> field, where conflict resolution has developed into an academic discipline
> and a rather coherent school of discussion and debate. And even though it
> lacks a coherent theoretical base, it has emerged as a discipline in
> colleges and universities around the world. A great number of scholars are
> now theorizing about conflicts and conflicts resolution creating a body of
> literature which now forms an embryonic approach to conflict and conflict
> resolution ( e.g. Scimecca, J.A., p.19 and 33).
>
> Conflict resolution is a vast field with a variety of methodological
> approaches. The common normative approach, though, is that conflicts should
> be solved in an orderly (following certain methods) and peaceful way.
> Peaceful here could mean anything from absence of direct violence or threat
> of violence, to the creation of a certain desirable and non-violent regime.
> Conflict resolution is, first of all, advocating a non-violent ideology. It
> basically advocates the alleviation of violence and then pushes for the
> development and allocation of conflict solving methods and development of
> institutions geared toward conflict management. For the Postcolonials
> violence is not necessarily a major problem. Frans Fanon, one of the strong
> influences in the post-colonial discourse, has put it this way: "At the
> level of the individuals, violence is a cleansing force; it forces the
> native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it
> makes him fearless and restores his self-respect" (Fanon, 1967, p.94).
>
>
> In relation to conflict resolution, this is not just a very different view
> of violence, but also of its psychological function. Within conflict
> resolution direct physical violence is seen as the highest stage of conflict
> escalation and a result of 'more unconscious and subconscious forces.' (6)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_6_>It is not far to interpret conflicts as a social relation which in fact
> describes a transformation from rationality and reason to irrationality and
> intuition. And a postcolonial critic would probably add: from Western to
> Non-western.
>
> If we for a moment separate the field into the two influential fields of
> Game theory and Human needs theory, it is clear that the former has taken
> the ethnic boundaries as communication barriers, which have to be broken
> down in order to envisage the position of the opponent. Game theory is
> insensitive to cultural differences and the unequal distribution of power.
> Therefore it tells us little about the problems outlined above. (7)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_7_>
>
> It is of course disputable whether conflict resolution advocates the
> deconstruction of ethnic boundaries. What about Human needs theory? One of
> the most influential scholars in this conflict resolution approach is
> undoubtedly John Burton, who belong to the so called London School within
> the field of conflict resolution. In his monumental work,* Conflict
> Resolution and Provention,* he "seeks to provide a framework for
> consideration of theory and practice in conflict resolution and provention."
> (Burton, 1990, p.x). He makes a distinction between disputes which "are an
> integral part of a competitive society; and conflicts which are deep-rooted
> in human needs." (Ibid., p.1). The need of identity somehow presupposes
> the reconstruction of ethnic boundaries. According to Burton, we* need* to
> have an identity and that implies ethnic boundaries. However, the boundary
> is supposed to be inclusive and not exclusive and discriminatory. Burton has
> also explained his key concept, 'Conflict* Pro*vention,' in a way which
> prevents boundaries from becoming politicized barriers. "The term* pre*vention
> has the connotation of containment. The term* pro*vention has been
> introduced to signify taking steps to remove a source of conflict, and more
> positively to promote conditions in which collaborative and valued
> relationships control behavior" (Ibid., p.* v* ).
>
> That is to enhance communication between conflicting parties. This is to
> say that people are not supposed to give up their personal and collective
> identification, but they are not supposed to be utilized as a political
> tool; ethnic boundaries are not to be subverted and strategically
> essentialized. The relation between the concepts of boundaries and needs of
> identity is objective and apolitical (Ibid., p.39f. ).
>
> If ontological needs exist it follows that the traditional belief that
> politics is subjective is false. It is this discovery, this deduction, that
> is the core of the contemporary shift in thought. Politics can no longer be
> justified as arbitrary, determined by ideologies and interests. It is
> possible to assess 'isms, leadership and systems generally by reference to
> these needs. We can predict the consequences of politics. (Ibid., p.117.)
>
> Burton's point here is that politics* in fact* is objective in its cause
> and development. We can assume that conflicts and even their resolution
> follow the same trajectory. Conflict resolution has had a tendency to slip
> into the grand theorizing about the universal causes and solutions to
> conflicts. (8) <http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_8_> The
> human needs approach accentuates where conflicts derives from the
> frustration of basic human needs. According to Burton, politics is not a
> subjective realm, but a realm open for negotiation between parties with at
> least theoretical ability to use reason and calculation in assessment of
> human needs. There are two problems with this theory.
>
> Human needs, like for instance the need for identity, is not an objective
> force which has a certain influence on politics. Human needs are experienced
> as well as expressed through cultural lenses and effected by relations of
> power. Burton argues that conflicts deriving from the frustration of the
> need of identity, are often to be found in so called multi-ethnic societies
> (Edward E. Azar's makes a similar point. Azar, 1990). For the postcolonials,
> marginalized human beings act in conflicts because they are deprived of
> their subjective rights which are theirs and realized by them. Furthermore,
> how is the need for identity satisfied and when is it frustrated? Is the
> need of identity frustrated when people almost never express their group
> belonging, because their social environment is indifferent to it, and is it
> satisfied when people for generations have been marginalized by the
> reconstruction of ethnic boundaries,* ascribing* an identity onto them?
> Does the frustration of human needs in the margins of the margin lead to
> conflicts at all, and if so, can they be handled the same way as 'other'
> conflicts? We will have reason to return to these last questions. The must
> fundamental question is of course, could the need of identity be satisfied
> by identifying with humanity?
>
>
>
> *Ethnic Boundaries and Marginality*
>
> The theoretical connection between ethnic boundaries and marginality can
> be developed in two steps. First, the connection between ethnic boundaries
> and marginality has to do with the exercise of power and culture. Culture
> indicates not only what is right or wrong but also who has the right to
> decide in these matters. Those who are deprived of the right, at least in
> relation to the dominant, we can call marginal. A great deal of the
> post-colonial literature deals with the colonial power to define a discourse
> in which the subjugated people were fixed into categories of races, castes,
> religions or tribes, creating a tidy map to conquer and control. Timothy
> Mitchell argues in a citation in Philip Darby and A.J. Paolini's essay:
>
> modern colonialism was constructed upon a vastly increased power of
> representation, a power that made possible an unprecedented fixing and
> policing of boundaries; an unprecedented power of portraying what lay
> 'outside.' Power is determined not so much by obvious recourse disparities,
> but by the ability of the colonial order to establish an absolute boundary
> between the West and the non-West, the modern and the past, order and
> disorder, self and other (Darby & Paolini, 1994, p.375).
>
> Power is the ability to construct a social boundary in this post-colonial
> view. Secondly, we can imagine that a boundary has a marginal zone, a place
> which is neither inside, nor outside. It is a socially constructed human 'no
> mans land' in which 'we' have located people (real or imagined) who are
> neither 'we' nor 'them', they are rather a subjugated subjectivity, which is
> a negation of 'we'. Why? Because they are needed as a permanent instrument
> of locating 'we' in relation to 'them', and tell us who 'we' are (culture),
> what are 'our' rights (politics), and what belongs to 'us' (economics) and
> so forth. Often, this space 'in-between'* is* the margins of the margin.
> The tribal population in India has in many places had that function during
> centuries. Living either* among* the dominant caste Hindu's or at the*fringes
> * of their settlements, they constitute the marginal which is in many
> places effectively silenced.
>
> The interesting thing to note is that there is no definite beginnings or
> ends to the marginal, and similarly there is no definite marginalized space
> which is totally without power. The margin is, in other words, a diffuse
> entity which can contain almost everything which is not commonly held as
> dominant in a specific setting and at a certain point in time. Or again in
> other words, the localization of the margin depends on the location of the
> observer. Being in the margin there is always space which is more
> marginalized and silenced, and, equally important, more dominant space.
>
> The pitfalls in the conversion and reconstruction of ethnic boundaries are
> many and sometimes even violently disastrous in relation to the margins of
> the margin. The construction of ethnic boundaries could be perceived as an
> act of violence in the sense that they are forced on individuals for whom
> these divisions are incongruent with their personal perception of social
> boundaries and thereby marginalized these individuals; i.e. they are
> marginalized by the marginalized.
>
>
>
> *Problems of Conversion and Deconstruction*
>
> The two realms of problems concerning conversion and deconstruction of
> ethnic boundaries which will be sketched out below, basically points to the
> problems of normativity in the postcolonial and conflict resolution
> approaches. But even more basically, they point to the connection between
> the soft sciences and political action; between theory and practice. Can we
> transform theoretical ideas, results and conclusion into political action
> and, at the same time, be observant from various political standpoints,
> especially toward those whom are so marginal that they are practically
> silenced?
>
>
>
> *Where is the Margins of the Margin in Assam?*
>
> *How can we possibly locate a marginal space? In the global society, the
> potentials for group formations and hence the conversion of ethnic
> boundaries are many, and these possibilities are often described as ethnic
> segmentation or stratification (ethnic levels), or in the post-colonial
> debate, as a power hierarchy. With such metaphors in mind, the postcolonial
> concern is to chose the right level in order to make the dominant discourse
> visible, subvert it, and eventually fight it. With this strategy, we might
> end up repressing the other marginalized groups or the marginalized of the
> marginalized groups. In that case, the strategy is no longer conversion of
> ethnic boundaries, but rather shift of positions from marginal to
> dominant. However, this distinction is not very easy to make for two
> reasons.*
>
>
> *First, it is not easy to locate a marginalized space. A marginalized
> space always contains even more severely marginalized spaces, which might
> however seem too 'small' or 'weak' for political mobilization. Consequently
> these subgroups are not only neglected, but also forced into a political
> project which they might not want to be part of, or at least against their
> interests. Localization is, in other words, important. Secondly, this space
> changes location, disappears, and appears depending on a variety of factors.
> We can not be sure that either the ethnic boundaries or the rationale behind
> their construction and reconstruction will persist, although one important
> part in boundary making is to make them appear as eternal.*
>
> *There are several examples to illustrate these problems of location andshift of positions.
> In the state of Assam in Northeast India, the Assamese elite started in the
> middle of the 19th century, to create an Assamese identity in contrast first
> of all to the dominant Bengali identity. By the advent of colonization in
> the 1820s, the Assamese nobility was removed from the apex of power,
> deprived of their former privileges, and Bengali was declared the official
> language of the province. The Bengali minority moving into the region was
> apparently successful in constructing a boundary towards the Assamese
> majority. Slowly a mixture of old and new Assamese leaders succeeded in
> subverting this ethnic boundary, and by independence, they gained political
> control of a territory which covered most of present day Northeast India.
> However, after independence five new states have been carved out of the
> Assam state, and this process doesn't seem to have reached a final end.*
>
> *Soon after independence, ethnic groups began to emerge as distinct
> communities with a political will different from that of the Assamese
> majority. The Naga elite demanded independence or autonomy immediately after
> 1947. After a long violent struggle in the mountains of Northeast Lastly,
> the Bodo elite of lowland Assam are demanding an autonomous state carved out
> of the Assam, but within the Indian Union.*
>
> *This row of events could be seen as the minorities' slow awakening and
> proliferation of their ethnic boundary toward an ever louder Assamese
> identity. It is indisputable that the Assamese leadership has shifted
> positions, forcing Assamese language and customs on other groups. This is
> the major impetus for the conversion of the ethnic boundary between the
> Assamese and the tribals. Second, the 'tribal' awakening' has to do with the
> rise in education and economic power of certain segments of the tribal
> population all over Northeast India, especially after independence. Tribal
> elites have emerged and use their power to assert their subjectivity and
> claim the same rights to control a certain territory as other 'major groups'
> within the Indian Union. In that development, we of course imagine that the
> marginalized space is moving downwards. Today we will find, that certain
> tribes, and segments of the tribals have no voice at all. They have been
> practically silenced in the struggle for autonomy by relatively dominant
> groups.*
>
> *What is interesting here is that during every stage of this process,
> there are moments of conversion of dominating ethnic boundaries (upwards)andsimultaneously, silencing of marginal subjectivities,
> i.e. to avoid any 'internal' ethnic boundaries. During the independence
> struggle, all ethnic boundaries were with one exception, successfully
> repressed. During the so called Assam Movement from 1979 to 1983, the
> differences between groups in Assam were again repressed in the struggle of
> the 'sons of the soil' against the 'foreigners,' mainly Bengali immigrants.
> In that movement, which was extremely violent, most of the casualties were
> found among the lowland tribal population,* *(9)*<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_9_>
> * which today are demanding an autonomous Bodo-land.*
>
> *An important aspect to lift to the fore here is that ethnic boundaries
> almost never fit with the 'boundaries of marginality.' The class aspect
> should be brought in here. What is appearing in the Assamese context is a
> new Bengali marginalized group facing the anger of an Assamese majority
> against an historically dominant Bengali upper and middle class. These
> Bengalis are poor peasants fleeing the densely populated Bangladesh and are
> now trying their luck in Assam as in other places in India. How should this
> marginal Bengali group subvert the ethnic boundary which keeps them mired in
> marginality? Furthermore, the conversion and reconstruction of ethnic
> boundaries depends on the power to convert and reconstruct, and that appears
> to be in the hands of the elites. But sufficient power never enters the
> margins of the margin, where groups are marginalized by the marginalized in
> the process of subverting the ethnic boundaries of domination.*
>
>
> *The fate of the Bengalis in Assam is shared with a great deal of Brahmins
> in Northern India. Now the numerous so-called 'backward castes' are, by
> democratic means, taking to power, and using it violently against their
> former high caste oppressors. Upper castes like Brahmins are however, a
> socio-economically very diversified group from rich to deeply poor. The
> latter are the victims of the newly born postcolonial politics now as they
> face the conversion of the caste boundary which has kept the lower castes in
> marginality for centuries.*
>
> *Who is marginalizing whom and for what purpose is a question to which I
> will return soon. At this stage, it should be clear that ethnic boundaries
> are a political means, some would say a weapon, whose use of stereotyping
> and homogenization lead to violent effects, both direct and epistemically,
> on the margins of the margin.*
>
>
>
> *Do the Margins of the Margin have a Voice in Southern Bihar?*
>
> The major handicap for the margins of the margin is not merely economic
> deprivation, but the fact that they have no voice to put forward their
> demands. 'The subaltern cannot speak.' (Spivak, 1994, p.104 ). This fact
> is a serious challenge to the conflict resolution approach, as it
> presupposes that there are parties involved in a conflict. To practice
> conflict resolution or management presupposes the existence of parties who
> can negotiate, and enter processes of conflict resolution (See e.g.
> Wallensteen, Peter, 1994, p. 5, 59). I have not heard (!) but I could
> imagine, that there are subjectivities in Bosnia and Israel Palestine which
> are not present or represented at the negotiation tables and are also
> neglected in the many NGO's which have some political influence in this
> conflict. Similarly in India, there are subjectivities which are generated
> by neither party nor in the political institutions of the conflict.
>
> In Southern Bihar, we find a population of mixed tribes and caste-Hindus.
> It is a poor area, with all the severity of poverty, and with all social
> indicators pointing low. People have since the colonial era learned to
> mistrust authorities in many other places including what is commonly known
> as the 'tribal belt' in Central India. Although the phenomenon of the
> margins of the margin is as evident here as in Northeast India, there is a
> common perception that whatever comes 'from above' is of evil. This
> perception is held by many from school teachers to forest and police
> officials. Furthermore there is little in the present developments which
> have changed that image of power and its institutions.
>
> When I visited a village in the Ranchi district in Southern Bihar in 1994
> and again in 1995, I learned that the villagers had had the opportunity to
> elect one of their own to the village council, the Panchayat, which is an
> elected body presiding over 4-5 villages. This election took place in 1984
> and should have been held again in 1989. But different political interests
> on the state level had postponed the election for years. The official reason
> was not known to the villagers, but their own perceptions were clear, namely
> that the people with power were not interested in hearing their voice.
> However, their elected Mukia, or headman in the Panchayat, might have been
> able to voice their demands and rights. Unfortunately, he and his family had
> long ago lost the contact with the villagers. He had settled in the town of
> Ranchi, and was now leading a life totally different from that of his former
> fellows. He had crossed over from, not the ethnic boundary, but a backward
> community to which he belonged into the political establishment.
> Politicians, despite ethnic and ideological differences, have a lot in
> common in terms of culture and interests.
>
> Could the margins of the margin raise their voice and appear as a subject
> or a party in the public media, and thereby start that conflict through
> which they should express their frustrated needs? That would require basic
> reading and writing skills which the villagers in Southern Bihar do not
> possess. The following short story, told to me on a train ride from Calcutta
> to McCluskieganj in Southern Bihar in 1995, illustrates this point. I was
> told by a school teacher that he had not been teaching in his one-man school
> in a remote tribal area for six month. He had not even been there. His own
> explanation was that it was too far away from his home. The school master
> was turning his blind eye to this apparent case of fraught, as long as he
> received ten percent of the teacher's salary. Now I asked about the fate of
> the children as they apparently were deprived of their education. With a
> slight surprise in his face, the teacher answered: "The children? They are
> tribals! They cannot learn much anyway."
>
>
> There are of course other political forces which offer themselves as
> representatives to the margins of the margin in Southern Bihar. During my
> visit in 1995, the Naxalite guerrillas had settled in the area. They are a
> Maoist group who are fighting a war against the Indian government and larger
> landholders located primarily in Central and Eastern India. As a guerrilla
> group they are totally dependent on the support of the villagers wherever
> they settle. When I arrived in 1995, the situation was tense and people were
> scared. The newspaper told about the violent conflict between the Naxalites
> and the government/police. Descriptions of the detailed battles between the
> two parties were followed by the government and police officials view on the
> matter. None of the newspapers contained a single word expressed by the
> villagers from any part of the area. That the villagers were a party, and
> the losing party, was not mentioned anywhere, not even between the lines.
>
> The fact was that in the village I described above, most of the young men
> had fled, to avoid recruitment by the guerrilla forces or, in the
> alternative, to be accused by the police for being guerrilla soldiers. A
> nearby village was totally deserted.
>
> Means of conflict resolution in the present conflict in Southern Bihar
> would perhaps include the government, the locally elected politicians, the
> guerrillas, the trade Unions and so on, but the margins of the margin would
> certainly be left out. And even if they were invited vors due to a deep and
> perfectly rational mistrust of authority. To put it a bit harshly; there is
> no conflict at all in Southern Bihar, simply because there are no
> representatives of the marginalized, among whom we might expect to find
> those with frustrated human needs.
>
> The question arises of course: Could they subvert the boundaries which
> keep them in their marginal position? Unfortunately, their identity as Yadav
> (a so called backward caste), Munda, and Orao, is already subverted by
> 'their own' elites in their struggle against the high castes. These elites
> are now controlling political bodies. The present Chief Minister of Bihar is
> a Yadav and his political power rests on his caste identity. He and the new
> 'backward caste elite' have succeeded in subverting the ethnic boundary
> which once held them in backwardness, and now use this very boundary both as
> a means to mobilize sufficient political support* and* to marginalized
> 'his own caste' (sic.). Again we have a case of shifting positions.
>
>
>
> *Conclusion*
>
> It is impossible to assess ethnic boundaries* per se*, in terms of
> advantages for the margins of the margin. The postcolonial attempt to
> subvert them into political means of resistance does not eradicate the
> phenomenon of marginality. Politicized ethnic boundaries have the tendency
> of dichotomization and hence the use of violence--epistemic or
> direct--towards whatever is different 'inside' or 'outside'. Sankaran
> Krishna has put it this way:
>
> I would like to begin by pointing out the irony that it is precisely the
> greatest victims of the West's essentialist conceits (the ex-colonials and
> neocolonials, Blacks, women, and so forth) that are articulating a need for
> new strategic essentialisms (Krishna, S., 1993, p.405).
>
> The line between conversion and shifting positions of domination is not
> easy to draw in concrete situations.(10)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_10_>There is a risk that the postcolonial strategic essentialism is just a
> replication of dominance on a different level and in a different context,
> and that marginality is, as already indicated, an inescapable part of the
> construction of ethnic boundaries. Ethnic boundaries may be, to put it
> perhaps too harshly, a mere means of dominance and violence. As Foucault
> warns:
>
> one can perfectly well conceive of revolution which leave essentially
> untouched the power relations which form the basis for the functioning of
> the state As soon as one endeavors to* detach power with its techniques
> and procedures* from the form of law within which it has been
> theoretically confined up until now, one is driven to ask this basic
> question:* isn't power simply a form of warlike domination?* (Foucault,
> 1980, p.123, my emphasis).
>
>
> Resistance in the form of strategic essentialization, and hence the
> conversion of ethnic boundaries could be seen as a replication of the*techniques and procedures
> * of power. Ethnic boundaries are then an inseparable part of the essence
> of the dominant, which in the contemporary inter-state system, rests on the
> idea of the nation-state as it is outlined in the introduction. Power,
> according to the imperative of the modern inter-state system derives from
> the ability to produce congruity between ethnic/national boundaries and
> political border. To make these two entities, i.e. the territory and the
> nation, coincide, is not only a violent, but also an impossible task which
> underscores the irony of the modern state.(11)<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/jorgens.html#N_11_>The case of Assam has given some indications of this irony, which also
> question the conversion of ethnic boundaries as a long term political
> strategy. In a longer perspective we might prefer to develop more
> sustainable social forms of interaction. This is actually one of the main
> concerns in the conflict resolution perspective.
>
> There are also pitfalls in the conflict resolution approach--pitfalls
> which the Bihari example, in part, demonstrated. One such pitfall is the
> common task of deconstructing the boundaries by identifying parties to
> represent sides of the conflict and bring them into processes of negotiation
> and conflict resolution. In Bihar, the problem would be to identify the
> parties and especially the margins of the margin. Not even the democratic
> institutions are, in their present form, sufficient as means through which
> conflicts can be handled and solved. Presently, such institutions rest on
> the relations of power, and the ability of one party to silence another.
>
> To realize that parties in a conflict do not necessarily earn the
> voluntary support of the group they claim to represent is a major challenge
> to the conflict resolution approach. The Northeastern problem of 'state'-
> building would probably have developed differently if the Indian government
> had been aware of the impossible principle of one tribe-one-state. A more
> fruitful strategy, might have been to transcend the ethnic boundaries and
> demands put forward by different parties. Such an endeavor could have
> envisaged the margins of the margin before they got suppressed and silenced
> effectively by 'strategic essentialism.' In Bihar, the social tensions are
> to a large extent swept under the carpet for the moment because the margins
> of the margin are not heard. For Conflict resolution practitioners, one of
> the main challenges ahead is to comprehend the meaning and effect of
> marginality in conflicts as well as in processes of conflict resolution.
>
> However, at least some of the intentions in the conflict resolution
> approach should be considered in relation to the margins of the margin.
> First of all, the primary goal is to avoid direct violence. This does not
> prevent political struggles, but it marks a clear standpoint -- that human
> life should not be sacrificed for the sake of a better society for the
> living. Secondly, the conflict resolution approach implies the will to find
> channels of communication; building bridges. This is important especially if
> methods are developed to raise the voice of the margins of the margin. The
> challenge is probably not to* give* a voice to a silenced party, but to
> create conditions and institutions through which the margins of the margin
> can speak. The obstacle so far has been universalism and insensitivity to
> culture, particularity, and power. Power has not only a direct impact on
> conflicts between the state and minorities, but on the very ability to speak
> and thereby to become visible in conflict resolution processes and political
> institutions. The two perspectives under scrutiny here, have in other words,
> a lot to contribute with to a more coherent perspective on political ethnic
> boundaries, violence, and marginality.
>
>
>
> *Notes*
>
> 1. For an an exception see Avruch, et al (eds.),1991.
>
> 2. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen has pointed out, the most serious, and
> perhaps common, pitfall in the study of ethnicity and nationalism is that of
> reification. (Eriksen, 1993). The fluidity of ethnic boundaries is described
> by Igor Kopytoff in the initial quote above.
>
>
> 3. As Joseph A Scimecca writes: " conflict resolution was born in a time
> of questioning whether traditional legal authority served the needs of
> people or supported a status quo that reinforced social and political
> inequality. [It was] a challenge to traditional authority, questioning of
> top-down, centralized decision making. the "power paradigm" was challenged
> via the notion that human beings seek to fulfil their basic human needs
> rather than always seeking power and material interests", (Scimecca, 1991,
> p.20).
>
> 4. Gandhi's and the Congress' handling of the so-called indigo-riots in
> 1917 and other similar social conflicts in Bihar clearly indicates that the
> lower castes were submerged under the principal conflict between the
> Congress and the British Empire. This is not to say that lower castes were
> not a crucial political weapon, but this weapon was firmly laid in the hands
> of the dominant castes. See (Frankel, 1989).
>
> 5. The conflict resolution literature range from texts on the human nature
> and the undiscovered conflict resolution potentials in human beings to
> concrete guidelines for intervention. (See e.g. Parry, 1991). At the other
> end of the spectra (Azar, 1990). There are also examples of invention of a
> new rational 'grammar' with the aim to render communication transparent in
> conflict situations and in everyday life (see e.g. Rosenberg, 1983).
>
> 6. Glasl has, among other, developed a stage model of conflict escalation
> and resolution (Glasl, 1982).
>
> 7. Ashis Nandy rightly observes "that the oppressed, when faced with
> problems of survival, had no obligation to follow any model or rules of the
> game." (Nandy, 1987, p.121).
>
> 8. For a broader discussion of the rationale perspective in conflict
> resolution see also Wallensteen, 1994, p.14. Also Azar, 1990, p. 42-48.
>
> 9. 5-7000 people were killed in two weeks time. (Gupta, 1984, p.2).
>
> 10. Even though G. Spivak has emphasized the heterogeneity and syncretic
> nature of the colonized and the colonizers, she does not disclaim the basic
> standpoint, that* colonizer*-*colonized* is the basic cleavage (wherever
> it emerges) and that this dynamic has to be found and the politicization
> encouraged. In that sense Spivak only points to a problem in the process of
> essentializing, but does not disclaim it. (Spivak, G., 1994).
>
> 11. The best discussion which I have come across so far is an article by
> Sankaran Krishna, (Krishna, 1994, pp.507-521).
>
>
>
> *References*
>
> Avruch, K., P. Black and J. Scimecca (Eds). 1991.* Conflict Resolution.
> Cross-Cultural Perspectives,* New York: Greenwood Press.
>
> Barth, F. (Ed.) 1982.* Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social
> Organization of Cultural Difference.* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
>
> Breckenridge, C. & Van der Veer (Eds.) 1994.*Orientalism and the
> Postcolonial Predicament. Perspectives on South Asia.* Delhi: Oxford
> University Press.
>
> Burton, J. 1990.* Conflict Resolution and Provention.* New York: Macmillan
> Press.
>
> Darby, P. & A. Paolini. 1994. "Bridging International Relations and
> Postcolonialism."* Alternatives,* Vol. 19, pp. 371-97.
>
> Eriksen, T. 1993.* Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological
> Perspectives.* London: Pluto Press.
>
> Fanon, F. 1967.* The Wretched of the Earth.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
>
> Foucault, M. 1980.* Power/Knowledge. Selected interviews and other
> writings 1972-1977.* Trans. and ed. by Colin Gordon. Hertfordshire: The
> Harvester Press Ltd.
>
> Frankel, F. 1989. "Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of the
> Brahmanical Social Order." In F. Frankel & M.S.A. Rao (Eds.),* Dominance
> and State Power in Modern India. Decline of a Social Order,* Vol 1, Delhi:
> Oxford University Press., pp.46-132
>
> Galtung, J. & T. Höivik 1971. "Structural and Direct Violence."* Journal
> of Peace Research*, Oslo, PRIO, pp. 73-76
>
> Gupta, S. 1984.* A Valley Divided,* New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Ltd.
>
> Kopytoff, I. (ed.) 1985.* The African Frontier. The Reproduction of
> Traditional African Societies.* Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
> University Press.
>
> Krishna, S. 1993. "The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on
> Critical. International Relations Theory."* Alternatives,* Vol 18, pp.
> 385-417
>
>
> ---------. 1996. "Cartographic Anxiety: Mapping the Body Politics in
> India." In Shapiro & Alker (Eds.), pp. 193-214.
>
> Nandy, A. 1987. "Cultural Frames for Social Transformation: A Credo."*Alternatives
> *, Vol. 12, pp. 113-123.
>
> Prakash, G. (ed.) 1995.* After Colonialism. Imperial Histories, and
> Postcolonial Displacement.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
>
> Scimecca, J. 1991. "Conflict Resolution in the United States: The
> Emergence of a Profession?" In Avruch, Black & Scimecca (eds.), pp.19-39.
>
> Shapiro, M. & H. Alker (eds.) 1996.* Challenging Boundaries.* University
> of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
>
> Spivak, G. 1994. "Can the Subaltern Speak?" In P.Williams & L. Chrisman,
> pp. 66-111.
>
> Verdery, K. 1994. "Ethnicity, Nationalism, and State-making. Ethnic Groups
> and Boundaries: Past and Future."' In Vermeulen, Hans, Govers, Cora (ed.),
> * The Anthropology of Ethnicity. Beyond 'Ethnic Groups and Boundaries.'*Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, pp. 33 - 58.
>
> Wallensteen, P. 1994.* Från krig till fred,* (From War to Peace). Uppsala:
> Almqvist & Wiksell Förlag AB.
>
> Weber, T. 1991.* Conflict Resolution and Ghandian Ethics.* New Delhi:
> Gandhi Peace. Foundation
>
> Williams, P. & L. Chrisman. 1994.* Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial
> Theory.* New York: Columbia University Press.
>
>
>
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